Jeanne Peijnenburg
Biographic Data
| ID | 1272181 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jeanne Peijnenburg |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jeanne |
| FAMILY NAME | Peijnenburg |
| SIGNATURE | PEIJNENBURG J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Groningen |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9768-4979 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 26 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 18 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
A New Condition for Transitivity of Probabilistic Support
As is well known, implication is transitive but probabilistic support is not. Eells and Sober, followed by Shogenji, showed that screening off is a sufficient constraint for the transitivity of probabilistic support. Moreover, this screening off condition can be weakened without sacrificing transitivity, as was demonstrated by Suppes and later by Roche. In this paper we introduce an even weaker sufficient condition for the transitivity of probabi…
Probabilistic truth approximation and fixed points
We use the method of fixed points to describe a form of probabilistic truth approximation which we illustrate by means of three examples. We then contrast this form of probabilistic truth approximation with another, more familiar kind, where no fixed points are used. In probabilistic truth approximation with fixed points the events are dependent on one another, but in the second kind they are independent. The first form exhibits a phenomenon that…
Screening off generalized
Eells and Sober proved in 1983 that screening off is a sufficient condition for the transitivity of probabilistic causality, and in 2003 Shogenji noted that the same goes for probabilistic support. We start this paper by conjecturing that Hans Reichenbach may have been aware of this fact. Then we consider the work of Suppes and Roche, who demonstrated in 1986 and 2012 respectively that screening off can be generalized, while still being sufficien…
Probability functions, belief functions and infinite regresses
In a recent paper Ronald Meester and Timber Kerkvliet argue by example that infinite epistemic regresses have different solutions depending on whether they are analyzed with probability functions or with belief functions. Meester and Kerkvliet give two examples, each of which aims to show that an analysis based on belief functions yields a different numerical outcome for the agent’s degree of rational belief than one based on probability function…
Till at last there remain nothing”
In A Treatise of Human Nature , David Hume presents an argument according to which all knowledge reduces to probability, and all probability reduces to nothing. Many have criticized this argument, while others find nothing wrong with it. In this paper we explain that the argument is invalid as it stands, but for different reasons than have been hitherto acknowledged. Once the argument is repaired, it becomes clear that there is indeed something t…
Introduction to the special issue on epistemic justification
In August 2015 the Faculty of Philosophy in Groningen hosted JustGroningen, a three-day conference on epistemic justification. The event was funded by the Netherlands Organisation of Scientific Research (NWO) as part of a project on infinite regresses in epistemology in which both of us are involved (Project Number 360-20-280). The present special issue sprang from this conference. It contains some papers that were presented there together with s…
Infinite regress in decision theory, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology
Transitivity and Partial Screening Off
The notion of probabilistic support is beset by well‐known problems. In this paper we add a new one to the list: the problem of transitivity. T omoji S hogenji has shown that positive probabilistic support, or confirmation, is transitive under the condition of screening off. However, under that same condition negative probabilistic support, or disconfirmation, is intransitive. Since there are many situations in which disconfirmation is transitive…
The Emergence of Justification
A major objection to epistemic infinitism is that it seems to make justification impossible. For if there is an infinite chain of reasons, each receiving its justification from its neighbour, then there is no justification to inherit in the first place. Some have argued that the objection arises from misunderstanding the character of justification. Justification is not something that one reason inherits from another; rather it gradually emerges f…
A case of confusing probability and confirmation
Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coherentists are, under certain conditions, committed to the conjunction fallacy. Stoneham considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no conjunction fallacy has been committed
Introduction to the Special Issue
Grounds and limits
From 1929 onwards, C. I. Lewis defended the foundationalist claim that judgements of the form ‘ x is probable’ only make sense if one assumes there to be a ground y that is certain (where x and y may be beliefs, propositions, or events). Without this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability of x could not be anything other than zero. Hans Reichenbach repeatedly contested Lewis’s idea, calling it “a remnant of rationalism”. The last move in this …
How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses
Could some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it might, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further, we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence
Probability all the Way Up
Probability without certainty
Cognitive Structures in Scientific Inquiry
Galileo and prior philosophy
Probability as a Theory Dependent Concept
The Emergence of Justification
A major objection to epistemic infinitism is that it seems to make justification impossible. For if there is an infinite chain of reasons, each receiving its justification from its neighbour, then there is no justification to inherit in the first place. Some have argued that the objection arises from misunderstanding the character of justification. Justification is not something that one reason inherits from another; rather it gradually emerges f…
How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses
Could some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it might, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further, we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence
Grounds and limits
From 1929 onwards, C. I. Lewis defended the foundationalist claim that judgements of the form ‘ x is probable’ only make sense if one assumes there to be a ground y that is certain (where x and y may be beliefs, propositions, or events). Without this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability of x could not be anything other than zero. Hans Reichenbach repeatedly contested Lewis’s idea, calling it “a remnant of rationalism”. The last move in this …
Galileo and prior philosophy
Probability without certainty
Screening off generalized
Eells and Sober proved in 1983 that screening off is a sufficient condition for the transitivity of probabilistic causality, and in 2003 Shogenji noted that the same goes for probabilistic support. We start this paper by conjecturing that Hans Reichenbach may have been aware of this fact. Then we consider the work of Suppes and Roche, who demonstrated in 1986 and 2012 respectively that screening off can be generalized, while still being sufficien…
Probability as a Theory Dependent Concept
Probability as a Theory Dependent Concept
Galileo and prior philosophy
Cognitive Structures in Scientific Inquiry
Probability all the Way Up
Probability without certainty
How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses
Could some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it might, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further, we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence
Grounds and limits
From 1929 onwards, C. I. Lewis defended the foundationalist claim that judgements of the form ‘ x is probable’ only make sense if one assumes there to be a ground y that is certain (where x and y may be beliefs, propositions, or events). Without this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability of x could not be anything other than zero. Hans Reichenbach repeatedly contested Lewis’s idea, calling it “a remnant of rationalism”. The last move in this …
A case of confusing probability and confirmation
Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coherentists are, under certain conditions, committed to the conjunction fallacy. Stoneham considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no conjunction fallacy has been committed
Introduction to the Special Issue
Transitivity and Partial Screening Off
The notion of probabilistic support is beset by well‐known problems. In this paper we add a new one to the list: the problem of transitivity. T omoji S hogenji has shown that positive probabilistic support, or confirmation, is transitive under the condition of screening off. However, under that same condition negative probabilistic support, or disconfirmation, is intransitive. Since there are many situations in which disconfirmation is transitive…
The Emergence of Justification
A major objection to epistemic infinitism is that it seems to make justification impossible. For if there is an infinite chain of reasons, each receiving its justification from its neighbour, then there is no justification to inherit in the first place. Some have argued that the objection arises from misunderstanding the character of justification. Justification is not something that one reason inherits from another; rather it gradually emerges f…
Infinite regress in decision theory, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology
Introduction to the special issue on epistemic justification
In August 2015 the Faculty of Philosophy in Groningen hosted JustGroningen, a three-day conference on epistemic justification. The event was funded by the Netherlands Organisation of Scientific Research (NWO) as part of a project on infinite regresses in epistemology in which both of us are involved (Project Number 360-20-280). The present special issue sprang from this conference. It contains some papers that were presented there together with s…
Till at last there remain nothing”
In A Treatise of Human Nature , David Hume presents an argument according to which all knowledge reduces to probability, and all probability reduces to nothing. Many have criticized this argument, while others find nothing wrong with it. In this paper we explain that the argument is invalid as it stands, but for different reasons than have been hitherto acknowledged. Once the argument is repaired, it becomes clear that there is indeed something t…
Probabilistic truth approximation and fixed points
We use the method of fixed points to describe a form of probabilistic truth approximation which we illustrate by means of three examples. We then contrast this form of probabilistic truth approximation with another, more familiar kind, where no fixed points are used. In probabilistic truth approximation with fixed points the events are dependent on one another, but in the second kind they are independent. The first form exhibits a phenomenon that…
Screening off generalized
Eells and Sober proved in 1983 that screening off is a sufficient condition for the transitivity of probabilistic causality, and in 2003 Shogenji noted that the same goes for probabilistic support. We start this paper by conjecturing that Hans Reichenbach may have been aware of this fact. Then we consider the work of Suppes and Roche, who demonstrated in 1986 and 2012 respectively that screening off can be generalized, while still being sufficien…
Probability functions, belief functions and infinite regresses
In a recent paper Ronald Meester and Timber Kerkvliet argue by example that infinite epistemic regresses have different solutions depending on whether they are analyzed with probability functions or with belief functions. Meester and Kerkvliet give two examples, each of which aims to show that an analysis based on belief functions yields a different numerical outcome for the agent’s degree of rational belief than one based on probability function…
A New Condition for Transitivity of Probabilistic Support
As is well known, implication is transitive but probabilistic support is not. Eells and Sober, followed by Shogenji, showed that screening off is a sufficient constraint for the transitivity of probabilistic support. Moreover, this screening off condition can be weakened without sacrificing transitivity, as was demonstrated by Suppes and later by Roche. In this paper we introduce an even weaker sufficient condition for the transitivity of probabi…
Epistemology (15 works) · Philosophy (14 works) · Mathematics (11 works) · Metaphysics (11 works) · Philosophy of language (11 works) · Philosophy of science (11 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (10 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (9 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works)