Stefano Bertea
Biographic Data
| ID | 1309767 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Stefano Bertea |
| GIVEN NAMES | Stefano |
| FAMILY NAME | Bertea |
| SIGNATURE | BERTEA S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Leicester |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6013-2326 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Doing What the Law Requires by Breaking Mandatory Laws
In this work, I contribute to the debate on the status and legitimacy of principled disobedience in a democratic polity. After introducing the notion, I move to argue that principled disobedience can be framed not only as a moral and political stance but also, and without contradiction, as a legal requirement. As a result, it will be maintained that not only can we engage in principled disobedience without necessarily violating our legal obligati…
Searching for Law in Its Own Right
In this work, I address the “demarcation problem” in law, which invites us to look for the essential properties distinguishing law from nonlaw. First, I introduce the main terms of the discussion, which has seen the traditional view that law is a distinctive practice with its own distinguishing properties pitted against the critical view that law cannot be associated with any such properties. I then turn to what I take to be the core of truth tha…
A Defence of Robust Idealism in Political Philosophy
In this contribution, I defend a robust model of political idealism, making the case for such an approach to both the theory and practice of politics. On this view, not only in framing a political philosophy but also in putting forward policy proposals and institutional designs, we need not think about feasibility as an overriding, make-or-break criterion for evaluating the soundness of that theory or proposal, neither of which loses its point si…
Where Objective Facts and Norms Meet (and What this Means for Law)
In this essay, I will engage with the controversy that has sprung up between the proponents of the sharp separation thesis and those of the entanglement thesis. What I will be defending is a variant of the entanglement thesis. By drawing on contemporary action theory and on epistemic conceptualism, I will argue that, while objective facts and practical norms are indeed distinct categories of thought, that distinction does not amount to a conceptu…
Is the autonomy of the will a paradoxical idea
Practical Reason in Law and Morality by Neil Maccormick
A Critique of Inclusive-Positivism
In this paper, I present a critique of inclusive positivism. Inclusive positivism is an untenable position, I argue, because the connection between law and critical morality is conceptual and thus more than merely an accident or a possibility: at the foundation of law we find social facts, but we also and importantly find moral evaluations. This thesis is supported by an argument showing in essence that law cannot exist apart from justification a…
A Critique of Inclusive-Positivism
In this paper, I present a critique of inclusive positivism. Inclusive positivism is an untenable position, I argue, because the connection between law and critical morality is conceptual and thus more than merely an accident or a possibility: at the foundation of law we find social facts, but we also and importantly find moral evaluations. This thesis is supported by an argument showing in essence that law cannot exist apart from justification a…
Practical Reason in Law and Morality by Neil Maccormick
A Defence of Robust Idealism in Political Philosophy
In this contribution, I defend a robust model of political idealism, making the case for such an approach to both the theory and practice of politics. On this view, not only in framing a political philosophy but also in putting forward policy proposals and institutional designs, we need not think about feasibility as an overriding, make-or-break criterion for evaluating the soundness of that theory or proposal, neither of which loses its point si…
Where Objective Facts and Norms Meet (and What this Means for Law)
In this essay, I will engage with the controversy that has sprung up between the proponents of the sharp separation thesis and those of the entanglement thesis. What I will be defending is a variant of the entanglement thesis. By drawing on contemporary action theory and on epistemic conceptualism, I will argue that, while objective facts and practical norms are indeed distinct categories of thought, that distinction does not amount to a conceptu…
Is the autonomy of the will a paradoxical idea
Searching for Law in Its Own Right
In this work, I address the “demarcation problem” in law, which invites us to look for the essential properties distinguishing law from nonlaw. First, I introduce the main terms of the discussion, which has seen the traditional view that law is a distinctive practice with its own distinguishing properties pitted against the critical view that law cannot be associated with any such properties. I then turn to what I take to be the core of truth tha…
Doing What the Law Requires by Breaking Mandatory Laws
In this work, I contribute to the debate on the status and legitimacy of principled disobedience in a democratic polity. After introducing the notion, I move to argue that principled disobedience can be framed not only as a moral and political stance but also, and without contradiction, as a legal requirement. As a result, it will be maintained that not only can we engage in principled disobedience without necessarily violating our legal obligati…
Law (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Law and economics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Law in Society and Culture (2 works)