Daniel Skibra
Biographic Data
| ID | 1307666 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Skibra |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Skibra |
| SIGNATURE | SKIBRA D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Konstanz |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7348-3678 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Self-ascription and primitiveness
Lewis’s property theory of the attitudes hinges on a notion of self-ascription that some philosophers allege is a primitive of the theory, and is suspect on those grounds. The present paper unpacks this complaint and the objections that flow from it. I argue that two sorts of objections can be made on the basis of the primitiveness complaint—what I call the evasion and the arbitrariness objections. Recent defenses of Lewis (e.g., Jackson and Stol…
Ought and agency
A thorny question surrounding the meaning of ought concerns a felt distinction between deontic uses of ought that seem to evaluate a state of affairs versus those that seem to describe a requirement or obligation to perform an action, as in (A) and (B), respectively. (A) There ought not be childhood death and disease. (B) You ought to keep that promise. Various accounts have been offered to explain the contrast between “agentive” and “non-agentiv…
On Content Uniformity for Beliefs and Desires
Kant’s Transcendental Arguments
Kant’s Transcendental Arguments
On Content Uniformity for Beliefs and Desires
Ought and agency
A thorny question surrounding the meaning of ought concerns a felt distinction between deontic uses of ought that seem to evaluate a state of affairs versus those that seem to describe a requirement or obligation to perform an action, as in (A) and (B), respectively. (A) There ought not be childhood death and disease. (B) You ought to keep that promise. Various accounts have been offered to explain the contrast between “agentive” and “non-agentiv…
Self-ascription and primitiveness
Lewis’s property theory of the attitudes hinges on a notion of self-ascription that some philosophers allege is a primitive of the theory, and is suspect on those grounds. The present paper unpacks this complaint and the objections that flow from it. I argue that two sorts of objections can be made on the basis of the primitiveness complaint—what I call the evasion and the arbitrariness objections. Recent defenses of Lewis (e.g., Jackson and Stol…
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy of mind (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Agency (philosophy) (1 work) · Ambiguity (1 work)