Yacin Hamami
Biographic Data
| ID | 1289166 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Yacin Hamami |
| GIVEN NAMES | Yacin |
| FAMILY NAME | Hamami |
| SIGNATURE | HAMAMI Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | Vrije Universiteit Brussel |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0780-7996 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Understanding in mathematics: The case of mathematical proofs
Although understanding is the object of a growing literature in epistemology and the philosophy of science, only few studies have concerned understanding in mathematics. This essay offers an account of a fundamental form of mathematical understanding: proof understanding. The account builds on a simple idea, namely that understanding a proof amounts to rationally reconstructing its underlying plan. This characterization is fleshed out by specifyi…
Going Round in Circles: A Cognitive Bias in Geometric Reasoning
Deductive reasoning is essential to most of our scientific and technological achievements and is a crucial component to scientific education. In Western culture, deductive reasoning first emerged as a dedicated mode of thinking in the field of geometry, but the cognitive mechanisms behind this major intellectual achievement remain largely understudied. Here, we report an unexpected cognitive bias in geometric reasoning that challenges existing th…
Rationality in Mathematical Proofs
Mathematical proofs are not sequences of arbitrary deductive steps—each deductive step is, to some extent, rational. This paper aims to identify and characterize the particular form of rationality at play in mathematical proofs. The approach adopted consists in viewing mathematical proofs as reports of proof activities—that is, sequences of deductive inferences—and in characterizing the rationality of the former in terms of that of the latter. It…
Proofs, Reliable Processes, and Justification in Mathematics
Although there exist today a variety of non-deductive reliable processes able to determine the truth of certain mathematical propositions, proof remains the only form of justification accepted in mathematical practice. Some philosophers and mathematicians have contested this commonly accepted epistemic superiority of proof on the ground that mathematicians are fallible: when the deductive method is carried out by a fallible agent, then it comes w…
Probabilistic Proofs, Lottery Propositions, and Mathematical Knowledge
In mathematics, any form of probabilistic proof obtained through the application of a probabilistic method is not considered as a legitimate way of gaining mathematical knowledge. In a series of papers, Don Fallis has defended the thesis that there are no epistemic reasons justifying mathematicians’ rejection of probabilistic proofs. This paper identifies such an epistemic reason. More specifically, it is argued here that if one adopts a concepti…
Cognitive processing of spatial relations in Euclidean diagrams
The cognitive processing of spatial relations in Euclidean diagrams is central to the diagram-based geometric practice of Euclid's Elements. In this study, we investigate this processing through two dichotomies among spatial relations-metric vs topological and exact vs co-exact-introduced by Manders in his seminal epistemological analysis of Euclid's geometric practice. To this end, we carried out a two-part experiment where participants were ask…
The interrogative model of inquiry meets dynamic epistemic logics
Logics of questions
Logics of questions
Proofs, Reliable Processes, and Justification in Mathematics
Although there exist today a variety of non-deductive reliable processes able to determine the truth of certain mathematical propositions, proof remains the only form of justification accepted in mathematical practice. Some philosophers and mathematicians have contested this commonly accepted epistemic superiority of proof on the ground that mathematicians are fallible: when the deductive method is carried out by a fallible agent, then it comes w…
The interrogative model of inquiry meets dynamic epistemic logics
The interrogative model of inquiry meets dynamic epistemic logics
Logics of questions
Cognitive processing of spatial relations in Euclidean diagrams
The cognitive processing of spatial relations in Euclidean diagrams is central to the diagram-based geometric practice of Euclid's Elements. In this study, we investigate this processing through two dichotomies among spatial relations-metric vs topological and exact vs co-exact-introduced by Manders in his seminal epistemological analysis of Euclid's geometric practice. To this end, we carried out a two-part experiment where participants were ask…
Probabilistic Proofs, Lottery Propositions, and Mathematical Knowledge
In mathematics, any form of probabilistic proof obtained through the application of a probabilistic method is not considered as a legitimate way of gaining mathematical knowledge. In a series of papers, Don Fallis has defended the thesis that there are no epistemic reasons justifying mathematicians’ rejection of probabilistic proofs. This paper identifies such an epistemic reason. More specifically, it is argued here that if one adopts a concepti…
Rationality in Mathematical Proofs
Mathematical proofs are not sequences of arbitrary deductive steps—each deductive step is, to some extent, rational. This paper aims to identify and characterize the particular form of rationality at play in mathematical proofs. The approach adopted consists in viewing mathematical proofs as reports of proof activities—that is, sequences of deductive inferences—and in characterizing the rationality of the former in terms of that of the latter. It…
Proofs, Reliable Processes, and Justification in Mathematics
Although there exist today a variety of non-deductive reliable processes able to determine the truth of certain mathematical propositions, proof remains the only form of justification accepted in mathematical practice. Some philosophers and mathematicians have contested this commonly accepted epistemic superiority of proof on the ground that mathematicians are fallible: when the deductive method is carried out by a fallible agent, then it comes w…
Understanding in mathematics: The case of mathematical proofs
Although understanding is the object of a growing literature in epistemology and the philosophy of science, only few studies have concerned understanding in mathematics. This essay offers an account of a fundamental form of mathematical understanding: proof understanding. The account builds on a simple idea, namely that understanding a proof amounts to rationally reconstructing its underlying plan. This characterization is fleshed out by specifyi…
Going Round in Circles: A Cognitive Bias in Geometric Reasoning
Deductive reasoning is essential to most of our scientific and technological achievements and is a crucial component to scientific education. In Western culture, deductive reasoning first emerged as a dedicated mode of thinking in the field of geometry, but the cognitive mechanisms behind this major intellectual achievement remain largely understudied. Here, we report an unexpected cognitive bias in geometric reasoning that challenges existing th…
Computer Science (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (4 works) · Mathematical proof (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Calculus (dental) (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Medicine (3 works)