John Pittard
Biographic Data
| ID | 1273308 |
|---|---|
| NAME | John Pittard |
| GIVEN NAMES | John |
| FAMILY NAME | Pittard |
| SIGNATURE | PITTARD J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yale University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4194-9987 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1984 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Advancing the Boltzmann Brain Skeptical Challenge
Some leading cosmological models predict that in the future history of the universe, there will be vast numbers of Boltzmann Brains (“brains” formed by chance in otherwise empty space), including many that are physical duplicates of your own brain and that (arguably) have conscious experiences indistinguishable from your own experiences. This article advances the skeptical challenge posed by this prediction in two ways. First, the author challeng…
AI and the Ends of Humanity
This essay serves as an introduction to a special themed issue on “AI and the Ends of Humanity,” and serves to highlight the distinctive features of this special issue. Much theological reflection on AI to date has focused on the question whether AI systems might acquire consciousness, personhood, and moral standing, on the ways in which AI is characterized in godlike terms, and on questions surrounding AI “alignment” and “ethical AI.” This speci…
Artificial General Intelligence, Moral Standing, and Attenuated Relationality
Some argue that if we develop machines with artificial general intelligence (“AGIs”), we might not be able to determine whether these machines are unfeeling tools without moral standing or instead conscious beings deserving of moral consideration. I reflect on this possibility from the standpoint of Christian theism. I argue, first, that Christian theists should be especially uncertain about the moral standing of hypothetical AGIs. Second, the pr…
Deceptive worlds, skepticism, and axiarchism
Axiarchism holds that fundamental concrete reality is necessarily ordered toward goodness. I argue that it is not fully rational to reject axiarchism while also rejecting radical skepticism. A key premise in the argument is that among conceivable worlds that contain one’s internal duplicate, ‘epistemically inhospitable’ worlds (i.e. worlds where all or most of one’s internal duplicates are radically deceived) are predominant. This predominance of…
The Skeptical Challenge of the Theistic Multiverse
The multiverse theodicy says that because God can without cost create an infinite number of universes, the standards of acceptability that a conceivable universe must meet to be worthy of divine creation are significantly laxer than is typically supposed in discussions of the problem of evil. While the prospect of a theistic multiverse arguably helps the theist to explain suffering, I argue that it also poses a serious skeptical worry. Given the …
The many ‘oughts’ of deliberation
Fundamental disagreements and the limits of instrumentalism
Disagreement, reliability, and resilience
Resolute Conciliationism
Psychophysical Flicker Threshold in Congenital Colour Vision Deficiencies
Psychophysical Flicker Threshold in Congenital Colour Vision Deficiencies
Resolute Conciliationism
Disagreement, reliability, and resilience
Fundamental disagreements and the limits of instrumentalism
The Skeptical Challenge of the Theistic Multiverse
The multiverse theodicy says that because God can without cost create an infinite number of universes, the standards of acceptability that a conceivable universe must meet to be worthy of divine creation are significantly laxer than is typically supposed in discussions of the problem of evil. While the prospect of a theistic multiverse arguably helps the theist to explain suffering, I argue that it also poses a serious skeptical worry. Given the …
The many ‘oughts’ of deliberation
Deceptive worlds, skepticism, and axiarchism
Axiarchism holds that fundamental concrete reality is necessarily ordered toward goodness. I argue that it is not fully rational to reject axiarchism while also rejecting radical skepticism. A key premise in the argument is that among conceivable worlds that contain one’s internal duplicate, ‘epistemically inhospitable’ worlds (i.e. worlds where all or most of one’s internal duplicates are radically deceived) are predominant. This predominance of…
Artificial General Intelligence, Moral Standing, and Attenuated Relationality
Some argue that if we develop machines with artificial general intelligence (“AGIs”), we might not be able to determine whether these machines are unfeeling tools without moral standing or instead conscious beings deserving of moral consideration. I reflect on this possibility from the standpoint of Christian theism. I argue, first, that Christian theists should be especially uncertain about the moral standing of hypothetical AGIs. Second, the pr…
Advancing the Boltzmann Brain Skeptical Challenge
Some leading cosmological models predict that in the future history of the universe, there will be vast numbers of Boltzmann Brains (“brains” formed by chance in otherwise empty space), including many that are physical duplicates of your own brain and that (arguably) have conscious experiences indistinguishable from your own experiences. This article advances the skeptical challenge posed by this prediction in two ways. First, the author challeng…
AI and the Ends of Humanity
This essay serves as an introduction to a special themed issue on “AI and the Ends of Humanity,” and serves to highlight the distinctive features of this special issue. Much theological reflection on AI to date has focused on the question whether AI systems might acquire consciousness, personhood, and moral standing, on the ways in which AI is characterized in godlike terms, and on questions surrounding AI “alignment” and “ethical AI.” This speci…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Skepticism (4 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (3 works)