Folke Tersman
Biographic Data
| ID | 1278488 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Folke Tersman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Folke |
| FAMILY NAME | Tersman |
| SIGNATURE | TERSMAN F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Uppsala University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4002-3007 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 9 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Seeking a reflective equilibrium in the face of disagreement
How is someone who seeks a reflective equilibrium to respond upon learning that others disagree with her? Regrettably, not much attention has been devoted to that question despite the extensive general discussion about the epistemic significance of disagreement that has taken place in recent years. This paper helps fill the lacuna by exploring possible connections between the relevant bodies of literature. More specifically, I claim that how user…
Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces
Facts about moral disagreement and human evolution have both been said to exclude the possibility of moral knowledge, but the question of how these challenges interact has largely gone unaddressed. The paper aims to present and defend a novel version of the evolutionary “debunking” argument for moral skepticism that appeals to both types of considerations. This argument has several advantages compared to more familiar versions. The standard debun…
Recent work on reflective equilibrium and method in ethics
The idea of reflective equilibrium (IRE) remains the most popular approach to questions about method in ethics, despite the masses of criticism it has been faced with over the years. Is this due to the availability of compelling responses to the criticisms or rather to factors that are independent of its reasonableness? The aim of this paper is to provide support for the first answer. I particularly focus on the recent discussion. Some recent obj…
To the Editor of Theoria
Moral Disagreement
Are We Lovers of the Good
Cannibals, Communists and Cognitivists
Quine on Ethics
Crispin Wright on Moral Disagreement
Journal Article Crispin Wright on Moral Disagreement Get access Folke Tersman Folke Tersman Stockholm University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 48, Issue 192, July 1998, Pages 359–365, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00106 Published: 07 January 2003
Recent work on reflective equilibrium and method in ethics
The idea of reflective equilibrium (IRE) remains the most popular approach to questions about method in ethics, despite the masses of criticism it has been faced with over the years. Is this due to the availability of compelling responses to the criticisms or rather to factors that are independent of its reasonableness? The aim of this paper is to provide support for the first answer. I particularly focus on the recent discussion. Some recent obj…
Quine on Ethics
Crispin Wright on Moral Disagreement
Journal Article Crispin Wright on Moral Disagreement Get access Folke Tersman Folke Tersman Stockholm University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 48, Issue 192, July 1998, Pages 359–365, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00106 Published: 07 January 2003
Cannibals, Communists and Cognitivists
Are We Lovers of the Good
Moral Disagreement
To the Editor of Theoria
Recent work on reflective equilibrium and method in ethics
The idea of reflective equilibrium (IRE) remains the most popular approach to questions about method in ethics, despite the masses of criticism it has been faced with over the years. Is this due to the availability of compelling responses to the criticisms or rather to factors that are independent of its reasonableness? The aim of this paper is to provide support for the first answer. I particularly focus on the recent discussion. Some recent obj…
Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces
Facts about moral disagreement and human evolution have both been said to exclude the possibility of moral knowledge, but the question of how these challenges interact has largely gone unaddressed. The paper aims to present and defend a novel version of the evolutionary “debunking” argument for moral skepticism that appeals to both types of considerations. This argument has several advantages compared to more familiar versions. The standard debun…
Seeking a reflective equilibrium in the face of disagreement
How is someone who seeks a reflective equilibrium to respond upon learning that others disagree with her? Regrettably, not much attention has been devoted to that question despite the extensive general discussion about the epistemic significance of disagreement that has taken place in recent years. This paper helps fill the lacuna by exploring possible connections between the relevant bodies of literature. More specifically, I claim that how user…
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Citation (3 works) · Library science (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works)