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Charles Sayward

Biographic Data

ID1287236
NAMECharles Sayward
GIVEN NAMESCharles
FAMILY NAMESayward
SIGNATURESAYWARD C
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Nebraska–Lincoln
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS14
TOTAL CITATIONS6
AUTHOR COUNT14
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1982
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2006
H-INDEX1
  • Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso

    Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward et al.•BOOK•Arithmetic and Ontology•2006

    This volume documents a lively exchange between five philosophers of mathematics. It also introduces a new voice in one central debate in the philosophy of mathematics. Non-realism, i.e., the view supported by Hugly and Sayward in their monograph, is an original position distinct from the widely known realism and anti-realism. Non-realism is characterized by the rejection of a central assumption shared by many realists and anti-realists, i.e., th…

  • What Truth is there in Psychological Egoism

    Charles Sayward, Peter Lang•ARTICLE•Facta Philosophica•2006

  • Does Scientific Realism Entail Mathematical Realism

    Charles Sayward, Peter Lang•ARTICLE•Facta Philosophica•2003

  • There Is A Problem with Substitutional Quantification

    Open Access•Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•Theoria•2002

    Whereas arithmetical quantification is substitutional in the sense that a particular quantification is true only if some instance of it is true, it does not follow (and, in fact, is not true) that an account of the truth‐conditions of the sentences of a language of arithmetic can be given by a substitutional semantics. A substitutional semantics fails in a most fundamental fashion: It fails to articulate the truth‐conditions of the quantification…

  • Geach on Generalization

    Open Access•Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•Dialogue•2002•References: 1

    Il y a des objections plausibles contre une approche substitutionnelle de la généralisation, dont certaines peuvent être contrées par un appel à une version de l'approche substitutionnelle qui a été proposée par Peter Geach il y a presque quarante ans. Il n'est pas clair que la conception substitutionnelle de Geach vaille pour tous les phénomènes de généralisation, mais on s'emploie ici à montrer que c'est une conception qui est tout à fait digne…

  • Intensionality and Truth: An Essay on the Philosophy of A. N. Prior

    Open Access•Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward•BOOK•Intensionality and Truth•1996

  • Quantifying over the reals

    Open Access•Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•Synthese•1994•Cited by: 1•References: 4

  • Moral relativism and deontic logic

    Open Access•Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•Synthese•1990

  • Four Views of Arithmetical Truth

    Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1990•Cited by: 1

    Journal Article Four Views of Arithmetical Truth Get access Charles Sayward Charles Sayward University of Nebraska-Lincoln Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 159, April 1990, Pages 155–168, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219808 Published: 01 April 1990

  • W.D. Ross on acting from motives

    Open Access•Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•The Journal of Value Inquiry•1988

  • Relativism and Ontology

    Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1987•Cited by: 4

    Journal Article Relativism and Ontology Get access Philip Hugly, Philip Hugly The University of Nebraska-Lincoln Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Charles sayward Charles sayward The University of Nebraska-Lincoln Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 37, Issue 148, July 1987, Pages 278–290, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220398 Published: 01 J…

  • Minds, Substances, and Capacities

    Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1983

    those things which we conceive clearly and distinctly as being diverse substances, as we regard mind and body to be, are really substances essentially distinct one from the other; and this is the conclusion of the Sixth Meditation. This is further confirmed in this same Meditation by the fact that we cannot conceive of body excepting in so far as it is divisible, while the mind cannot be conceived of excepting as indivisible. For we are not able …

  • Anarchism and Rights Violations

    Open Access•Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•Critica•1982

  • Should persons be sacrificed for the general welfare

    Open Access•Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•The Journal of Value Inquiry•1982

  • Relativism and Ontology

    Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1987•Cited by: 4

    Journal Article Relativism and Ontology Get access Philip Hugly, Philip Hugly The University of Nebraska-Lincoln Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Charles sayward Charles sayward The University of Nebraska-Lincoln Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 37, Issue 148, July 1987, Pages 278–290, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220398 Published: 01 J…

  • Quantifying over the reals

    Open Access•Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•Synthese•1994•Cited by: 1•References: 4

  • Four Views of Arithmetical Truth

    Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1990•Cited by: 1

    Journal Article Four Views of Arithmetical Truth Get access Charles Sayward Charles Sayward University of Nebraska-Lincoln Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 159, April 1990, Pages 155–168, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219808 Published: 01 April 1990

  • Anarchism and Rights Violations

    Open Access•Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•Critica•1982

  • Should persons be sacrificed for the general welfare

    Open Access•Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•The Journal of Value Inquiry•1982

  • Minds, Substances, and Capacities

    Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1983

    those things which we conceive clearly and distinctly as being diverse substances, as we regard mind and body to be, are really substances essentially distinct one from the other; and this is the conclusion of the Sixth Meditation. This is further confirmed in this same Meditation by the fact that we cannot conceive of body excepting in so far as it is divisible, while the mind cannot be conceived of excepting as indivisible. For we are not able …

  • Relativism and Ontology

    Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1987•Cited by: 4

    Journal Article Relativism and Ontology Get access Philip Hugly, Philip Hugly The University of Nebraska-Lincoln Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Charles sayward Charles sayward The University of Nebraska-Lincoln Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 37, Issue 148, July 1987, Pages 278–290, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220398 Published: 01 J…

  • W.D. Ross on acting from motives

    Open Access•Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•The Journal of Value Inquiry•1988

  • Moral relativism and deontic logic

    Open Access•Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•Synthese•1990

  • Four Views of Arithmetical Truth

    Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1990•Cited by: 1

    Journal Article Four Views of Arithmetical Truth Get access Charles Sayward Charles Sayward University of Nebraska-Lincoln Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 159, April 1990, Pages 155–168, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219808 Published: 01 April 1990

  • Quantifying over the reals

    Open Access•Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•Synthese•1994•Cited by: 1•References: 4

  • Intensionality and Truth: An Essay on the Philosophy of A. N. Prior

    Open Access•Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward•BOOK•Intensionality and Truth•1996

  • There Is A Problem with Substitutional Quantification

    Open Access•Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•Theoria•2002

    Whereas arithmetical quantification is substitutional in the sense that a particular quantification is true only if some instance of it is true, it does not follow (and, in fact, is not true) that an account of the truth‐conditions of the sentences of a language of arithmetic can be given by a substitutional semantics. A substitutional semantics fails in a most fundamental fashion: It fails to articulate the truth‐conditions of the quantification…

  • Geach on Generalization

    Open Access•Charles Sayward•ARTICLE•Dialogue•2002•References: 1

    Il y a des objections plausibles contre une approche substitutionnelle de la généralisation, dont certaines peuvent être contrées par un appel à une version de l'approche substitutionnelle qui a été proposée par Peter Geach il y a presque quarante ans. Il n'est pas clair que la conception substitutionnelle de Geach vaille pour tous les phénomènes de généralisation, mais on s'emploie ici à montrer que c'est une conception qui est tout à fait digne…

  • Does Scientific Realism Entail Mathematical Realism

    Charles Sayward, Peter Lang•ARTICLE•Facta Philosophica•2003

  • Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso

    Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward et al.•BOOK•Arithmetic and Ontology•2006

    This volume documents a lively exchange between five philosophers of mathematics. It also introduces a new voice in one central debate in the philosophy of mathematics. Non-realism, i.e., the view supported by Hugly and Sayward in their monograph, is an original position distinct from the widely known realism and anti-realism. Non-realism is characterized by the rejection of a central assumption shared by many realists and anti-realists, i.e., th…

  • What Truth is there in Psychological Egoism

    Charles Sayward, Peter Lang•ARTICLE•Facta Philosophica•2006

Philosophy (10 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (3 works) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology (2 works)

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