Michael Veber
Biographic Data
| ID | 1310808 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael Veber |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | Veber |
| SIGNATURE | VEBER M |
| AFFILIATIONS | East Carolina University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3573-2060 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The Paradox of Dogmatism as a Regulative Epistemic Problem
The paradox of dogmatism is an argument to the effect that any subject who knows that P can thereby know that any counterevidence is misleading and, therefore, the subject ought to ignore that counterevidence. Regulative epistemology is the effort to develop principles to guide inquiry. The paradox of dogmatism is not typically understood as a regulative problem. But that is an illuminating way to view it. Understood that way, this paper offers a…
Why I am not HxA
Heterodox Academy requires its members to pledge their support for its three ideals: open inquiry, viewpoint diversity, and constructive disagreement. Given the history of loyalty oaths in academia, it is surprising that a society that bills itself the way Heterodox Academy does would require one. And there is a more serious problem. "Constructive Disagreement", as Heterodox Academy understands and advocates for it, is inconsistent with open inqu…
A different kind of dream-based skepticism
The Epistemology of Belief - Hamid Vahid
Hamid Vahid's book deals with an array of issues – the idea that belief aims at truth, Moore's paradox, the basing relation, the problem of easy knowledge, fallibilism and self‐knowledge. One of Vahid's favourite weapons is the principle of charity. It is very hard to stick to this principle when interpreting most of his arguments. Each chapter addresses a single problem. Vahid begins with a survey and critique of existing approaches and ends by …
What Do You Do with Misleading Evidence
Gilbert Harman has presented an argument to the effect that if S knows that p then S knows that any evidence for not‐p is misleading. Therefore S is warranted in being dogmatic about anything he happens to know. I explain, and reject, Sorensen's attempt to solve the paradox via Jackson's theory of conditionals. S is not in a position to disregard evidence even when he knows it to be misleading
What Do You Do with Misleading Evidence
Gilbert Harman has presented an argument to the effect that if S knows that p then S knows that any evidence for not‐p is misleading. Therefore S is warranted in being dogmatic about anything he happens to know. I explain, and reject, Sorensen's attempt to solve the paradox via Jackson's theory of conditionals. S is not in a position to disregard evidence even when he knows it to be misleading
What Do You Do with Misleading Evidence
Gilbert Harman has presented an argument to the effect that if S knows that p then S knows that any evidence for not‐p is misleading. Therefore S is warranted in being dogmatic about anything he happens to know. I explain, and reject, Sorensen's attempt to solve the paradox via Jackson's theory of conditionals. S is not in a position to disregard evidence even when he knows it to be misleading
The Epistemology of Belief - Hamid Vahid
Hamid Vahid's book deals with an array of issues – the idea that belief aims at truth, Moore's paradox, the basing relation, the problem of easy knowledge, fallibilism and self‐knowledge. One of Vahid's favourite weapons is the principle of charity. It is very hard to stick to this principle when interpreting most of his arguments. Each chapter addresses a single problem. Vahid begins with a survey and critique of existing approaches and ends by …
A different kind of dream-based skepticism
Why I am not HxA
Heterodox Academy requires its members to pledge their support for its three ideals: open inquiry, viewpoint diversity, and constructive disagreement. Given the history of loyalty oaths in academia, it is surprising that a society that bills itself the way Heterodox Academy does would require one. And there is a more serious problem. "Constructive Disagreement", as Heterodox Academy understands and advocates for it, is inconsistent with open inqu…
The Paradox of Dogmatism as a Regulative Epistemic Problem
The paradox of dogmatism is an argument to the effect that any subject who knows that P can thereby know that any counterevidence is misleading and, therefore, the subject ought to ignore that counterevidence. Regulative epistemology is the effort to develop principles to guide inquiry. The paradox of dogmatism is not typically understood as a regulative problem. But that is an illuminating way to view it. Understood that way, this paper offers a…
Argument (complex analysis) (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works) · Computer Science (1 work) · Constructive (1 work) · Dream (1 work) · Elitism (1 work)