Michael Moehler
Biographic Data
| ID | 1296192 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael Moehler |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | Moehler |
| SIGNATURE | MOEHLER M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Virginia Tech |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3617-796X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 16 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 16 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Moral Roleplaying and Gamification of the Moral Space
This article, based on multilevel social contract theory, advances a novel notion of moral agency for morally pluralistic societies. The notion considers moral agency to be not only socially embedded, modular, and fluid but also at times, to require the adoption of certain ends, at least temporarily, for successful social cooperation. Engaging in such “moral roleplaying,” and, in this sense, gamifying the social moral space, allows for moral diff…
Strategic justice, conventions, and game theory
Evolutionary, game-theoretic approaches to justice and the social contract have become increasingly popular in contemporary moral and political philosophy. (Vanderschraaf, Strategic justice: convention and problems of balancing divergent interests, Oxford University Press, 2019) theory of strategic justice represents the most recent contribution to this tradition and, in many ways, can be viewed as a culmination of it. This article discusses some…
New Approaches to Social Contract Theory
Instrumentalism in the Social and Moral Sciences
This article responds to recent criticism regarding the application of consequentialism and rational choice theory in the social and moral sciences. It clarifies the limited scope of the presented criticism and its overly simplistic view of social scientific inquiry that, together, lead to the presentation of an argument that claims more than it warrants. Moreover, I argue that the criticism overlooks one of the most important uses of instrumenta…
Contractarianism
This article discusses the use of orthodox rational choice theory in the context of moral contractarianism. The article’s goals are threefold. First, the article clarifies the nature of moral contractarianism and corrects a fundamental misconception. Second, it responds to criticism that follows from this misconception. It shows that the criticism either misconstrues the nature of moral contractarianism or does not apply. Third, the article clari…
Integrated Moral Agency and the Practical Phenomenon of Moral Diversity
The practical phenomenon of moral diversity is a central feature of many contemporary societies and poses a distinct problem to moral theory building. Because of its goal to settle the moral question fully and exclusively and/or to provide better understanding of moral disagreement, traditional first-order moral theory often does not provide sufficient guidance to address this phenomenon and moral agency in deeply morally diverse societies. In th…
Strategic justice, conventionalism, and bargaining theory
Contractarianism
This Element provides a systematic defense of moral contractarianism as a distinct approach to the social contract. It elucidates, in comparison to moral conventionalism and moral contractualism, the distinct features of moral contractarianism, its scope, and conceptual and practical challenges that concern the relationship between morality and self-interest, the problems of assurance and compliance, rule-following, counterfactualism, and the nex…
Replies to Gaus, Van Schoelandt and Cooper
In Minimal Morality (2018), I develop a multilevel social contract theory that combines Humean, Hobbesian and Kantian moral features to accommodate deep moral pluralism. I argue that, for the conditions described, the theory is most promising for ensuring mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in a world in which a fully just society, due to moral pluralism, is unattainable. In this article, following some initial remarks that frame m…
The Rawls–Harsanyi Dispute
Central to the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute is the question of whether the core modeling device of Rawls' theory of justice, the original position, justifies Rawls' principles of justice, as Rawls suggests, or whether it justifies the average utility principle, as Harsanyi suggests. Many commentators agree with Harsanyi and consider this dispute to be primarily about the correct application of normative decision theory to Rawls' original position. I ar…
Impartiality, Priority, and Justice
Orthodox rational choice contractarianism
In a recent article, Gauthier (2013) rejects orthodox rational choice contractarianism in favor of a revisionist approach to the social contract that, according to him, justifies his principle of maximin proportionate gain (formerly the principle of minimax relative concession or maximin relative benefit) as a principle of distributive justice. I agree with Gauthier that his principle of maximin proportionate gain cannot be justified by orthodox …
The scope of instrumental morality
Contractarian ethics and Harsanyi’s two justifications of utilitarianism
Harsanyi defends utilitarianism by means of an axiomatic proof and by what he calls the ‘equiprobability model’. Both justifications of utilitarianism aim to show that utilitarian ethics can be derived from Bayesian rationality and some weak moral constraints on the reasoning of rational agents. I argue that, from the perspective of Bayesian agents, one of these constraints, the impersonality constraint, is not weak at all if its meaning is made …
The (Stabilized) Nash Bargaining Solution as a Principle of Distributive Justice
It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting prin…
Justice and peaceful cooperation
Justice is important, but so is peaceful cooperation. In this article, I argue that if one takes seriously the autonomy of individuals and groups and the fact of moral pluralism, a just system of cooperation cannot guarantee peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic world. As a response to this consideration, I develop a contractarian theory that can secure peace in a pluralistic world of autonomous agents, assuming that the agents who exist in this …
Why Hobbes' State of Nature is Best Modeled by an Assurance Game
In this article, I argue that if one closely follows Hobbes' line of reasoning in Leviathan , in particular his distinction between the second and the third law of nature, and the logic of his contractarian theory, then Hobbes' state of nature is best translated into the language of game theory by an assurance game, and not by a one-shot or iterated prisoner's dilemma game, nor by an assurance dilemma game. Further, I support Hobbes' conclusion t…
Why Hobbes' State of Nature is Best Modeled by an Assurance Game
In this article, I argue that if one closely follows Hobbes' line of reasoning in Leviathan , in particular his distinction between the second and the third law of nature, and the logic of his contractarian theory, then Hobbes' state of nature is best translated into the language of game theory by an assurance game, and not by a one-shot or iterated prisoner's dilemma game, nor by an assurance dilemma game. Further, I support Hobbes' conclusion t…
The (Stabilized) Nash Bargaining Solution as a Principle of Distributive Justice
It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting prin…
Orthodox rational choice contractarianism
In a recent article, Gauthier (2013) rejects orthodox rational choice contractarianism in favor of a revisionist approach to the social contract that, according to him, justifies his principle of maximin proportionate gain (formerly the principle of minimax relative concession or maximin relative benefit) as a principle of distributive justice. I agree with Gauthier that his principle of maximin proportionate gain cannot be justified by orthodox …
Contractarian ethics and Harsanyi’s two justifications of utilitarianism
Harsanyi defends utilitarianism by means of an axiomatic proof and by what he calls the ‘equiprobability model’. Both justifications of utilitarianism aim to show that utilitarian ethics can be derived from Bayesian rationality and some weak moral constraints on the reasoning of rational agents. I argue that, from the perspective of Bayesian agents, one of these constraints, the impersonality constraint, is not weak at all if its meaning is made …
Instrumentalism in the Social and Moral Sciences
This article responds to recent criticism regarding the application of consequentialism and rational choice theory in the social and moral sciences. It clarifies the limited scope of the presented criticism and its overly simplistic view of social scientific inquiry that, together, lead to the presentation of an argument that claims more than it warrants. Moreover, I argue that the criticism overlooks one of the most important uses of instrumenta…
Strategic justice, conventionalism, and bargaining theory
Justice and peaceful cooperation
Justice is important, but so is peaceful cooperation. In this article, I argue that if one takes seriously the autonomy of individuals and groups and the fact of moral pluralism, a just system of cooperation cannot guarantee peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic world. As a response to this consideration, I develop a contractarian theory that can secure peace in a pluralistic world of autonomous agents, assuming that the agents who exist in this …
Why Hobbes' State of Nature is Best Modeled by an Assurance Game
In this article, I argue that if one closely follows Hobbes' line of reasoning in Leviathan , in particular his distinction between the second and the third law of nature, and the logic of his contractarian theory, then Hobbes' state of nature is best translated into the language of game theory by an assurance game, and not by a one-shot or iterated prisoner's dilemma game, nor by an assurance dilemma game. Further, I support Hobbes' conclusion t…
The (Stabilized) Nash Bargaining Solution as a Principle of Distributive Justice
It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting prin…
Contractarian ethics and Harsanyi’s two justifications of utilitarianism
Harsanyi defends utilitarianism by means of an axiomatic proof and by what he calls the ‘equiprobability model’. Both justifications of utilitarianism aim to show that utilitarian ethics can be derived from Bayesian rationality and some weak moral constraints on the reasoning of rational agents. I argue that, from the perspective of Bayesian agents, one of these constraints, the impersonality constraint, is not weak at all if its meaning is made …
The scope of instrumental morality
Orthodox rational choice contractarianism
In a recent article, Gauthier (2013) rejects orthodox rational choice contractarianism in favor of a revisionist approach to the social contract that, according to him, justifies his principle of maximin proportionate gain (formerly the principle of minimax relative concession or maximin relative benefit) as a principle of distributive justice. I agree with Gauthier that his principle of maximin proportionate gain cannot be justified by orthodox …
Impartiality, Priority, and Justice
The Rawls–Harsanyi Dispute
Central to the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute is the question of whether the core modeling device of Rawls' theory of justice, the original position, justifies Rawls' principles of justice, as Rawls suggests, or whether it justifies the average utility principle, as Harsanyi suggests. Many commentators agree with Harsanyi and consider this dispute to be primarily about the correct application of normative decision theory to Rawls' original position. I ar…
Replies to Gaus, Van Schoelandt and Cooper
In Minimal Morality (2018), I develop a multilevel social contract theory that combines Humean, Hobbesian and Kantian moral features to accommodate deep moral pluralism. I argue that, for the conditions described, the theory is most promising for ensuring mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in a world in which a fully just society, due to moral pluralism, is unattainable. In this article, following some initial remarks that frame m…
Contractarianism
This Element provides a systematic defense of moral contractarianism as a distinct approach to the social contract. It elucidates, in comparison to moral conventionalism and moral contractualism, the distinct features of moral contractarianism, its scope, and conceptual and practical challenges that concern the relationship between morality and self-interest, the problems of assurance and compliance, rule-following, counterfactualism, and the nex…
Integrated Moral Agency and the Practical Phenomenon of Moral Diversity
The practical phenomenon of moral diversity is a central feature of many contemporary societies and poses a distinct problem to moral theory building. Because of its goal to settle the moral question fully and exclusively and/or to provide better understanding of moral disagreement, traditional first-order moral theory often does not provide sufficient guidance to address this phenomenon and moral agency in deeply morally diverse societies. In th…
Strategic justice, conventionalism, and bargaining theory
Contractarianism
This article discusses the use of orthodox rational choice theory in the context of moral contractarianism. The article’s goals are threefold. First, the article clarifies the nature of moral contractarianism and corrects a fundamental misconception. Second, it responds to criticism that follows from this misconception. It shows that the criticism either misconstrues the nature of moral contractarianism or does not apply. Third, the article clari…
Strategic justice, conventions, and game theory
Evolutionary, game-theoretic approaches to justice and the social contract have become increasingly popular in contemporary moral and political philosophy. (Vanderschraaf, Strategic justice: convention and problems of balancing divergent interests, Oxford University Press, 2019) theory of strategic justice represents the most recent contribution to this tradition and, in many ways, can be viewed as a culmination of it. This article discusses some…
New Approaches to Social Contract Theory
Instrumentalism in the Social and Moral Sciences
This article responds to recent criticism regarding the application of consequentialism and rational choice theory in the social and moral sciences. It clarifies the limited scope of the presented criticism and its overly simplistic view of social scientific inquiry that, together, lead to the presentation of an argument that claims more than it warrants. Moreover, I argue that the criticism overlooks one of the most important uses of instrumenta…
Moral Roleplaying and Gamification of the Moral Space
This article, based on multilevel social contract theory, advances a novel notion of moral agency for morally pluralistic societies. The notion considers moral agency to be not only socially embedded, modular, and fluid but also at times, to require the adoption of certain ends, at least temporarily, for successful social cooperation. Engaging in such “moral roleplaying,” and, in this sense, gamifying the social moral space, allows for moral diff…
Political Philosophy and Ethics (14 works) · Sociology (14 works) · Epistemology (13 works) · Law (12 works) · Philosophy (12 works) · Political science (12 works) · Law and economics (9 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (9 works) · Economic Justice (8 works) · Politics (8 works)