Annemarie Kalis
Biographic Data
| ID | 1290968 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Annemarie Kalis |
| GIVEN NAMES | Annemarie |
| FAMILY NAME | Kalis |
| SIGNATURE | KALIS A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Utrecht University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8574-492X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Beyond Belief? Delusions and the Regulative Account of Folk Psychology
Making sense of folk psychological practices
Folk psychology, or the everyday practice of interpreting each other’s behavior in terms of mental states, is a common feature of many social communities. The existence of such practices in which people ascribe for example beliefs, desires and intentions to each other, raises important philosophical questions. For example, what is the purpose of ascribing mental states to another person or to oneself? And: do folk psychological practices in diffe…
The life project account of eating disorders
Recovery from eating disorders is known to be difficult. Individuals with eating disorders are generally poorly responsive to change: their eating behaviour is rigid, and they are often inflexible as regards their eating-related goals. This opens up questions about their agency in eating. Why do individuals with eating disorders not “just stop” performing problematic eating behaviour, despite the enormous burden this behaviour may inflict in thei…
Intentions in Ecological Psychology
According to ecological psychology, agency is a crucial feature of living organisms: therefore many ecological psychologists maintain that explaining agency is one of the core aims of the discipline. This paper aims to contribute to this goal by arguing that an ecological understanding of agency requires an account of intention. So far, intentions have not played a dominant role in ecological accounts of agency. The reluctance to integrate a noti…
Really situated self-control
Traditionally, self-control is conceptualized in terms of internal processes such as willpower or motivational mechanisms. These processes supposedly explain how agents manage to exercise self-control or, in other words, how they act on the basis of their best judgment in the face of conflicting motivation. Against the mainstream view that self-control is a mechanism or set of mechanisms realized in the brain, several authors have recently argued…
Understanding implicit bias
What attitude does someone manifesting implicit bias really have? According to the default representationalist picture, implicit bias involves having conflicting attitudes (explicit versus implicit) with respect to the topic at hand. In opposition to this orthodoxy, dispositionalists argue that attitudes should be understood as higher-level dispositional features of the person as a whole. Following this metaphysical view, the discordance characte…
Normativity in social accounts of reasoning
In recent years, the philosophy and psychology of reasoning have made a ‘social turn’: in both disciplines it is now common to reject the traditional picture of reasoning as a solitary intellectual exercise in favour of the idea that reasoning is a social activity driven by social aims. According to the most prominent social account, Mercier and Sperber’s interactionist theory, this implies that reasoning is not a normative activity. As they argu…
Folk psychology as a causal language
According to Oude Maatman (2020), our recent suggestion (Borsboom et al., 2019) that symptom networks are irreducible because they rely on folk psychological descriptions, threatens to undermine the main achievements of the network approach. In this article, we take up Oude Maatman’s challenge and develop an argument showing in what sense folk psychological concepts describe features of reality, and what it means to say that folk psychology is a …
Brain disorders? Not really
In the past decades, reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding policies in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology. Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interpla…
Why option generation matters for the design of autonomous e-coaching systems
Autonomous e-coaching systems offer their users suggestions for action, thereby affecting the user’s decision-making process. More specifically, the suggestions that these systems make influence the options for action that people actually consider. Surprisingly though, options and the corresponding process of option generation—a decision-making stage preceding intention formation and action selection—have received very little attention in the var…
The life project account of eating disorders
Recovery from eating disorders is known to be difficult. Individuals with eating disorders are generally poorly responsive to change: their eating behaviour is rigid, and they are often inflexible as regards their eating-related goals. This opens up questions about their agency in eating. Why do individuals with eating disorders not “just stop” performing problematic eating behaviour, despite the enormous burden this behaviour may inflict in thei…
Why option generation matters for the design of autonomous e-coaching systems
Autonomous e-coaching systems offer their users suggestions for action, thereby affecting the user’s decision-making process. More specifically, the suggestions that these systems make influence the options for action that people actually consider. Surprisingly though, options and the corresponding process of option generation—a decision-making stage preceding intention formation and action selection—have received very little attention in the var…
Brain disorders? Not really
In the past decades, reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding policies in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology. Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interpla…
Folk psychology as a causal language
According to Oude Maatman (2020), our recent suggestion (Borsboom et al., 2019) that symptom networks are irreducible because they rely on folk psychological descriptions, threatens to undermine the main achievements of the network approach. In this article, we take up Oude Maatman’s challenge and develop an argument showing in what sense folk psychological concepts describe features of reality, and what it means to say that folk psychology is a …
Understanding implicit bias
What attitude does someone manifesting implicit bias really have? According to the default representationalist picture, implicit bias involves having conflicting attitudes (explicit versus implicit) with respect to the topic at hand. In opposition to this orthodoxy, dispositionalists argue that attitudes should be understood as higher-level dispositional features of the person as a whole. Following this metaphysical view, the discordance characte…
Normativity in social accounts of reasoning
In recent years, the philosophy and psychology of reasoning have made a ‘social turn’: in both disciplines it is now common to reject the traditional picture of reasoning as a solitary intellectual exercise in favour of the idea that reasoning is a social activity driven by social aims. According to the most prominent social account, Mercier and Sperber’s interactionist theory, this implies that reasoning is not a normative activity. As they argu…
Intentions in Ecological Psychology
According to ecological psychology, agency is a crucial feature of living organisms: therefore many ecological psychologists maintain that explaining agency is one of the core aims of the discipline. This paper aims to contribute to this goal by arguing that an ecological understanding of agency requires an account of intention. So far, intentions have not played a dominant role in ecological accounts of agency. The reluctance to integrate a noti…
Really situated self-control
Traditionally, self-control is conceptualized in terms of internal processes such as willpower or motivational mechanisms. These processes supposedly explain how agents manage to exercise self-control or, in other words, how they act on the basis of their best judgment in the face of conflicting motivation. Against the mainstream view that self-control is a mechanism or set of mechanisms realized in the brain, several authors have recently argued…
Making sense of folk psychological practices
Folk psychology, or the everyday practice of interpreting each other’s behavior in terms of mental states, is a common feature of many social communities. The existence of such practices in which people ascribe for example beliefs, desires and intentions to each other, raises important philosophical questions. For example, what is the purpose of ascribing mental states to another person or to oneself? And: do folk psychological practices in diffe…
The life project account of eating disorders
Recovery from eating disorders is known to be difficult. Individuals with eating disorders are generally poorly responsive to change: their eating behaviour is rigid, and they are often inflexible as regards their eating-related goals. This opens up questions about their agency in eating. Why do individuals with eating disorders not “just stop” performing problematic eating behaviour, despite the enormous burden this behaviour may inflict in thei…
Beyond Belief? Delusions and the Regulative Account of Folk Psychology
Psychology (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Folk psychology (3 works) · Mental Health Research Topics (3 works) · Normative (3 works) · Philosophy of mind (3 works)