Antoni Plutynski
Biographic Data
| ID | 129037 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Antoni Plutynski |
| GIVEN NAMES | Antoni |
| FAMILY NAME | Plutynski |
| SIGNATURE | PLUTYNSKI A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Utah |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3791-7720 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 32 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 16 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1943 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
The meaning of a measure
The variable “p” is characterized as a single dimension of risk for psychopathology. The aim of this paper is to critically assess debates over “p” in the scientific literature, and their larger philosophical import. What uses – practical, or theoretical – does such a measure serve? What reasons might one have to be skeptical of p? Drawing upon methodological and empirical critiques of p in the scientific literature, this paper argues that p is n…
What personality can teach us about mental health
While there have been forty years of active debate among philosophers of psychiatry about how to define mental disorder, there has been relatively little discussion of mental health. This is starting to change. A new literature is emerging about what it means to have mental health. While some define mental health as simply as the absence of mental disorder, others argue to the contrary that mental health is distinct from, and not reducible to, th…
Concepts of Actionability in Precision Oncology
“Actionability” is a key concept in precision oncology. Its precise definition, however, remains contested. This article undertakes a philosophical analysis of “actionability” to aid in conceptual clarification. We map distinct concepts of actionability, arguing that each is best understood as a contextually objective category articulated to mitigate risk of “conceptual slippage.” We defend “interactive pluralism,” acknowledging the need for dist…
Sometimes you ride the Pegasus, sometimes you take the road
Mitchell’s philosophical contributions are part of an ongoing conversation among philosophers and scientists about laws and unification in biology, going back at least to Darwin. This article situates Mitchell in this conversation, explains why and how she has correctly guided us away from false idols, and engages several difficult questions she leaves open. I argue that there are different epistemic roles laws (or models describing lawlike regul…
Going big by going small
Book Forum
What and How Do Cancer Systems Biologists Explain
In this article, we argue, first, that there are very different research projects that fall under the heading of “systems biology of cancer.” While they share some general features, they differ in their aims and theoretical commitments. Second, we argue that some explanations in systems biology of cancer are concerned with properties of signaling networks (such as robustness or fragility) and how they may play an important causal role in patterns…
Philosophy of epidemiology
Cancer and the goals of integration
A philosopher goes wild
What was Fisher’s fundamental theorem of natural selection and what was it for
Strategies of Model Building in Population Genetics
In 1966, Richard Levins argued that there are different strategies in model building in population biology. In this paper, I reply to Orzack and Sober's (1993) critiques of Levins and argue that his views on modeling strategies apply also in the context of evolutionary genetics. In particular, I argue that there are different ways in which models are used to ask and answer questions about the dynamics of evolutionary change, prospectively and ret…
Explanatory Unification and the Early Synthesis
The object of this paper is to reply to Morrison's ([2000]) claim that while ‘structural unity’ was achieved at the level of the mathematical models of population genetics in the early synthesis, there was explanatory disunity. I argue to the contrary, that the early synthesis effected by the founders of theoretical population genetics was unifying and explanatory both. Defending this requires a reconsideration of Morrison's notion of explanation…
Explanation in Classical Population Genetics
The recent literature in philosophy of biology has drawn attention to the different sorts of explanations proffered in the biological sciences—we have molecular, biomedical, and evolutionary explanations. Do these explanations all have a common structure or relation that they seek to capture? This paper will answer in the negative. I defend a pluralistic and pragmatic approach to explanation. Using examples from classical population genetics, I a…
Modeling Evolution in Theory and Practice
This paper uses a number of examples of diverse types and functions of models in evolutionary biology to argue that the demarcation between theory and practice, or “theory model” and “data model,” is often difficult to make. It is shown how both mathematical and laboratory models function as plausibility arguments, existence proofs, and refutations in the investigation of questions about the pattern and process of evolutionary history. I consider…
The Revival of Popular Art in Poland
As a rule the effort to revive the vanishing art of the people in European countries has met with failure. Popular artistic handicraft is the result of the native material needs of the folk, as well as of their spiritual need for expression in the production of beautiful things. When the life of a tribe which has achieved through the centuries a harmonious equilibrium and unity becomes violently disturbed by outside influences, the chances of pre…
Cancer and the goals of integration
Strategies of Model Building in Population Genetics
In 1966, Richard Levins argued that there are different strategies in model building in population biology. In this paper, I reply to Orzack and Sober's (1993) critiques of Levins and argue that his views on modeling strategies apply also in the context of evolutionary genetics. In particular, I argue that there are different ways in which models are used to ask and answer questions about the dynamics of evolutionary change, prospectively and ret…
What was Fisher’s fundamental theorem of natural selection and what was it for
Modeling Evolution in Theory and Practice
This paper uses a number of examples of diverse types and functions of models in evolutionary biology to argue that the demarcation between theory and practice, or “theory model” and “data model,” is often difficult to make. It is shown how both mathematical and laboratory models function as plausibility arguments, existence proofs, and refutations in the investigation of questions about the pattern and process of evolutionary history. I consider…
Philosophy of epidemiology
Explanatory Unification and the Early Synthesis
The object of this paper is to reply to Morrison's ([2000]) claim that while ‘structural unity’ was achieved at the level of the mathematical models of population genetics in the early synthesis, there was explanatory disunity. I argue to the contrary, that the early synthesis effected by the founders of theoretical population genetics was unifying and explanatory both. Defending this requires a reconsideration of Morrison's notion of explanation…
Explanation in Classical Population Genetics
The recent literature in philosophy of biology has drawn attention to the different sorts of explanations proffered in the biological sciences—we have molecular, biomedical, and evolutionary explanations. Do these explanations all have a common structure or relation that they seek to capture? This paper will answer in the negative. I defend a pluralistic and pragmatic approach to explanation. Using examples from classical population genetics, I a…
Concepts of Actionability in Precision Oncology
“Actionability” is a key concept in precision oncology. Its precise definition, however, remains contested. This article undertakes a philosophical analysis of “actionability” to aid in conceptual clarification. We map distinct concepts of actionability, arguing that each is best understood as a contextually objective category articulated to mitigate risk of “conceptual slippage.” We defend “interactive pluralism,” acknowledging the need for dist…
What and How Do Cancer Systems Biologists Explain
In this article, we argue, first, that there are very different research projects that fall under the heading of “systems biology of cancer.” While they share some general features, they differ in their aims and theoretical commitments. Second, we argue that some explanations in systems biology of cancer are concerned with properties of signaling networks (such as robustness or fragility) and how they may play an important causal role in patterns…
The Revival of Popular Art in Poland
As a rule the effort to revive the vanishing art of the people in European countries has met with failure. Popular artistic handicraft is the result of the native material needs of the folk, as well as of their spiritual need for expression in the production of beautiful things. When the life of a tribe which has achieved through the centuries a harmonious equilibrium and unity becomes violently disturbed by outside influences, the chances of pre…
Modeling Evolution in Theory and Practice
This paper uses a number of examples of diverse types and functions of models in evolutionary biology to argue that the demarcation between theory and practice, or “theory model” and “data model,” is often difficult to make. It is shown how both mathematical and laboratory models function as plausibility arguments, existence proofs, and refutations in the investigation of questions about the pattern and process of evolutionary history. I consider…
Explanation in Classical Population Genetics
The recent literature in philosophy of biology has drawn attention to the different sorts of explanations proffered in the biological sciences—we have molecular, biomedical, and evolutionary explanations. Do these explanations all have a common structure or relation that they seek to capture? This paper will answer in the negative. I defend a pluralistic and pragmatic approach to explanation. Using examples from classical population genetics, I a…
Explanatory Unification and the Early Synthesis
The object of this paper is to reply to Morrison's ([2000]) claim that while ‘structural unity’ was achieved at the level of the mathematical models of population genetics in the early synthesis, there was explanatory disunity. I argue to the contrary, that the early synthesis effected by the founders of theoretical population genetics was unifying and explanatory both. Defending this requires a reconsideration of Morrison's notion of explanation…
What was Fisher’s fundamental theorem of natural selection and what was it for
Strategies of Model Building in Population Genetics
In 1966, Richard Levins argued that there are different strategies in model building in population biology. In this paper, I reply to Orzack and Sober's (1993) critiques of Levins and argue that his views on modeling strategies apply also in the context of evolutionary genetics. In particular, I argue that there are different ways in which models are used to ask and answer questions about the dynamics of evolutionary change, prospectively and ret…
A philosopher goes wild
Cancer and the goals of integration
Philosophy of epidemiology
What and How Do Cancer Systems Biologists Explain
In this article, we argue, first, that there are very different research projects that fall under the heading of “systems biology of cancer.” While they share some general features, they differ in their aims and theoretical commitments. Second, we argue that some explanations in systems biology of cancer are concerned with properties of signaling networks (such as robustness or fragility) and how they may play an important causal role in patterns…
Book Forum
Sometimes you ride the Pegasus, sometimes you take the road
Mitchell’s philosophical contributions are part of an ongoing conversation among philosophers and scientists about laws and unification in biology, going back at least to Darwin. This article situates Mitchell in this conversation, explains why and how she has correctly guided us away from false idols, and engages several difficult questions she leaves open. I argue that there are different epistemic roles laws (or models describing lawlike regul…
Going big by going small
Concepts of Actionability in Precision Oncology
“Actionability” is a key concept in precision oncology. Its precise definition, however, remains contested. This article undertakes a philosophical analysis of “actionability” to aid in conceptual clarification. We map distinct concepts of actionability, arguing that each is best understood as a contextually objective category articulated to mitigate risk of “conceptual slippage.” We defend “interactive pluralism,” acknowledging the need for dist…
What personality can teach us about mental health
While there have been forty years of active debate among philosophers of psychiatry about how to define mental disorder, there has been relatively little discussion of mental health. This is starting to change. A new literature is emerging about what it means to have mental health. While some define mental health as simply as the absence of mental disorder, others argue to the contrary that mental health is distinct from, and not reducible to, th…
The meaning of a measure
The variable “p” is characterized as a single dimension of risk for psychopathology. The aim of this paper is to critically assess debates over “p” in the scientific literature, and their larger philosophical import. What uses – practical, or theoretical – does such a measure serve? What reasons might one have to be skeptical of p? Drawing upon methodological and empirical critiques of p in the scientific literature, this paper argues that p is n…
Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Biology (6 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics (4 works) · Genetics (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Psychology (4 works)