Federica Isabella Malfatti
Biographic Data
| ID | 1294927 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Federica Isabella Malfatti |
| GIVEN NAMES | Federica Isabella |
| FAMILY NAME | Malfatti |
| SIGNATURE | MALFATTI F I |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universität Innsbruck |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3079-2876 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The Social Fabric of Understanding
Disagreements in understanding
The topic of disagreement has captured a great deal of attention among epistemologists in recent years. In this paper, I want to raise the issue of disagreement for the epistemic aim of understanding. I will address three main issues. The first concerns the nature of understanding disagreement. What do disagreements in understanding amount to? What kind of disagreement is at play when two agents understand something differently, or have a differe…
ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding
Towards Ideal Understanding
What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) sufficient representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) sufficient truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fit. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient c…
The social fabric of understanding: Equilibrium, authority, and epistemic empathy
We discuss the social-epistemic aspects of Catherine Elgin’s theory of reflective equilibrium and understanding and argue that it yields an argument for the view that a crucial social-epistemic function of epistemic authorities is to foster understanding in their communities. We explore the competences that enable epistemic authorities to fulfil this role and argue that among them is an epistemic virtue we call “epistemic empathy”
Introduction to the topical collection “True enough? Themes from Elgin”
Can Testimony Transmit Understanding
Can we transmit understanding via testimony in more or less the same way in which we transmit knowledge? The standard view in social epistemology has a straightforward answer: no, we cannot. Three arguments supporting the standard view have been formulated so far. The first appeals to the claim that gaining understanding requires a greater cognitive effort than acquiring testimonial knowledge does. The second appeals to a certain type of epistemi…
The social fabric of understanding: Equilibrium, authority, and epistemic empathy
We discuss the social-epistemic aspects of Catherine Elgin’s theory of reflective equilibrium and understanding and argue that it yields an argument for the view that a crucial social-epistemic function of epistemic authorities is to foster understanding in their communities. We explore the competences that enable epistemic authorities to fulfil this role and argue that among them is an epistemic virtue we call “epistemic empathy”
ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding
Can Testimony Transmit Understanding
Can we transmit understanding via testimony in more or less the same way in which we transmit knowledge? The standard view in social epistemology has a straightforward answer: no, we cannot. Three arguments supporting the standard view have been formulated so far. The first appeals to the claim that gaining understanding requires a greater cognitive effort than acquiring testimonial knowledge does. The second appeals to a certain type of epistemi…
The social fabric of understanding: Equilibrium, authority, and epistemic empathy
We discuss the social-epistemic aspects of Catherine Elgin’s theory of reflective equilibrium and understanding and argue that it yields an argument for the view that a crucial social-epistemic function of epistemic authorities is to foster understanding in their communities. We explore the competences that enable epistemic authorities to fulfil this role and argue that among them is an epistemic virtue we call “epistemic empathy”
Introduction to the topical collection “True enough? Themes from Elgin”
Towards Ideal Understanding
What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) sufficient representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) sufficient truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fit. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient c…
The Social Fabric of Understanding
Disagreements in understanding
The topic of disagreement has captured a great deal of attention among epistemologists in recent years. In this paper, I want to raise the issue of disagreement for the epistemic aim of understanding. I will address three main issues. The first concerns the nature of understanding disagreement. What do disagreements in understanding amount to? What kind of disagreement is at play when two agents understand something differently, or have a differe…
ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding
Epistemology (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Critical Realism in Sociology (2 works) · Educational Strategies and Epistemologies (2 works)