Enrico Petracca
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1290922 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Enrico Petracca |
| NOMBRES | Enrico |
| APELLIDO | Petracca |
| FIRMA | PETRACCA E |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Bologna |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7572-8117 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 10 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 1 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2014 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Social phenomena as a challenge to the scaling-up problem
Peter E. Earl, Toward a Wider Vision of Behavioral Economics
Trust as the glue of cognitive institutions
In this paper we consider the importance of trust, in the context of economic institutions, and specifically with respect to questions about market mechanisms and the role of social interactions. We review recent advances in institutional economics closely tied to developments in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, involving extended and enactive cognition. We argue that the analysis of different conceptions of institutional mind extension,…
Trust and reliance in the cognitive institutions of cryptocurrency
The stated aim of cryptocurrencies is to free the monetary system from the need to trust financial intermediaries, by relying on incentive design and technology. Many descriptive studies, however, have questioned cryptocurrencies’ delivery on the promise of trustlessness. This paper promotes a normative analysis of trust in cryptocurrencies by discussing (i) whether trust is in principle eliminable, and (ii) whether trustlessness is in itself a d…
The utility of goods or actions? A neurophilosophical assessment of a recent neuroeconomic controversy
The paper provides a neurophilosophical assessment of a controversy between two neuroeconomic models that compete to identify the putative object of neural utility: goods or actions. We raise two objections to the common view that sees the ‘good-based’ model prevailing over the ‘action-based’ model. First, we suggest extending neuroeconomic model discrimination to all of the models’ neurophilosophical assumptions, showing that action-based assump…
How can embodied cognition naturalize bounded rationality
Two Styles of Social Neuroeconomics
In a now classic in the philosophy of economics, Don Ross has distinguished two “styles” of neuroeconomics (Ross, 2008). One style, called “neurocellular economics”, is said to borrow models from economics to interpret neuroscientific data and is contrasted with “behavioral economics in the scanner”, said instead to use neuroscientific methods to trace the neural origins of behavior violating normative precepts. The new book Social Neuroeconomics…
On the origins and consequences of Simon’s modular approach to bounded rationality in economics
This paper discusses why in the 1950s Herbert Simon introduced bounded rationality as a modular notion—consisting of a “cognitive” and an “environmental” module—and explores the consequences of this choice. Originally, Simon emphasised cognition in economics and the environment in psychology to meet specific disciplinary interests. Continuing adaptively to emphasise cognition in economics has led, then, to significant unintended consequences: (i)…
Simulating Marx
Starting in the 1950s, computer programs for simulating cognitive processes and intelligent behaviour were the hallmark of Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence and ‘cognitivist’ cognitive science. This article examines a somewhat neglected case of simulation pursued by one of the founding fathers of simulation methodology, Herbert A. Simon. In the 1970s and 1980s, Simon had repeated contacts with Marxist countries and scientists, in the con…
Numerals as triggers of System 1 and System 2 in the ‘bat and ball’ problem
Simulating Marx
Starting in the 1950s, computer programs for simulating cognitive processes and intelligent behaviour were the hallmark of Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence and ‘cognitivist’ cognitive science. This article examines a somewhat neglected case of simulation pursued by one of the founding fathers of simulation methodology, Herbert A. Simon. In the 1970s and 1980s, Simon had repeated contacts with Marxist countries and scientists, in the con…
Numerals as triggers of System 1 and System 2 in the ‘bat and ball’ problem
On the origins and consequences of Simon’s modular approach to bounded rationality in economics
This paper discusses why in the 1950s Herbert Simon introduced bounded rationality as a modular notion—consisting of a “cognitive” and an “environmental” module—and explores the consequences of this choice. Originally, Simon emphasised cognition in economics and the environment in psychology to meet specific disciplinary interests. Continuing adaptively to emphasise cognition in economics has led, then, to significant unintended consequences: (i)…
Simulating Marx
Starting in the 1950s, computer programs for simulating cognitive processes and intelligent behaviour were the hallmark of Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence and ‘cognitivist’ cognitive science. This article examines a somewhat neglected case of simulation pursued by one of the founding fathers of simulation methodology, Herbert A. Simon. In the 1970s and 1980s, Simon had repeated contacts with Marxist countries and scientists, in the con…
Two Styles of Social Neuroeconomics
In a now classic in the philosophy of economics, Don Ross has distinguished two “styles” of neuroeconomics (Ross, 2008). One style, called “neurocellular economics”, is said to borrow models from economics to interpret neuroscientific data and is contrasted with “behavioral economics in the scanner”, said instead to use neuroscientific methods to trace the neural origins of behavior violating normative precepts. The new book Social Neuroeconomics…
The utility of goods or actions? A neurophilosophical assessment of a recent neuroeconomic controversy
The paper provides a neurophilosophical assessment of a controversy between two neuroeconomic models that compete to identify the putative object of neural utility: goods or actions. We raise two objections to the common view that sees the ‘good-based’ model prevailing over the ‘action-based’ model. First, we suggest extending neuroeconomic model discrimination to all of the models’ neurophilosophical assumptions, showing that action-based assump…
How can embodied cognition naturalize bounded rationality
Trust as the glue of cognitive institutions
In this paper we consider the importance of trust, in the context of economic institutions, and specifically with respect to questions about market mechanisms and the role of social interactions. We review recent advances in institutional economics closely tied to developments in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, involving extended and enactive cognition. We argue that the analysis of different conceptions of institutional mind extension,…
Trust and reliance in the cognitive institutions of cryptocurrency
The stated aim of cryptocurrencies is to free the monetary system from the need to trust financial intermediaries, by relying on incentive design and technology. Many descriptive studies, however, have questioned cryptocurrencies’ delivery on the promise of trustlessness. This paper promotes a normative analysis of trust in cryptocurrencies by discussing (i) whether trust is in principle eliminable, and (ii) whether trustlessness is in itself a d…
Social phenomena as a challenge to the scaling-up problem
Peter E. Earl, Toward a Wider Vision of Behavioral Economics
Psychology (8 obras) · Epistemology (7 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Cognition (5 obras) · Cognitive science (5 obras) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (4 obras) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras) · Sociology (4 obras)