Ciro De Florio
Biographic Data
| ID | 1292104 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ciro De Florio |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ciro |
| FAMILY NAME | De Florio |
| SIGNATURE | DE FLORIO C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5503-7463 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Normal Future Assertions
Some scholars have considered the fact that we make assertions about the future as an argument in favor of certain semantics of future tense sentences. In particular, the debate has focused on the assertion of future contingents. Besson and Hattiangadi (Philos Stud 167:251–271, 2014) and Besson and Hattiangadi (in: Goldberg, The Oxford handbook of assertion, Oxford University Press, New York, 2020) argue that the fact that we assert future contin…
Retrogradation of Truth and Omniscience
Todd and Rabern have argued that assuming future contingents are untrue, together with accepting the principle of the retrogradation of truth (p→PF(p)), implies that it is metaphysically impossible that an omniscient entity exists. Since the possibility of an omniscient being is a metaphyisical and theological thesis that should not depend on assumed temporal semantics, Todd and Rabern conclude that, if one wishes to maintain the untruth of futur…
Future, truth, and probability
According to some scholars, universalist semantics of the future are incompatible with classical ascriptions of probability. This alleged fact is used as an argument for the linearist semantics of the future. In this paper, we show that, on the contrary, universalist semantics of the future are in harmony with the theory of probability, while the advocates of linearist semantics have to pay high theoretical costs to maintain the coherence with th…
Future and Negation
In this article, we take into consideration two semantics of the future tense: linearism, according to which future-tense sentences are interpreted on a single history, and universalism, according to which they are evaluated by universally quantifying on the plurality of future histories that radiate from the present instant. Specifically, we focus on a objection advanced against universalism: if universalism were correct semantics of will , nega…
Fragmenting modal logic
Fragmentalism allows incompatible facts to constitute reality in an absolute manner, provided that they fail to obtain together. In recent years, the view has been extensively discussed, with a focus on its formalisation in model-theoretic terms. This paper focuses on three formalisations: Lipman's approach, the subvaluationist interpretation, and a novel view that has been so far overlooked. The aim of the paper is to explore the application of …
Retro-Closure Principle and Omniscience
todd_pa-rabern:2021 have argued that if we assume that future contingents are untrue and if we accept the Retro-closure principle (p\rightarrow\mathbf{PF}(p)), then the existence of a temporal omniscient entity becomes metaphysically impossible. Since the truth of a metaphysical and theological theory should not be dependent on questions of temporal semantics, Todd and Rabern conclude that, if one wishes to maintain that future contingents are un…
From thin objects to thin concepts
In this short paper we consider Linnebo's thin/thick dichotomy: first, we show that it does not overlap with the very common one between abstract/concrete objects; second, on the basis of some difficulties with the distinction, we propose, as a possible way out, to move from thin/thick objects to thin/thick concepts
A critique of Malpass's argument against Supervaluationism
Supervaluationism is one of the most discussed approaches to the semantics of future tense sentences in a branching time. In this paper, we consider the criticism advanced by Malpass against Supervaluationism. This criticism relies on the fact that supervaluationists must accept as supertrue disjunctions whose disjuncts are not only supertrue—which supervaluationists are ready to acknowledge—but also not satisfiable. In order to show this, Malpas…
Assertions and future tense semantics
We don’t know we don’t know
Identity criteria
From Arithmetic to Metaphysics
From Arithmetic to Metaphysics
Identity criteria
Assertions and future tense semantics
We don’t know we don’t know
Retro-Closure Principle and Omniscience
todd_pa-rabern:2021 have argued that if we assume that future contingents are untrue and if we accept the Retro-closure principle (p\rightarrow\mathbf{PF}(p)), then the existence of a temporal omniscient entity becomes metaphysically impossible. Since the truth of a metaphysical and theological theory should not be dependent on questions of temporal semantics, Todd and Rabern conclude that, if one wishes to maintain that future contingents are un…
From thin objects to thin concepts
In this short paper we consider Linnebo's thin/thick dichotomy: first, we show that it does not overlap with the very common one between abstract/concrete objects; second, on the basis of some difficulties with the distinction, we propose, as a possible way out, to move from thin/thick objects to thin/thick concepts
A critique of Malpass's argument against Supervaluationism
Supervaluationism is one of the most discussed approaches to the semantics of future tense sentences in a branching time. In this paper, we consider the criticism advanced by Malpass against Supervaluationism. This criticism relies on the fact that supervaluationists must accept as supertrue disjunctions whose disjuncts are not only supertrue—which supervaluationists are ready to acknowledge—but also not satisfiable. In order to show this, Malpas…
Future and Negation
In this article, we take into consideration two semantics of the future tense: linearism, according to which future-tense sentences are interpreted on a single history, and universalism, according to which they are evaluated by universally quantifying on the plurality of future histories that radiate from the present instant. Specifically, we focus on a objection advanced against universalism: if universalism were correct semantics of will , nega…
Fragmenting modal logic
Fragmentalism allows incompatible facts to constitute reality in an absolute manner, provided that they fail to obtain together. In recent years, the view has been extensively discussed, with a focus on its formalisation in model-theoretic terms. This paper focuses on three formalisations: Lipman's approach, the subvaluationist interpretation, and a novel view that has been so far overlooked. The aim of the paper is to explore the application of …
Retrogradation of Truth and Omniscience
Todd and Rabern have argued that assuming future contingents are untrue, together with accepting the principle of the retrogradation of truth (p→PF(p)), implies that it is metaphysically impossible that an omniscient entity exists. Since the possibility of an omniscient being is a metaphyisical and theological thesis that should not depend on assumed temporal semantics, Todd and Rabern conclude that, if one wishes to maintain the untruth of futur…
Future, truth, and probability
According to some scholars, universalist semantics of the future are incompatible with classical ascriptions of probability. This alleged fact is used as an argument for the linearist semantics of the future. In this paper, we show that, on the contrary, universalist semantics of the future are in harmony with the theory of probability, while the advocates of linearist semantics have to pay high theoretical costs to maintain the coherence with th…
Normal Future Assertions
Some scholars have considered the fact that we make assertions about the future as an argument in favor of certain semantics of future tense sentences. In particular, the debate has focused on the assertion of future contingents. Besson and Hattiangadi (Philos Stud 167:251–271, 2014) and Besson and Hattiangadi (in: Goldberg, The Oxford handbook of assertion, Oxford University Press, New York, 2020) argue that the fact that we assert future contin…
Philosophy and Theoretical Science (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (6 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works)