Iskra Fileva
Biographic Data
| ID | 1272142 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Iskra Fileva |
| GIVEN NAMES | Iskra |
| FAMILY NAME | Fileva |
| SIGNATURE | FILEVA I |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Colorado Boulder |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4664-439X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Virtue in a time of depraved ideals
Aristotle owned slaves and held racist and misogynist views. If anyone today engaged in the same practices or held Aristotle’s views, that person would be judged harshly. However, we do not judge Aristotle particularly harshly. Should we? What standard of virtue ought we apply in judging the characters of people who lived in remote times and places? This is the question I discuss in this paper. I consider and reject several alternatives and then …
Altruism and the Boundaries of Sanity
I present a puzzle about our intuitive responses to two cases: saving another in an emergency versus donating all of one's organs to save strangers in ordinary circumstances. We have different reactions to the two types of cases. But are there morally relevant differences here, and if so, what are they
George Orwell: The Ethics of Equality
Impermissible Altruism: A Response to Pummer
I raise three problems for Pummer’s account of impermissible yet praiseworthy actions. First, Pummer does not offer a plausible account of the motives of his agents, and this presents a major obstacle to evaluating those agents’ conduct. Second, the success of his argument hinges on a problematic way of individuating actions. Finally, there is a better candidate for a type of action that is both praiseworthy and impermissible, but this candidate …
Moral Testimony and Collective Moral Governance
I suggest that a moderate version of pessimism about moral testimony succeeds. However, I claim also that all major pessimist accounts—Understanding, Affect, Virtue, and Autonomy—fail. Having argued for these claims, I propose a new pessimist alternative
The optionality of supererogatory acts is just what you think it is: A reply to Benn
The gender puzzles
What is gender and how do we know what our gender is? These are the questions I propose to answer here. I review and reject several hypotheses: gender as sex or—a more careful version of the view—as subjective experiences that arise from sexual characteristics; gender as brain configuration; and gender as a historical kind. I express sympathy with an existentialist conception of gender but argue that such a conception, even according to its propo…
You Disgust Me. Or Do You? On the Very Idea of Moral Disgust
It has been argued that so-called moral disgust is either not really moral or not really disgust. I maintain that sceptics are wrong: there is a distinct emotional response best described as ‘moral disgust’. I offer an account of its constitutive features
Just another article on Moore’s paradox, but we don’t believe that
Just another article on Moore’s paradox, but we don’t believe that
The gender puzzles
What is gender and how do we know what our gender is? These are the questions I propose to answer here. I review and reject several hypotheses: gender as sex or—a more careful version of the view—as subjective experiences that arise from sexual characteristics; gender as brain configuration; and gender as a historical kind. I express sympathy with an existentialist conception of gender but argue that such a conception, even according to its propo…
You Disgust Me. Or Do You? On the Very Idea of Moral Disgust
It has been argued that so-called moral disgust is either not really moral or not really disgust. I maintain that sceptics are wrong: there is a distinct emotional response best described as ‘moral disgust’. I offer an account of its constitutive features
The optionality of supererogatory acts is just what you think it is: A reply to Benn
Moral Testimony and Collective Moral Governance
I suggest that a moderate version of pessimism about moral testimony succeeds. However, I claim also that all major pessimist accounts—Understanding, Affect, Virtue, and Autonomy—fail. Having argued for these claims, I propose a new pessimist alternative
George Orwell: The Ethics of Equality
Impermissible Altruism: A Response to Pummer
I raise three problems for Pummer’s account of impermissible yet praiseworthy actions. First, Pummer does not offer a plausible account of the motives of his agents, and this presents a major obstacle to evaluating those agents’ conduct. Second, the success of his argument hinges on a problematic way of individuating actions. Finally, there is a better candidate for a type of action that is both praiseworthy and impermissible, but this candidate …
Virtue in a time of depraved ideals
Aristotle owned slaves and held racist and misogynist views. If anyone today engaged in the same practices or held Aristotle’s views, that person would be judged harshly. However, we do not judge Aristotle particularly harshly. Should we? What standard of virtue ought we apply in judging the characters of people who lived in remote times and places? This is the question I discuss in this paper. I consider and reject several alternatives and then …
Altruism and the Boundaries of Sanity
I present a puzzle about our intuitive responses to two cases: saving another in an emergency versus donating all of one's organs to save strangers in ordinary circumstances. We have different reactions to the two types of cases. But are there morally relevant differences here, and if so, what are they
Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (5 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Political science (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Economics (2 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (2 works) · Law (2 works)