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Roberta Q Herzberg

Biographic Data

ID1324020
NAMERoberta Q Herzberg
GIVEN NAMESRoberta Q
FAMILY NAMEHerzberg
SIGNATUREHERZBERG R Q
AFFILIATIONSIndiana University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS8
TOTAL CITATIONS49
AUTHOR COUNT8
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1986
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2020
H-INDEX3
  • Gifts as governance

    Open Access•Nathan P Goodman, Roberta Q Herzberg•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional Economics•2020

    How do gifts relate to formal and informal institutions? Giving gifts, especially in the form of anti-poverty aid, opens the givers to a serious social dilemma: the Samaritan's dilemma. We explain how the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints uses a mixture of formal and informal governance to provide sustainable social welfare programs that avoid this dilemma. These institutions not only govern aid arrangements, but also provide governance…

  • Governing their commons

    Open Access•Roberta Q Herzberg•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2015•Cited by: 3•References: 14

  • Elinor Ostrom (1933–2012)

    Open Access•Roberta Herzberg, Roberta Q Herzberg et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2012•Cited by: 1•References: 2

  • An Analytic Choice Approach to Concurrent Majorities

    Roberta Herzberg, Roberta Q Herzberg•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1992•Cited by: 2•References: 16

    John C. Calhoun proposed a constitutional design awarding each "major" interest in society a veto over government action, and thus assuring that no government action could occur at the expense of significant interests. This paper develops a simple formal model based on the assumptions and conditions outlined in Calhoun's theory to show that his design results in a decision process more stable than that expected under simple majority rule. Moreove…

  • Advice and Consent

    Open Access•Patrick J Haney, Roberta Q Herzberg et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1992•Cited by: 19•References: 20

    This research explores two approaches to modeling decisions about when to resort to conflict. The authors begin from a model of a single actor making unilateral decisions for her or his nation-state. That model is expanded to incorporate advisors who make recommendations to the unitary actor. Those recommendations can be accepted or rejected as the leader sees fit. The authors' concern is to explore the robustness of the unitary actor model when …

  • Results on Sophisticated Voting in an Experimental Setting

    Roberta Q Herzberg, Rick K Wilson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1988•Cited by: 17•References: 15

    This research explores the extent of sophisticated voting in a simplified agenda setting. We begin from the commonly held presumption that decision makers (whether legislators or school board members) employ sophisticated strategies when voting. This viewpoint has been rigorously modeled under a variety of formal theories. However, given that there is little corroborative empirical evidence that decision makers use sophisticated voting strategies…

  • Negative Decision Powers and Institutional Equilibrium

    Rick K Wilson, Roberta Herzberg et al.•ARTICLE•The Western Political Quarterly•1987•Cited by: 6•References: 21

    VER the past decade an important strand of political science research has turned to studying actors' behavioral strategies within political institutions. This new institutionalism has focused largely on legislative processes, with the approaches to that study varying from the historical to the analytical (see the discussion by Shepsle 1986). The principal question asked by these researchers is: In what ways do institutions affect the actions of p…

  • McCloskey versus McIntyre

    Roberta Q Herzberg•ARTICLE•Publius The Journal of Federalism•1986•Cited by: 1

    The 1984 election in the Eighth Congressional District of Indiana produced an unclear result. Election night totals gave the victory to the Democratic incumbent Francis McCloskey. Subsequent recounts by state and local officials gave the victory to Republican Richard McIntyre. A further recount by the U.S. House of Representatives returned the victory to McCloskey by a four-vote margin. Partisanship was important in all phases of deciding the out…

  • Advice and Consent

    Open Access•Patrick J Haney, Roberta Q Herzberg et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1992•Cited by: 19•References: 20

    This research explores two approaches to modeling decisions about when to resort to conflict. The authors begin from a model of a single actor making unilateral decisions for her or his nation-state. That model is expanded to incorporate advisors who make recommendations to the unitary actor. Those recommendations can be accepted or rejected as the leader sees fit. The authors' concern is to explore the robustness of the unitary actor model when …

  • Results on Sophisticated Voting in an Experimental Setting

    Roberta Q Herzberg, Rick K Wilson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1988•Cited by: 17•References: 15

    This research explores the extent of sophisticated voting in a simplified agenda setting. We begin from the commonly held presumption that decision makers (whether legislators or school board members) employ sophisticated strategies when voting. This viewpoint has been rigorously modeled under a variety of formal theories. However, given that there is little corroborative empirical evidence that decision makers use sophisticated voting strategies…

  • Negative Decision Powers and Institutional Equilibrium

    Rick K Wilson, Roberta Herzberg et al.•ARTICLE•The Western Political Quarterly•1987•Cited by: 6•References: 21

    VER the past decade an important strand of political science research has turned to studying actors' behavioral strategies within political institutions. This new institutionalism has focused largely on legislative processes, with the approaches to that study varying from the historical to the analytical (see the discussion by Shepsle 1986). The principal question asked by these researchers is: In what ways do institutions affect the actions of p…

  • Governing their commons

    Open Access•Roberta Q Herzberg•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2015•Cited by: 3•References: 14

  • An Analytic Choice Approach to Concurrent Majorities

    Roberta Herzberg, Roberta Q Herzberg•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1992•Cited by: 2•References: 16

    John C. Calhoun proposed a constitutional design awarding each "major" interest in society a veto over government action, and thus assuring that no government action could occur at the expense of significant interests. This paper develops a simple formal model based on the assumptions and conditions outlined in Calhoun's theory to show that his design results in a decision process more stable than that expected under simple majority rule. Moreove…

  • Elinor Ostrom (1933–2012)

    Open Access•Roberta Herzberg, Roberta Q Herzberg et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2012•Cited by: 1•References: 2

  • McCloskey versus McIntyre

    Roberta Q Herzberg•ARTICLE•Publius The Journal of Federalism•1986•Cited by: 1

    The 1984 election in the Eighth Congressional District of Indiana produced an unclear result. Election night totals gave the victory to the Democratic incumbent Francis McCloskey. Subsequent recounts by state and local officials gave the victory to Republican Richard McIntyre. A further recount by the U.S. House of Representatives returned the victory to McCloskey by a four-vote margin. Partisanship was important in all phases of deciding the out…

  • McCloskey versus McIntyre

    Roberta Q Herzberg•ARTICLE•Publius The Journal of Federalism•1986•Cited by: 1

    The 1984 election in the Eighth Congressional District of Indiana produced an unclear result. Election night totals gave the victory to the Democratic incumbent Francis McCloskey. Subsequent recounts by state and local officials gave the victory to Republican Richard McIntyre. A further recount by the U.S. House of Representatives returned the victory to McCloskey by a four-vote margin. Partisanship was important in all phases of deciding the out…

  • Negative Decision Powers and Institutional Equilibrium

    Rick K Wilson, Roberta Herzberg et al.•ARTICLE•The Western Political Quarterly•1987•Cited by: 6•References: 21

    VER the past decade an important strand of political science research has turned to studying actors' behavioral strategies within political institutions. This new institutionalism has focused largely on legislative processes, with the approaches to that study varying from the historical to the analytical (see the discussion by Shepsle 1986). The principal question asked by these researchers is: In what ways do institutions affect the actions of p…

  • Results on Sophisticated Voting in an Experimental Setting

    Roberta Q Herzberg, Rick K Wilson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1988•Cited by: 17•References: 15

    This research explores the extent of sophisticated voting in a simplified agenda setting. We begin from the commonly held presumption that decision makers (whether legislators or school board members) employ sophisticated strategies when voting. This viewpoint has been rigorously modeled under a variety of formal theories. However, given that there is little corroborative empirical evidence that decision makers use sophisticated voting strategies…

  • An Analytic Choice Approach to Concurrent Majorities

    Roberta Herzberg, Roberta Q Herzberg•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1992•Cited by: 2•References: 16

    John C. Calhoun proposed a constitutional design awarding each "major" interest in society a veto over government action, and thus assuring that no government action could occur at the expense of significant interests. This paper develops a simple formal model based on the assumptions and conditions outlined in Calhoun's theory to show that his design results in a decision process more stable than that expected under simple majority rule. Moreove…

  • Advice and Consent

    Open Access•Patrick J Haney, Roberta Q Herzberg et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1992•Cited by: 19•References: 20

    This research explores two approaches to modeling decisions about when to resort to conflict. The authors begin from a model of a single actor making unilateral decisions for her or his nation-state. That model is expanded to incorporate advisors who make recommendations to the unitary actor. Those recommendations can be accepted or rejected as the leader sees fit. The authors' concern is to explore the robustness of the unitary actor model when …

  • Elinor Ostrom (1933–2012)

    Open Access•Roberta Herzberg, Roberta Q Herzberg et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2012•Cited by: 1•References: 2

  • Governing their commons

    Open Access•Roberta Q Herzberg•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2015•Cited by: 3•References: 14

  • Gifts as governance

    Open Access•Nathan P Goodman, Roberta Q Herzberg•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional Economics•2020

    How do gifts relate to formal and informal institutions? Giving gifts, especially in the form of anti-poverty aid, opens the givers to a serious social dilemma: the Samaritan's dilemma. We explain how the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints uses a mixture of formal and informal governance to provide sustainable social welfare programs that avoid this dilemma. These institutions not only govern aid arrangements, but also provide governance…

Political science (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · American Constitutional Law and Politics (2 works)

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