Daniel D Hutto
Biographic Data
| ID | 1289897 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel D Hutto |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel D |
| FAMILY NAME | Hutto |
| SIGNATURE | HUTTO D D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Wollongong |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3585-4618 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 27 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 25 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 27 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Keeping cognition kinky: A reply to Moyal-Sharrock on contentful cognition and its origins
Advocates of radical enactivism maintain that contentful cognition is kinky, and that we need a kinky explanation of its natural origins (Hutto & Satne 2017, Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving enactivism . MIT Press.). In advancing this idea, they maintain that there are qualitatively important cognitive differences between creatures capable of full-fledged contentful thought and speech and those which are not. Moreover, they maintain that…
Education after a Radical E-Turn: A Revolution in Theory and Practice
With the E-turn, we have seen the rise of conceptions of cognition that challenge the mainstream cognitivist assumption that cognitive activity is always representational and takes place in-the-head. However, E-conceptions come in many different shapes, forms, and guises. This paper seeks to progress our thinking about what adopting two different E-conceptions of cognition could mean when it comes to rethinking educational theory and practice. It…
Beyond the extended mind: New arguments for extensive enactivism
Clark and Chalmers (Analysis 58:7–19, 1998) landmark paper, The Extended Mind, launched a thousand ships and changed the contours of the larger sea of theorizing about cognition. Over the past twenty-six years, it has led to intense philosophical debates about of the constitutive bounds of mind and cognition and generated multiple waves of work taking the form of various attempts to clarify and defend its core thesis. The extended mind thesis sta…
Enacting Phronesis: Some Deliberations About Enactive Ethics
Enactivists have made several forays into the domain of ethical thought over the past decades: their proposals vary in foci and ambition (Colombetti and Torrance in Phenomenol Cogn Sci 8:505–526, 2009, Fourlas and Cuffari in Topoi 41:355–371, 2022, as reported by Di Paolo and De Jaegher (Linguistic bodies: the continuity between life and language, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2022), Pescador Canales and Mojica in Topoi 41:257–274, 2022). Rather than sur…
Against intellectualism about skill
This paper will argue that intellectualism about skill—the contention that skilled performance is without exception guided by proposition knowledge—is fundamentally flawed. It exposes that intellectualists about skill run into intractable theoretical problems in explicating a role for their novel theoretical conceit of practical modes of presentation. It then examines a proposed solution by Carlotta Pavese which seeks to identify practical modes …
Predictive Processing and Some Disillusions about Illusions
A number of perceptual (exteroceptive and proprioceptive) illusions present problems for predictive processing accounts. In this chapter we’ll review explanations of the Müller-Lyer Illusion (MLI), the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) and the Alien Hand Illusion (AHI) based on the idea of Prediction Error Minimization (PEM), and show why they fail. In spite of the relatively open communicative processes which, on many accounts, are posited between hier…
Getting real about pretense: A radical enactivist proposal
This paper argues that radical enactivism (RE) offers a framework with the required nuance needed for understanding of the full range of the various forms of pretense. In particular, its multi-storey account of cognition, which holds that psychological attitudes can be both contentless and contentful, enables it to appropriately account for both the most basic and most advanced varieties of pretense. By comparison with other existing accounts of …
Re-affirming experience, presence, and the world: Setting the RECord straight in reply to Noë
Similarity-based cognition: Radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience
Going Radical
E-approaches to cognition—enactive, embodied, ecological—conceive of minds as fundamentally relational and interactive. They are often heralded as offering a new paradigm for thinking about the mental. Yet only the most radical versions of E-approaches—those that seek not to complement but to replace traditional cognitivist accounts of mind—have any prospect of ushering in a truly revolutionary rethink of the nature of cognition. This chapter con…
Getting into predictive processing’s great guessing game: Bootstrap heaven or hell
Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content
Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism , which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have c…
Basic social cognition without mindreading: Minding minds without attributing contents
A Reconciliation for the Future of Psychiatry: Both Folk Psychology and Cognitive Science
Philosophy of psychiatry faces a tough choice between two competing ways of understanding mental disorders. The folk psychology or FP view puts our everyday normative conceptual scheme in the driver’s seat – on the assumption that it, and it only, tells us what mental disorders are (Graham 2009). Opposing this, the scientific image or SI view (Murphy 2006, Gerrans 2014) holds that our understanding of mental disorders must come, wholly and solely…
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
Journal Article Radical Embodied Cognitive Science Get access Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. ByChemero Anthony. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009, Pp. 188. H/b $64.95) Daniel D. Hutto Daniel D. Hutto School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong, Australia; School of Humanities, University of Hertfordshire, UK E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxfor…
Hand, an Organ of the Mind: What the Manual Tells the Mental
Action understanding: How low can you go
Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content
A book that promotes the thesis that basic forms of mentality—intentionally directed cognition and perceptual experience—are best understood as embodied yet contentless. Most of what humans do and experience is best understood in terms of dynamically unfolding interactions with the environment. Many philosophers and cognitive scientists now acknowledge the critical importance of situated, environment-involving embodied engagements as a means of u…
ToM Rules, but It Is Not OK
A distinctive part of our everyday adult way of making sense of one another involves making sense of actions performed for reasons. This practice, which has been the focus of intense scrutiny, frequently dons the somewhat unfortunate label ‘Folk Psychology’ (or FP) in the philosophical literature.1 It travels under many other names too: common-sense psychology; naïve psychology; Homo sapiens psychology; the person theory of humans; belief/ desire…
Interacting? Yes. But, of what kind and on what basis
Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice
We argue that theory-of-mind (ToM) approaches, such as "theory theory" and "simulation theory", are both problematic and not needed. They account for neither our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others nor the true basis of our folk psychological understanding, even when narrowly construed. Developmental evidence shows that young infants are capable of grasping the purposeful intentions of others through the perception of bodily movemen…
Limited Engagements and Narrative Extensions
E‐approaches to the mind stress the embodied, embedded and enactive nature of mental phenomena. In their more radical, non‐representational variants these approaches offer innovative and powerful new ways of understanding fundamental modes of intersubjective social interaction: I‐approaches. While promising, E and I accounts have natural limits. In particular, they are unable to explain human competence in making sense of reasons for actions in f…
Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons (Bradford Books)
An argument that challenges the dominant "theory theory" and simulation theory approaches to folk psychology by claiming that our everyday understanding of intentional actions done for reasons is acquired by exposure to and engaging in specific kinds of narratives. --From publisher's description
Folk Psychology Re-Assessed
Questing for Happiness: Augmenting Aristotle with Davidson
Drawing heavily on Aristotle, Tabensky attempts to establish ‘an ethic that flows from the very structure of our being’, but he also calls on Davidson’s arguments about the essentially social character of rationality to shore up Aristotle’s claim that we are essentially social beings. This much of his project, I argue is successful. However Tabensky takes this a step further and proposes a pluralist ethic on the grounds that a ‘fully’ or ‘properl…
Basic social cognition without mindreading: Minding minds without attributing contents
Similarity-based cognition: Radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience
Getting into predictive processing’s great guessing game: Bootstrap heaven or hell
A Cause for Concern: Reasons, Causes and Explanations
Original article can be found at: http://www.jstor.org/journals/00318205.html Copyright Blackwell Publishing. [Full text of this article is not available in the UHRA]
Against intellectualism about skill
This paper will argue that intellectualism about skill—the contention that skilled performance is without exception guided by proposition knowledge—is fundamentally flawed. It exposes that intellectualists about skill run into intractable theoretical problems in explicating a role for their novel theoretical conceit of practical modes of presentation. It then examines a proposed solution by Carlotta Pavese which seeks to identify practical modes …
A Cause for Concern: Reasons, Causes and Explanations
Original article can be found at: http://www.jstor.org/journals/00318205.html Copyright Blackwell Publishing. [Full text of this article is not available in the UHRA]
Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory Nor Therapy
There are a number of fundamental topics, including 'reality', 'meaning' and 'logic', that cannot be dealt with properly without an appropriate understanding of the end and limits of philosophy. In this book, Daniel D. Hutto draws on Wittgenstein's insights into how we must approach these topics to challenge the idea that we face a simple, methodological choice in philosophy: to advance theory or to attempt therapy. Consideration of these topics …
Questing for Happiness: Augmenting Aristotle with Davidson
Drawing heavily on Aristotle, Tabensky attempts to establish ‘an ethic that flows from the very structure of our being’, but he also calls on Davidson’s arguments about the essentially social character of rationality to shore up Aristotle’s claim that we are essentially social beings. This much of his project, I argue is successful. However Tabensky takes this a step further and proposes a pluralist ethic on the grounds that a ‘fully’ or ‘properl…
Folk Psychology Re-Assessed
Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice
We argue that theory-of-mind (ToM) approaches, such as "theory theory" and "simulation theory", are both problematic and not needed. They account for neither our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others nor the true basis of our folk psychological understanding, even when narrowly construed. Developmental evidence shows that young infants are capable of grasping the purposeful intentions of others through the perception of bodily movemen…
Limited Engagements and Narrative Extensions
E‐approaches to the mind stress the embodied, embedded and enactive nature of mental phenomena. In their more radical, non‐representational variants these approaches offer innovative and powerful new ways of understanding fundamental modes of intersubjective social interaction: I‐approaches. While promising, E and I accounts have natural limits. In particular, they are unable to explain human competence in making sense of reasons for actions in f…
Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons (Bradford Books)
An argument that challenges the dominant "theory theory" and simulation theory approaches to folk psychology by claiming that our everyday understanding of intentional actions done for reasons is acquired by exposure to and engaging in specific kinds of narratives. --From publisher's description
ToM Rules, but It Is Not OK
A distinctive part of our everyday adult way of making sense of one another involves making sense of actions performed for reasons. This practice, which has been the focus of intense scrutiny, frequently dons the somewhat unfortunate label ‘Folk Psychology’ (or FP) in the philosophical literature.1 It travels under many other names too: common-sense psychology; naïve psychology; Homo sapiens psychology; the person theory of humans; belief/ desire…
Interacting? Yes. But, of what kind and on what basis
Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content
A book that promotes the thesis that basic forms of mentality—intentionally directed cognition and perceptual experience—are best understood as embodied yet contentless. Most of what humans do and experience is best understood in terms of dynamically unfolding interactions with the environment. Many philosophers and cognitive scientists now acknowledge the critical importance of situated, environment-involving embodied engagements as a means of u…
Hand, an Organ of the Mind: What the Manual Tells the Mental
Action understanding: How low can you go
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
Journal Article Radical Embodied Cognitive Science Get access Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. ByChemero Anthony. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009, Pp. 188. H/b $64.95) Daniel D. Hutto Daniel D. Hutto School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong, Australia; School of Humanities, University of Hertfordshire, UK E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxfor…
A Reconciliation for the Future of Psychiatry: Both Folk Psychology and Cognitive Science
Philosophy of psychiatry faces a tough choice between two competing ways of understanding mental disorders. The folk psychology or FP view puts our everyday normative conceptual scheme in the driver’s seat – on the assumption that it, and it only, tells us what mental disorders are (Graham 2009). Opposing this, the scientific image or SI view (Murphy 2006, Gerrans 2014) holds that our understanding of mental disorders must come, wholly and solely…
Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content
Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism , which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have c…
Basic social cognition without mindreading: Minding minds without attributing contents
Going Radical
E-approaches to cognition—enactive, embodied, ecological—conceive of minds as fundamentally relational and interactive. They are often heralded as offering a new paradigm for thinking about the mental. Yet only the most radical versions of E-approaches—those that seek not to complement but to replace traditional cognitivist accounts of mind—have any prospect of ushering in a truly revolutionary rethink of the nature of cognition. This chapter con…
Getting into predictive processing’s great guessing game: Bootstrap heaven or hell
Re-affirming experience, presence, and the world: Setting the RECord straight in reply to Noë
Similarity-based cognition: Radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience
Predictive Processing and Some Disillusions about Illusions
A number of perceptual (exteroceptive and proprioceptive) illusions present problems for predictive processing accounts. In this chapter we’ll review explanations of the Müller-Lyer Illusion (MLI), the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) and the Alien Hand Illusion (AHI) based on the idea of Prediction Error Minimization (PEM), and show why they fail. In spite of the relatively open communicative processes which, on many accounts, are posited between hier…
Getting real about pretense: A radical enactivist proposal
This paper argues that radical enactivism (RE) offers a framework with the required nuance needed for understanding of the full range of the various forms of pretense. In particular, its multi-storey account of cognition, which holds that psychological attitudes can be both contentless and contentful, enables it to appropriately account for both the most basic and most advanced varieties of pretense. By comparison with other existing accounts of …
Against intellectualism about skill
This paper will argue that intellectualism about skill—the contention that skilled performance is without exception guided by proposition knowledge—is fundamentally flawed. It exposes that intellectualists about skill run into intractable theoretical problems in explicating a role for their novel theoretical conceit of practical modes of presentation. It then examines a proposed solution by Carlotta Pavese which seeks to identify practical modes …
Keeping cognition kinky: A reply to Moyal-Sharrock on contentful cognition and its origins
Advocates of radical enactivism maintain that contentful cognition is kinky, and that we need a kinky explanation of its natural origins (Hutto & Satne 2017, Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving enactivism . MIT Press.). In advancing this idea, they maintain that there are qualitatively important cognitive differences between creatures capable of full-fledged contentful thought and speech and those which are not. Moreover, they maintain that…
Education after a Radical E-Turn: A Revolution in Theory and Practice
With the E-turn, we have seen the rise of conceptions of cognition that challenge the mainstream cognitivist assumption that cognitive activity is always representational and takes place in-the-head. However, E-conceptions come in many different shapes, forms, and guises. This paper seeks to progress our thinking about what adopting two different E-conceptions of cognition could mean when it comes to rethinking educational theory and practice. It…
Epistemology (20 works) · Philosophy (20 works) · Psychology (20 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (18 works) · Cognitive science (15 works) · Cognition (9 works) · Enactivism (8 works) · Metaphysics (8 works) · Philosophy of mind (8 works) · Action Observation and Synchronization (7 works)