Majid D Beni
Biographic Data
| ID | 1305207 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Majid D Beni |
| GIVEN NAMES | Majid D |
| FAMILY NAME | Beni |
| SIGNATURE | BENI M D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Middle East Technical University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8719-0825 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 19 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Bootstrapping and Its Discontents in Consciousness Science
Free will is real—I could not have believed otherwise
This paper seeks to advance the compatibilist theory of free will, particularly building upon contributions by Christian List (and also Daniel Dennett) regarding the agential capacity to act otherwise. Emphasizing the importance of genuine agential abilities, it aims to conceptualize these abilities in empirically grounded terms, avoiding reliance on modal notions and eschewing an insurmountable divide between physical and psychological levels. T…
Agency as a functional kind
This article seeks to define the genuine (functional) kind of agency by identifying its essential property. In the context of this article, the essential property, also termed super‐explanatory, is the ability of an agent to make counterfactual models of outcomes of its actions. This article adopts a naturalist approach, informed by advancements in computational neuroscience, to define the functional kind of agency. The offered definition is deli…
Flocking Together: Free Energy, Bayesian Inference, and the Social Nature of Science
Kinds Without Structure Are Blind; Structure Without Kinds Is Empty: Remarks on the Methodology of Consciousness Science
This paper critically examines the challenges in consciousness research, with a focus on natural kind (NK) reasoning. It proposes supplementing NK reasoning with a structural realist framework, shifting the focus from identifying a natural kind of consciousness to understanding invariant structural relationships across diverse theories, thereby addressing divergence and ensuring coherence. By using predictive processing as a formal framework that…
Consciousness and the measurement problem
The intentional structure of generative models
Tables turned on table talk
Constraining the Compression: Thermodynamic Depth and Composition
This paper examines Bird's account of restricted compositionality in terms of compression of information. Additionally, this paper proposes an alternative perspective (to Bird's) that links compositionality to the Free Energy Principle and the minimisation of collective entropy. Emphasising functional integration, this criterion provides a more focused and relatively more objective (patternist) account of composition
Structural Realism About the Free Energy Principle, the Best of Both Worlds
There are realist and antirealist interpretations of the free energy principle (FEP). This paper aims to chart out a structural realist interpretation of FEP. To do so, it draws on Worrall’s (Dialectica 43(1–2): 99–124, 1989) proposal. The general insight of Worrall’s paper is that there is progress at the level of the structure of theories rather than their content. To enact Worrall’s strategy in the context of FEP, this paper will focus on char…
Carving teleology at its joints
This paper addresses the conceptualisation and measurement of goal-directedness. Drawing inspiration from Ernst Mayr’s demarcation between multiple meanings of teleology, we propose a refined approach that delineates different kinds of teleology/teleonomy based on the temporal depth of generative models of self-organising systems that evince free energy minimisation
A free energy reconstruction of arguments for panpsychism
Casting inference to the best explanation's lot with active inference
This paper draws on the resources of computational neuroscience (an account of active inference under the free energy principle) to address Bas van Fraassen's bad lot objection to the inference to the best explanation (IBE). The general assumption of this paper is that IBE is a finessed form of active inferences that self‐organising systems perform to maximise the chance of their survival. Under this assumption, the paper aims to establish the fo…
A tale of two architectures
Structures in Physics and Neuroscience: Structural Realism and the Unity of Science
Agency, Causation, and Empiricism
Price claims that the agency theory of causation could be understood as a sophisticated form of either realism or empiricism (but not a simple‐minded form of any of them). In this paper, I argue that the agency theory could find a more congenial ally in constructive empiricism (rather than realism) and show that this new alliance would be profitable to both constructive empiricism and the agency theory of causation
A critical analysis of Markovian monism
The theoretical question of the practical considerations: Some Carnapian reflections
In spite of some interesting recent research, Carnap’s emphasis on the bearing of the practical features on the constitution of knowledge is not duly appreciated yet. A few decades before the emerging thrill about the pragmatic encroachment in epistemology, it was Carnap who, inspired by the accomplishments of the pragmatists, had made some lasting remarks about the bearing of the essentially non-epistemic factors on the formation of knowledge. T…
Structural realist account of the self
A critical analysis of Markovian monism
Constraining the Compression: Thermodynamic Depth and Composition
This paper examines Bird's account of restricted compositionality in terms of compression of information. Additionally, this paper proposes an alternative perspective (to Bird's) that links compositionality to the Free Energy Principle and the minimisation of collective entropy. Emphasising functional integration, this criterion provides a more focused and relatively more objective (patternist) account of composition
Carving teleology at its joints
This paper addresses the conceptualisation and measurement of goal-directedness. Drawing inspiration from Ernst Mayr’s demarcation between multiple meanings of teleology, we propose a refined approach that delineates different kinds of teleology/teleonomy based on the temporal depth of generative models of self-organising systems that evince free energy minimisation
Structural realist account of the self
Structural realist account of the self
The theoretical question of the practical considerations: Some Carnapian reflections
In spite of some interesting recent research, Carnap’s emphasis on the bearing of the practical features on the constitution of knowledge is not duly appreciated yet. A few decades before the emerging thrill about the pragmatic encroachment in epistemology, it was Carnap who, inspired by the accomplishments of the pragmatists, had made some lasting remarks about the bearing of the essentially non-epistemic factors on the formation of knowledge. T…
Structures in Physics and Neuroscience: Structural Realism and the Unity of Science
Agency, Causation, and Empiricism
Price claims that the agency theory of causation could be understood as a sophisticated form of either realism or empiricism (but not a simple‐minded form of any of them). In this paper, I argue that the agency theory could find a more congenial ally in constructive empiricism (rather than realism) and show that this new alliance would be profitable to both constructive empiricism and the agency theory of causation
A critical analysis of Markovian monism
A tale of two architectures
A free energy reconstruction of arguments for panpsychism
Casting inference to the best explanation's lot with active inference
This paper draws on the resources of computational neuroscience (an account of active inference under the free energy principle) to address Bas van Fraassen's bad lot objection to the inference to the best explanation (IBE). The general assumption of this paper is that IBE is a finessed form of active inferences that self‐organising systems perform to maximise the chance of their survival. Under this assumption, the paper aims to establish the fo…
Structural Realism About the Free Energy Principle, the Best of Both Worlds
There are realist and antirealist interpretations of the free energy principle (FEP). This paper aims to chart out a structural realist interpretation of FEP. To do so, it draws on Worrall’s (Dialectica 43(1–2): 99–124, 1989) proposal. The general insight of Worrall’s paper is that there is progress at the level of the structure of theories rather than their content. To enact Worrall’s strategy in the context of FEP, this paper will focus on char…
Carving teleology at its joints
This paper addresses the conceptualisation and measurement of goal-directedness. Drawing inspiration from Ernst Mayr’s demarcation between multiple meanings of teleology, we propose a refined approach that delineates different kinds of teleology/teleonomy based on the temporal depth of generative models of self-organising systems that evince free energy minimisation
The intentional structure of generative models
Tables turned on table talk
Constraining the Compression: Thermodynamic Depth and Composition
This paper examines Bird's account of restricted compositionality in terms of compression of information. Additionally, this paper proposes an alternative perspective (to Bird's) that links compositionality to the Free Energy Principle and the minimisation of collective entropy. Emphasising functional integration, this criterion provides a more focused and relatively more objective (patternist) account of composition
Bootstrapping and Its Discontents in Consciousness Science
Free will is real—I could not have believed otherwise
This paper seeks to advance the compatibilist theory of free will, particularly building upon contributions by Christian List (and also Daniel Dennett) regarding the agential capacity to act otherwise. Emphasizing the importance of genuine agential abilities, it aims to conceptualize these abilities in empirically grounded terms, avoiding reliance on modal notions and eschewing an insurmountable divide between physical and psychological levels. T…
Agency as a functional kind
This article seeks to define the genuine (functional) kind of agency by identifying its essential property. In the context of this article, the essential property, also termed super‐explanatory, is the ability of an agent to make counterfactual models of outcomes of its actions. This article adopts a naturalist approach, informed by advancements in computational neuroscience, to define the functional kind of agency. The offered definition is deli…
Flocking Together: Free Energy, Bayesian Inference, and the Social Nature of Science
Kinds Without Structure Are Blind; Structure Without Kinds Is Empty: Remarks on the Methodology of Consciousness Science
This paper critically examines the challenges in consciousness research, with a focus on natural kind (NK) reasoning. It proposes supplementing NK reasoning with a structural realist framework, shifting the focus from identifying a natural kind of consciousness to understanding invariant structural relationships across diverse theories, thereby addressing divergence and ensuring coherence. By using predictive processing as a formal framework that…
Consciousness and the measurement problem
Philosophy (14 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (13 works) · Epistemology (13 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (12 works) · Cognitive science (8 works) · Philosophy of science (8 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Metaphysics (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 works)