Eric Hochstein
Biographic Data
| ID | 1271310 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eric Hochstein |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eric |
| FAMILY NAME | Hochstein |
| SIGNATURE | HOCHSTEIN E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Victoria |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9741-4469 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 18 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Mechanistic Mayhem
Integration without integrated models or theories
Learning to Appreciate the Gray Areas
Anil Gupta’s Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry provides an impressive and novel account of rational justification based on conscious experience which is used as a foundation for a new theory of empiricism. In this critical notice, I argue that Gupta’s project is fascinating, but is often hampered by a lack of sufficient philosophical justification and clarity regarding some essential features of his project, as well as a lack of engagement …
How metaphysical commitments shape the study of psychological mechanisms
The study of psychological mechanisms is an interdisciplinary endeavour, requiring insights from many different domains (from electrophysiology, to psychology, to theoretical neuroscience, to computer science). In this article, I argue that philosophy plays an essential role in this interdisciplinary project, and that effective scientific study of psychological mechanisms requires that working scientists be responsible metaphysicians. This means …
When does ‘Folk Psychology’ Count as Folk Psychological
It has commonly been argued that certain types of mental descriptions, specifically those characterized in terms of propositional attitudes, are part of a folk-psychological understanding of the mind. Recently, it has also been argued that this is the case even when such descriptions are employed as part of scientific theories in domains like social psychology and comparative psychology. In this article, I argue that there is no plausible way to …
One mechanism, many models
Giving up on convergence and autonomy
Categorizing the Mental
A common view in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology is that there is an ideally correct way of categorizing the structures and operations of the mind, and that the goal of neuroscience and psychology is to find this correct categorizational scheme. Categories which cannot find a place within this correct framework ought to be eliminated from scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this general idea runs counter to produc…
One mechanism, many models
Categorizing the Mental
A common view in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology is that there is an ideally correct way of categorizing the structures and operations of the mind, and that the goal of neuroscience and psychology is to find this correct categorizational scheme. Categories which cannot find a place within this correct framework ought to be eliminated from scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this general idea runs counter to produc…
Giving up on convergence and autonomy
Integration without integrated models or theories
When does ‘Folk Psychology’ Count as Folk Psychological
It has commonly been argued that certain types of mental descriptions, specifically those characterized in terms of propositional attitudes, are part of a folk-psychological understanding of the mind. Recently, it has also been argued that this is the case even when such descriptions are employed as part of scientific theories in domains like social psychology and comparative psychology. In this article, I argue that there is no plausible way to …
One mechanism, many models
Giving up on convergence and autonomy
Categorizing the Mental
A common view in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology is that there is an ideally correct way of categorizing the structures and operations of the mind, and that the goal of neuroscience and psychology is to find this correct categorizational scheme. Categories which cannot find a place within this correct framework ought to be eliminated from scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this general idea runs counter to produc…
When does ‘Folk Psychology’ Count as Folk Psychological
It has commonly been argued that certain types of mental descriptions, specifically those characterized in terms of propositional attitudes, are part of a folk-psychological understanding of the mind. Recently, it has also been argued that this is the case even when such descriptions are employed as part of scientific theories in domains like social psychology and comparative psychology. In this article, I argue that there is no plausible way to …
How metaphysical commitments shape the study of psychological mechanisms
The study of psychological mechanisms is an interdisciplinary endeavour, requiring insights from many different domains (from electrophysiology, to psychology, to theoretical neuroscience, to computer science). In this article, I argue that philosophy plays an essential role in this interdisciplinary project, and that effective scientific study of psychological mechanisms requires that working scientists be responsible metaphysicians. This means …
Learning to Appreciate the Gray Areas
Anil Gupta’s Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry provides an impressive and novel account of rational justification based on conscious experience which is used as a foundation for a new theory of empiricism. In this critical notice, I argue that Gupta’s project is fascinating, but is often hampered by a lack of sufficient philosophical justification and clarity regarding some essential features of his project, as well as a lack of engagement …
Integration without integrated models or theories
Mechanistic Mayhem
Cognitive science (7 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Philosophy of science (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Cognition (4 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works)