Christine Tiefensee
Biographic Data
| ID | 1312569 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christine Tiefensee |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christine |
| FAMILY NAME | Tiefensee |
| SIGNATURE | TIEFENSEE C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Frankfurt School of Finance & Management |
| ORCID | 0009-0005-3832-3440 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Many meanings, many speech acts
In Reasoning with Attitude , Luca Incurvati and Julian Schlöder defend what they call inferential expressivism: a proposed synthesis of inferentialism and expressivism, according to which semantic values are given by inferential relations between attitude expressions. In this contribution, I examine how far inferential expressivism departs from more traditional forms of inferentialism and, insofar as it does diverge, put pressure on the claim tha…
Through thick and thin
One major insight derived from the moral twin earth debate is that evaluative and descriptive terms possess different levels of semantic stability, in that the meanings of the former but not the latter tend to remain constant over significant counterfactual variance in patterns of application. At the same time, it is common in metanormative debate to divide evaluative terms into those that are thin and those that are thick. In this paper, I combi…
Indeterminacy and collective harms
The ‘no-difference problem’ challenges us to explain in which way the occurrence of an aggregate effect gives us reason to act in a specific way, although our individual actions make no difference to the effect’s occurrence. When discussing this problem, philosophers usually distinguish between so-called ‘triggering cases’, where the aggregate effect in question is brought about upon reaching a precise threshold, and ‘non-triggering cases’, in wh…
Error, consistency and triviality
In this paper, we present a new semantic challenge to the moral error theory. Its first component calls upon moral error theorists to deliver a deontic semantics that is consistent with the error‐theoretic denial of moral truths by returning the truth‐value false to all moral deontic sentences. We call this the ‘consistency challenge’ to the moral error theory. Its second component demands that error theorists explain in which way moral deontic a…
Metasemantics for the Relaxed
This chapter discusses how to meet the ‘generalized integration challenge’ as a relaxed moral realist by providing a metasemantics of moral vocabulary which is compatible with relaxing about moral metaphysics and epistemology. Employing normative inferentialism and focussing on evaluative moral terms in particular, it is suggested that evaluative moral terms function to explain proprieties of language exit transitions, where having this function …
"Ought" and Error
The moral error theory generally does not receive good press in metaethics. This paper adds to the bad news. In contrast to other critics, though, I do not attack error theorists’ characteristic thesis that no moral assertion is ever true. Instead, I develop a new counter-argument which questions error theorists’ ability to defend their claim that moral utterances are (typically) meaningful assertions. More precisely: Moral error theorists lack a…
Error Theory, Relaxation and Inferentialism
Error theories can be built on considerations of incoherence, propounding that moral thinking is flawed because it involves built-in contradictions. If relaxed philosophers are right, metaphysically driven error theories are mistaken: justification of moral ontological commitment does not depend on domain-external, metaphysical considerations. This chapter considers what error theorists might gain, but also what they may lose, by adopting this mo…
Inferentialist metaethics, bifurcations and ontological commitment
Expressivism, Anti-Archimedeanism and Supervenience
Inferentialist metaethics, bifurcations and ontological commitment
Through thick and thin
One major insight derived from the moral twin earth debate is that evaluative and descriptive terms possess different levels of semantic stability, in that the meanings of the former but not the latter tend to remain constant over significant counterfactual variance in patterns of application. At the same time, it is common in metanormative debate to divide evaluative terms into those that are thin and those that are thick. In this paper, I combi…
Expressivism, Anti-Archimedeanism and Supervenience
Expressivism, Anti-Archimedeanism and Supervenience
Inferentialist metaethics, bifurcations and ontological commitment
Error Theory, Relaxation and Inferentialism
Error theories can be built on considerations of incoherence, propounding that moral thinking is flawed because it involves built-in contradictions. If relaxed philosophers are right, metaphysically driven error theories are mistaken: justification of moral ontological commitment does not depend on domain-external, metaphysical considerations. This chapter considers what error theorists might gain, but also what they may lose, by adopting this mo…
"Ought" and Error
The moral error theory generally does not receive good press in metaethics. This paper adds to the bad news. In contrast to other critics, though, I do not attack error theorists’ characteristic thesis that no moral assertion is ever true. Instead, I develop a new counter-argument which questions error theorists’ ability to defend their claim that moral utterances are (typically) meaningful assertions. More precisely: Moral error theorists lack a…
Metasemantics for the Relaxed
This chapter discusses how to meet the ‘generalized integration challenge’ as a relaxed moral realist by providing a metasemantics of moral vocabulary which is compatible with relaxing about moral metaphysics and epistemology. Employing normative inferentialism and focussing on evaluative moral terms in particular, it is suggested that evaluative moral terms function to explain proprieties of language exit transitions, where having this function …
Indeterminacy and collective harms
The ‘no-difference problem’ challenges us to explain in which way the occurrence of an aggregate effect gives us reason to act in a specific way, although our individual actions make no difference to the effect’s occurrence. When discussing this problem, philosophers usually distinguish between so-called ‘triggering cases’, where the aggregate effect in question is brought about upon reaching a precise threshold, and ‘non-triggering cases’, in wh…
Error, consistency and triviality
In this paper, we present a new semantic challenge to the moral error theory. Its first component calls upon moral error theorists to deliver a deontic semantics that is consistent with the error‐theoretic denial of moral truths by returning the truth‐value false to all moral deontic sentences. We call this the ‘consistency challenge’ to the moral error theory. Its second component demands that error theorists explain in which way moral deontic a…
Through thick and thin
One major insight derived from the moral twin earth debate is that evaluative and descriptive terms possess different levels of semantic stability, in that the meanings of the former but not the latter tend to remain constant over significant counterfactual variance in patterns of application. At the same time, it is common in metanormative debate to divide evaluative terms into those that are thin and those that are thick. In this paper, I combi…
Many meanings, many speech acts
In Reasoning with Attitude , Luca Incurvati and Julian Schlöder defend what they call inferential expressivism: a proposed synthesis of inferentialism and expressivism, according to which semantic values are given by inferential relations between attitude expressions. In this contribution, I examine how far inferential expressivism departs from more traditional forms of inferentialism and, insofar as it does diverge, put pressure on the claim tha…
Epistemology (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Free Will and Agency (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Philosophy of language (5 works) · Expressivism (3 works) · Psychology (3 works)