Daniel Kodaj
Biographic Data
| ID | 1291476 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Kodaj |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Kodaj |
| SIGNATURE | KODAJ D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Eötvös Loránd University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1439-9951 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
From Dispositions to Possible Worlds
Dispositions (powers, potentialities) have become popular in metaphysics in recent years, and some of their proponents are advertising them as the best metaphysical grounds for modality. This project has a logical as well as an ontological side: dispositionalists offer modal and counterfactual semantics that make no use of possible worlds. I argue that, as a result of their counterfactual semantics, dispositionalists are in fact committed to enti…
Erők és diszpozíciók a kortárs metafizikában
Dispositions are properties that make their bearers liable to cause or undergo change – for example, fragility makes its bearers liable to break. One of the interesting recent developments in analytic metaphysics is the idea that dispositions are not reducible to non-dispositional properties and they can be deployed in novel analyses of causation, natural laws, free will, teleology, normativity, and modality; in addition, they could even help est…
In defense of teleological intuitions
Humean Idealism
I outline a version of idealism that borrows from Humean Supervenience. The resulting theory is immune to what is often considered to be the most powerful anti-idealist argument, the gist of which is that the idealist can’t supply truthmakers (or an adequate supervenience base) for commonly accepted truths about the physical world. That charge has no purchase on Humean idealism
Who is almighty
Peter Geach recommended conceiving of God as almighty, not as omnipotent. I argue that Geach's heuristic explanation of almightiness does not provide a workable definition, and I propose one on his behalf. The resulting notion turns out to have precisely those theoretical virtues that Geach advertised: it is immune to the logical puzzles that bedevil omnipotence, and it is better suited to religious contexts than the notion of maximal power that …
Evil and the god of indifference
The evidential problem of evil involves a rarely discussed challenge, namely the challenge of defending theism against the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator. Our argument uses a Bayesian framework and it starts by showing that if the only alternative to classical theism is naturalistic atheism, then fine-tuning can render theism virtually certain, even in the face of evil. But if the alternatives include the hypothesis of a morally indi…
Revisiting the Epistemic Regress of Dispositions
Pandispositionalists have not refuted the charge that their ideology precludes knowledge of the external world. Their replies boil down to the claim that some dispositions (viz introspectively accessible properties of epistemic subjects) can be detected without the mediation of their effects. But this reply is ineffective if the regress is restated in terms of mind-independent domains of science
Religious Evil: The Basic Issues
Religious evil is evil apparently caused or justified by religious beliefs or institutions. Religious evil is a significant issue both in applied ethics and in the philosophy of religion; in the latter area, it grounds a distinctive atheistic argument from evil. The two aspects of religious evil are interrelated in the sense that one's solution to the atheistic argument from religious evil predisposes one to specific approaches to the ethical pro…
The problem of religious evil: Co-winner of the 2014 Religious Studies Postgraduate Essay Prize
The article argues that evils perpetrated in the name of God (‘religious evils') generate a special version of the problem of evil, and a concomitant evidential argument, that cannot be solved by any of the current defences and theodicies. The article draws on historical examples to clarify the concept of religious evil, it shows that religious evil is a candidate defeater of theism, and it claims that the resulting evidential argument cannot be …
No prominent works on this page.
The problem of religious evil: Co-winner of the 2014 Religious Studies Postgraduate Essay Prize
The article argues that evils perpetrated in the name of God (‘religious evils') generate a special version of the problem of evil, and a concomitant evidential argument, that cannot be solved by any of the current defences and theodicies. The article draws on historical examples to clarify the concept of religious evil, it shows that religious evil is a candidate defeater of theism, and it claims that the resulting evidential argument cannot be …
Religious Evil: The Basic Issues
Religious evil is evil apparently caused or justified by religious beliefs or institutions. Religious evil is a significant issue both in applied ethics and in the philosophy of religion; in the latter area, it grounds a distinctive atheistic argument from evil. The two aspects of religious evil are interrelated in the sense that one's solution to the atheistic argument from religious evil predisposes one to specific approaches to the ethical pro…
Evil and the god of indifference
The evidential problem of evil involves a rarely discussed challenge, namely the challenge of defending theism against the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator. Our argument uses a Bayesian framework and it starts by showing that if the only alternative to classical theism is naturalistic atheism, then fine-tuning can render theism virtually certain, even in the face of evil. But if the alternatives include the hypothesis of a morally indi…
Revisiting the Epistemic Regress of Dispositions
Pandispositionalists have not refuted the charge that their ideology precludes knowledge of the external world. Their replies boil down to the claim that some dispositions (viz introspectively accessible properties of epistemic subjects) can be detected without the mediation of their effects. But this reply is ineffective if the regress is restated in terms of mind-independent domains of science
Who is almighty
Peter Geach recommended conceiving of God as almighty, not as omnipotent. I argue that Geach's heuristic explanation of almightiness does not provide a workable definition, and I propose one on his behalf. The resulting notion turns out to have precisely those theoretical virtues that Geach advertised: it is immune to the logical puzzles that bedevil omnipotence, and it is better suited to religious contexts than the notion of maximal power that …
Erők és diszpozíciók a kortárs metafizikában
Dispositions are properties that make their bearers liable to cause or undergo change – for example, fragility makes its bearers liable to break. One of the interesting recent developments in analytic metaphysics is the idea that dispositions are not reducible to non-dispositional properties and they can be deployed in novel analyses of causation, natural laws, free will, teleology, normativity, and modality; in addition, they could even help est…
In defense of teleological intuitions
Humean Idealism
I outline a version of idealism that borrows from Humean Supervenience. The resulting theory is immune to what is often considered to be the most powerful anti-idealist argument, the gist of which is that the idealist can’t supply truthmakers (or an adequate supervenience base) for commonly accepted truths about the physical world. That charge has no purchase on Humean idealism
From Dispositions to Possible Worlds
Dispositions (powers, potentialities) have become popular in metaphysics in recent years, and some of their proponents are advertising them as the best metaphysical grounds for modality. This project has a logical as well as an ontological side: dispositionalists offer modal and counterfactual semantics that make no use of possible worlds. I argue that, as a result of their counterfactual semantics, dispositionalists are in fact committed to enti…
Philosophy (9 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (4 works) · Chemistry (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Philosophy of religion (3 works)