Leszek Wroński
Biographic Data
| ID | 1307547 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Leszek Wroński |
| GIVEN NAMES | Leszek |
| FAMILY NAME | Wroński |
| SIGNATURE | WROŃSKI L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Jagiellonian University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7152-4544 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Elimination Counterexamples
What chance-credence norms should be
We show a somewhat surprising result concerning the relationship between the Principal Principle and its allegedly generalized form. Then, we formulate a few desiderata concerning chance-credence norms and argue that none of the norms widely discussed in the literature satisfies all of them. We suggest that the New Principle comes out as the best contender
Objective consequentialism and the plurality of chances
I claim that objective consequentialism (OC) faces a problem stemming from the existence in some situations of a plurality of chances relevant to the outcomes of an agent’s acts. I suggest that this phenomenon bears structural resemblance to the well-known Reference Class problem. I outline a few ways in which one could attempt to deal with the issue, suggesting that it is the higher-level chance that should be employed by OC
Completion of the Causal Completability Problem
We give a few results concerning the notions of causal completability and causal closedness of classical probability spaces (Hofer-Szabó et al. [1999]; Gyenis and Rédei [2004]). We prove that (i) any classical probability space has a causally closed extension; (ii) any finite classical probability space with positive rational probabilities on the atoms of the event algebra can be extended to a causally up-to-three-closed finite space; and (iii) a…
Reichenbach's Paradise
Since its first introduction by Hans Reichenbach, many philosophers have claimed to refute the common cause principle. The situation is not so straightforward, though: validity of the principle remains an open question. The book traces different formulations of the principle, and provides proofs of a few pertinent theorems, settling the relevant questions in various probability spaces. It offers both philosophical insight and mathematical rigor
On Minkowskian branching structures
On infinite EPR-like correlations
On infinite EPR-like correlations
Completion of the Causal Completability Problem
We give a few results concerning the notions of causal completability and causal closedness of classical probability spaces (Hofer-Szabó et al. [1999]; Gyenis and Rédei [2004]). We prove that (i) any classical probability space has a causally closed extension; (ii) any finite classical probability space with positive rational probabilities on the atoms of the event algebra can be extended to a causally up-to-three-closed finite space; and (iii) a…
On Minkowskian branching structures
On infinite EPR-like correlations
Reichenbach's Paradise
Since its first introduction by Hans Reichenbach, many philosophers have claimed to refute the common cause principle. The situation is not so straightforward, though: validity of the principle remains an open question. The book traces different formulations of the principle, and provides proofs of a few pertinent theorems, settling the relevant questions in various probability spaces. It offers both philosophical insight and mathematical rigor
Completion of the Causal Completability Problem
We give a few results concerning the notions of causal completability and causal closedness of classical probability spaces (Hofer-Szabó et al. [1999]; Gyenis and Rédei [2004]). We prove that (i) any classical probability space has a causally closed extension; (ii) any finite classical probability space with positive rational probabilities on the atoms of the event algebra can be extended to a causally up-to-three-closed finite space; and (iii) a…
Objective consequentialism and the plurality of chances
I claim that objective consequentialism (OC) faces a problem stemming from the existence in some situations of a plurality of chances relevant to the outcomes of an agent’s acts. I suggest that this phenomenon bears structural resemblance to the well-known Reference Class problem. I outline a few ways in which one could attempt to deal with the issue, suggesting that it is the higher-level chance that should be employed by OC
What chance-credence norms should be
We show a somewhat surprising result concerning the relationship between the Principal Principle and its allegedly generalized form. Then, we formulate a few desiderata concerning chance-credence norms and argue that none of the norms widely discussed in the literature satisfies all of them. We suggest that the New Principle comes out as the best contender
Elimination Counterexamples
Mathematics (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Quantum Mechanics and Applications (3 works) · Discrete mathematics (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works)