Charles Lassiter
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1287418 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Charles Lassiter |
| PRENOMES | Charles |
| SOBRENOME | Lassiter |
| ASSINATURA | LASSITER C |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Gonzaga University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6833-5913 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 15 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 15 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2013 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
New Ontological Foundations for Extended Minds
Introduction to the Special Issue
In this article, we offer an overview of the philosophical and psychological literatures on expertise. Work so far has failed to engage with recent work in embodied and encultured cognition--in particular the notions of interactivity and semiosis. We suggest how bringing these concepts on board reveals new areas of research concerning the philosophy and psychology of expertise. We conclude with a brief synopsis of each paper
Reading the Signs
A naturalistic approach to expert-identification begins by asking, ‘how do novices pick out putative experts?’ Alvin Goldman and Elizabeth Anderson, representing a fairly common approach, consider agents’ psychological biases as well as social situatedness. As good as this is, culture’s role in shaping cognitive mechanisms is neglected. An explanatory framework that works well to accommodate culturally-sensitive mechanisms is Peircean semiotics. …
Precedent and rest stop convergence in reflective equilibrium
The method of reflective equilibrium is typically characterized as a process of two kinds of adjustments: hold fixed one’s current set of commitments/intuitions and adjust rules/principles to account for them, then hold fixed those rules while making adjustments to one’s set of commitments. Repeat until no further adjustments are required. Such characterizations ignore the role of precedent, i.e., information about the commitments and rules of ot…
Convergence and Shared Reflective Equilibrium
We build a model of the reflective equilibrium method to better understand under what conditions a community of agents would achieve a shared equilibrium. We find that, despite guaranteeing that agents individually reach equilibrium and numerous constraints on how agents deliberate, it is surprisingly difficult for a community to converge on a small number of equilibria. Consequently, the literature on reflective equilibrium has underestimated th…
Watching People Watching People
Novices sometimes misidentify authorities and end up endorsing false beliefs as a result. In this paper, I suggest that this phenomenon is at least sometimes the result of culturally evolved mechanisms functioning in faulty epistemic contexts. I identify three background conditions which, when satisfied, enable expert-identifying mechanisms to function properly. When any one of them fails, that increases the likelihood of identifying a non-author…
Could a robot flirt? 4E cognition, reactive attitudes, and robot autonomy
Particularized conversational implicatures and miraculous communication
In search of an ontology for 4E theories
Arational belief convergence
How to power encultured minds
Language and simplexity
Diversity and Resistance to Change
We argue that two society-level properties-resistance to change and diversity within a culture-significantly affect agents' degrees of marginalization, which is here defined as access to cultural knowledge and institutional means for accomplishing cultural goals. We develop an agent-based model using findings from Norasakkunkit et al. (Norasakkunkit and Uchida, 2011, 2014; Norasakkunkit et al., 2012). We found that varying the degrees of resistan…
Aristotle and distributed language
The coupling-constitution fallacy
The coupling-constitution fallacy claims that arguments for extended cognition involve the inference of “x and y constitute z” from “x is coupled to y” and that such inferences are fallacious. We argue that the coupling-constitution fallacy fails in its goal to undermine the hypothesis of extended cognition: appeal to the coupling-constitution fallacy to rule out possible empirical counterexamples to intracranialism is fallacious. We demonstrate …
The coupling-constitution fallacy
The coupling-constitution fallacy claims that arguments for extended cognition involve the inference of “x and y constitute z” from “x is coupled to y” and that such inferences are fallacious. We argue that the coupling-constitution fallacy fails in its goal to undermine the hypothesis of extended cognition: appeal to the coupling-constitution fallacy to rule out possible empirical counterexamples to intracranialism is fallacious. We demonstrate …
Aristotle and distributed language
Diversity and Resistance to Change
We argue that two society-level properties-resistance to change and diversity within a culture-significantly affect agents' degrees of marginalization, which is here defined as access to cultural knowledge and institutional means for accomplishing cultural goals. We develop an agent-based model using findings from Norasakkunkit et al. (Norasakkunkit and Uchida, 2011, 2014; Norasakkunkit et al., 2012). We found that varying the degrees of resistan…
Language and simplexity
How to power encultured minds
Particularized conversational implicatures and miraculous communication
In search of an ontology for 4E theories
Arational belief convergence
Watching People Watching People
Novices sometimes misidentify authorities and end up endorsing false beliefs as a result. In this paper, I suggest that this phenomenon is at least sometimes the result of culturally evolved mechanisms functioning in faulty epistemic contexts. I identify three background conditions which, when satisfied, enable expert-identifying mechanisms to function properly. When any one of them fails, that increases the likelihood of identifying a non-author…
Could a robot flirt? 4E cognition, reactive attitudes, and robot autonomy
Convergence and Shared Reflective Equilibrium
We build a model of the reflective equilibrium method to better understand under what conditions a community of agents would achieve a shared equilibrium. We find that, despite guaranteeing that agents individually reach equilibrium and numerous constraints on how agents deliberate, it is surprisingly difficult for a community to converge on a small number of equilibria. Consequently, the literature on reflective equilibrium has underestimated th…
New Ontological Foundations for Extended Minds
Introduction to the Special Issue
In this article, we offer an overview of the philosophical and psychological literatures on expertise. Work so far has failed to engage with recent work in embodied and encultured cognition--in particular the notions of interactivity and semiosis. We suggest how bringing these concepts on board reveals new areas of research concerning the philosophy and psychology of expertise. We conclude with a brief synopsis of each paper
Reading the Signs
A naturalistic approach to expert-identification begins by asking, ‘how do novices pick out putative experts?’ Alvin Goldman and Elizabeth Anderson, representing a fairly common approach, consider agents’ psychological biases as well as social situatedness. As good as this is, culture’s role in shaping cognitive mechanisms is neglected. An explanatory framework that works well to accommodate culturally-sensitive mechanisms is Peircean semiotics. …
Precedent and rest stop convergence in reflective equilibrium
The method of reflective equilibrium is typically characterized as a process of two kinds of adjustments: hold fixed one’s current set of commitments/intuitions and adjust rules/principles to account for them, then hold fixed those rules while making adjustments to one’s set of commitments. Repeat until no further adjustments are required. Such characterizations ignore the role of precedent, i.e., information about the commitments and rules of ot…
Epistemology (14 obras) · Philosophy (14 obras) · Psychology (9 obras) · Computer Science (8 obras) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (6 obras) · Metaphysics (6 obras) · Sociology (6 obras) · Linguistics (5 obras) · Philosophy of language (5 obras) · Cognitive science (4 obras)