Marcus P Adams
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1273133 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Marcus P Adams |
| PRENOMES | Marcus P |
| SOBRENOME | Adams |
| ASSINATURA | ADAMS M P |
| AFILIAÇÕES | https://dx.doi.org/1084Department of Philosophy, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, NY, USA |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 10 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 3 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2009 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Margaret Cavendish as Critic and Reviser of Hobbes on Matter and Motion
Margaret Cavendish’s materialism holds that all motion is self-motion. Although she shows affinities to Hobbes’s understanding of “entire cause,” her strategy opposes features of Hobbes’s account of matter while revising his understanding of “motion.” Cavendish’s rejection of Hobbes’s persistence principle and his account of “place” can be understood as following from a more thorough interpretation of the impossibility of abstracting accidents fr…
Companion to Hobbes
Natural Philosophy, Abstraction, and Mathematics among Materialists
The nature of light is a focus of Thomas Hobbes’s natural philosophical project. Hobbes’s explanation of the light (lux) of lucid bodies differs across his works, from dilation and contraction in Elements of Law to simple circular motions in De corpore. However, Hobbes consistently explains perceived light (lumen) by positing that bodily resistance (endeavor) generates the phantasm of light. In Letters I.XIX–XX of Philosophical Letters, fellow ma…
A Companion to Hobbes
Motion as an Accident of Matter
Margaret Cavendish is widely known as a materialist. However, since Cavendishian matter is always in motion, “matter” and “motion” are equally important foundational concepts for her natural philosophy. In Philosophical Letters (1664), she takes to task her materialist rival Thomas Hobbes by assaulting his account of accidents in general and his concept of “rest” in particular. In this article, I argue that Cavendish defends her continuous‐motion…
Natural Philosophy, Deduction, and Geometry in the Hobbes-Boyle Debate
This paper examines Hobbes’s criticisms of Robert Boyle’s air-pump experiments in light of Hobbes’s account in De Corpore and De Homine of the relationship of natural philosophy to geometry. I argue that Hobbes’s criticisms rely upon his understanding of what counts as “true physics.” Instead of seeing Hobbes as defending natural philosophy as “a causal enterprise ... [that] as such, secured total and irrevocable assent,” 1 I argue that, in his d…
Hobbes on natural philosophy as “True Physics” and mixed mathematics
Hobbes, Definitions, and Simplest Conceptions
Several recent commentators argue that Thomas Hobbes’s account of the nature of science is conventionalist. Engaging in scientific practice on a conventionalist account is more a matter of making sure one connects one term to another properly rather than checking one’s claims, e.g., by experiment. In this paper, I argue that the conventionalist interpretation of Hobbesian science accords neither with Hobbes’s theoretical account in De corpore and…
Modularity, Theory of Mind, and Autism Spectrum Disorder
The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism spectrum disorder has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. In a series of papers, Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone argue that positing a ToM module does not best explain the deficits exhibited by individuals with autism. In this article, I first criticize Gerrans and Stone's account. Second, I discuss various studies of individuals with autism and argue that t…
Empirical evidence and the knowledge-that/knowledge-how distinction
Empirical evidence and the knowledge-that/knowledge-how distinction
Modularity, Theory of Mind, and Autism Spectrum Disorder
The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism spectrum disorder has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. In a series of papers, Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone argue that positing a ToM module does not best explain the deficits exhibited by individuals with autism. In this article, I first criticize Gerrans and Stone's account. Second, I discuss various studies of individuals with autism and argue that t…
Hobbes, Definitions, and Simplest Conceptions
Several recent commentators argue that Thomas Hobbes’s account of the nature of science is conventionalist. Engaging in scientific practice on a conventionalist account is more a matter of making sure one connects one term to another properly rather than checking one’s claims, e.g., by experiment. In this paper, I argue that the conventionalist interpretation of Hobbesian science accords neither with Hobbes’s theoretical account in De corpore and…
Hobbes on natural philosophy as “True Physics” and mixed mathematics
Natural Philosophy, Deduction, and Geometry in the Hobbes-Boyle Debate
This paper examines Hobbes’s criticisms of Robert Boyle’s air-pump experiments in light of Hobbes’s account in De Corpore and De Homine of the relationship of natural philosophy to geometry. I argue that Hobbes’s criticisms rely upon his understanding of what counts as “true physics.” Instead of seeing Hobbes as defending natural philosophy as “a causal enterprise ... [that] as such, secured total and irrevocable assent,” 1 I argue that, in his d…
A Companion to Hobbes
Motion as an Accident of Matter
Margaret Cavendish is widely known as a materialist. However, since Cavendishian matter is always in motion, “matter” and “motion” are equally important foundational concepts for her natural philosophy. In Philosophical Letters (1664), she takes to task her materialist rival Thomas Hobbes by assaulting his account of accidents in general and his concept of “rest” in particular. In this article, I argue that Cavendish defends her continuous‐motion…
Natural Philosophy, Abstraction, and Mathematics among Materialists
The nature of light is a focus of Thomas Hobbes’s natural philosophical project. Hobbes’s explanation of the light (lux) of lucid bodies differs across his works, from dilation and contraction in Elements of Law to simple circular motions in De corpore. However, Hobbes consistently explains perceived light (lumen) by positing that bodily resistance (endeavor) generates the phantasm of light. In Letters I.XIX–XX of Philosophical Letters, fellow ma…
Companion to Hobbes
Margaret Cavendish as Critic and Reviser of Hobbes on Matter and Motion
Margaret Cavendish’s materialism holds that all motion is self-motion. Although she shows affinities to Hobbes’s understanding of “entire cause,” her strategy opposes features of Hobbes’s account of matter while revising his understanding of “motion.” Cavendish’s rejection of Hobbes’s persistence principle and his account of “place” can be understood as following from a more thorough interpretation of the impossibility of abstracting accidents fr…
Philosophy (8 obras) · Epistemology (7 obras) · Historical Philosophy and Science (6 obras) · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought (6 obras) · Medieval and Classical Philosophy (4 obras) · Natural Philosophy (4 obras) · Physics (4 obras) · History (3 obras) · Child and Animal Learning Development (2 obras) · Classical mechanics (2 obras)