J T M Miller
Biographic Data
| ID | 1356615 |
|---|---|
| NAME | J T M Miller |
| GIVEN NAMES | J T M |
| FAMILY NAME | Miller |
| SIGNATURE | MILLER J T M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Durham University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2654-5012 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 24 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
‘Water’ and ‘Water’
Putnam’s Twin-Earth thought experiment has been hugely influential as an argument in favor of semantic externalism. In this article, I argue that the Twin-Earth thought experiment relies on some previously unnoticed metaphysical assumptions about how to individuate words. My aim is not to argue that semantic externalism is false. Rather I aim to show that Putnam’s thought experiment is only effective as an argument for semantic externalism if we …
There are no uninstantiated words
Kaplan ([1990]. “Words.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64: 93–119; [2011]. “Words on Words.” The Journal of Philosophy 108 (9): 504–529) argues that there are no unspoken words. Hawthorne and Lepore ([2011]. “On Words.” The Journal of Philosophy 108 (9): 447–485) put forward examples that purport to show that there can be such words. Here, I argue that Kaplan is correct, if we grant him a minor variation. While Hawthorne and Lepore migh…
Hyperintensionality and Ontological Categories
In this paper, I discuss how to distinguish between ontological categories and ordinary categories. Using an argument against van Inwagen’s proposed account of what makes a category ontological as a springboard, I argue that if ontological categories are modally robust, then ontological categories need to be understood hyperintensionally. This conclusion opens up a wide range of new ways to define ‘ontological category’, and I close by briefly ou…
How to Misspell ‘Paris’
One feature of language is that we are able to make mistakes in our use of language. Amongst other sorts of mistakes, we can misspeak, misspell, missign, or misunderstand. Given this, it seems that our metaphysics of words should be flexible enough to accommodate such mistakes. It has been argued that a nominalist account of words cannot accommodate the phenomenon of misspelling. I sketch a nominalist trope-bundle view of words that can
The metaphysics of puns
In this paper, I aim to discuss what puns, metaphysically, are. I argue that the type-token view of words leads to an indeterminacy problem when we consider puns. I then outline an alternative account of puns, based on recent nominalist views of words, that does not suffer from this indeterminacy
Easy Ontology, Regress, and Holism
In this paper, I distinguish between two possible versions of Amie Thomasson’s easy ontology project that differ in virtue of positing atomic or holistic application conditions, and evaluate the strengths of a holistic version over a non-holistic version. In particular, I argue that neither of the recently identified regress or circularity problems are troublesome for the supporter of easy ontology if they adopt a holistic account of application …
Merely verbal disputes and common ground
In this paper I offer a new characterisation of what makes a dispute merely verbal. This new characterisation builds on the framework initially outlined by Jenkins and additionally makes use of Stalnaker's notion of ‘common ground’. I argue that this ‘common ground account’ can better classify disputes as merely verbal, and can better explain cases of playing devil's advocate
E.J. Lowe and Ontology
Journal Article E.J. Lowe and Ontology Get access E.J. Lowe and Ontology, Edited By Mirosław Szatkowski. (New York, Oxford: Routledge, 2022. Pp. 326. Price £130.00.) J T M Miller J T M Miller University of Durham, UK Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Issue 3, July 2023, Pages 877–881, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad013 Published: 14 February 2023
A bundle theory of words
It has been a common assumption that words are substances that instantiate or have properties. In this paper, I question the assumption that our ontology of words requires posting substances by outlining a bundle theory of words, wherein words are bundles of various sorts of properties (such as semantic, phonetic, orthographic, and grammatical properties). I argue that this view can better account for certain phenomena than substance theories, is…
The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics
One of the greatest metaphysical insights that Aristotle contributed to the history of philosophy is that objects may be partitioned in two ways: into parts and into abstracta. The latter kind of division has not received due attention among contemporary extensional mereologists (who advocate division into parts only), and even in neo-Aristotelian quarters. In addition to clarifying which type of part is relevant for understanding Aristotle’s hyl…
Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics
The ontology of words
What are words? What makes two token words tokens of the same word-type? Are words abstract entities, or are they (merely) collections of tokens? The ontology of words tries to provide answers to these, and related questions. This article provides an overview of some of the most prominent views proposed in the literature, with a particular focus on the debate between type-realist, nominalist, and eliminativist ontologies of words
A Philosophical Guide to Chance
The philosophical literature on chance often seems to favour quite dense and technical exposition. For A Philosophical Guide to Chance, Handfield should be thoroughly congratulated for resisting this. This book is remarkably clear and unfailingly accessible, and will undoubtedly have its place on undergraduate reading lists. Typically, reviews begin with a brief summary of topics within the book. This is difficult due to the unwavering breadth pr…
The ontology of words
What are words? What makes two token words tokens of the same word-type? Are words abstract entities, or are they (merely) collections of tokens? The ontology of words tries to provide answers to these, and related questions. This article provides an overview of some of the most prominent views proposed in the literature, with a particular focus on the debate between type-realist, nominalist, and eliminativist ontologies of words
A bundle theory of words
It has been a common assumption that words are substances that instantiate or have properties. In this paper, I question the assumption that our ontology of words requires posting substances by outlining a bundle theory of words, wherein words are bundles of various sorts of properties (such as semantic, phonetic, orthographic, and grammatical properties). I argue that this view can better account for certain phenomena than substance theories, is…
A Philosophical Guide to Chance
The philosophical literature on chance often seems to favour quite dense and technical exposition. For A Philosophical Guide to Chance, Handfield should be thoroughly congratulated for resisting this. This book is remarkably clear and unfailingly accessible, and will undoubtedly have its place on undergraduate reading lists. Typically, reviews begin with a brief summary of topics within the book. This is difficult due to the unwavering breadth pr…
The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics
One of the greatest metaphysical insights that Aristotle contributed to the history of philosophy is that objects may be partitioned in two ways: into parts and into abstracta. The latter kind of division has not received due attention among contemporary extensional mereologists (who advocate division into parts only), and even in neo-Aristotelian quarters. In addition to clarifying which type of part is relevant for understanding Aristotle’s hyl…
Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics
The ontology of words
What are words? What makes two token words tokens of the same word-type? Are words abstract entities, or are they (merely) collections of tokens? The ontology of words tries to provide answers to these, and related questions. This article provides an overview of some of the most prominent views proposed in the literature, with a particular focus on the debate between type-realist, nominalist, and eliminativist ontologies of words
A bundle theory of words
It has been a common assumption that words are substances that instantiate or have properties. In this paper, I question the assumption that our ontology of words requires posting substances by outlining a bundle theory of words, wherein words are bundles of various sorts of properties (such as semantic, phonetic, orthographic, and grammatical properties). I argue that this view can better account for certain phenomena than substance theories, is…
Easy Ontology, Regress, and Holism
In this paper, I distinguish between two possible versions of Amie Thomasson’s easy ontology project that differ in virtue of positing atomic or holistic application conditions, and evaluate the strengths of a holistic version over a non-holistic version. In particular, I argue that neither of the recently identified regress or circularity problems are troublesome for the supporter of easy ontology if they adopt a holistic account of application …
Merely verbal disputes and common ground
In this paper I offer a new characterisation of what makes a dispute merely verbal. This new characterisation builds on the framework initially outlined by Jenkins and additionally makes use of Stalnaker's notion of ‘common ground’. I argue that this ‘common ground account’ can better classify disputes as merely verbal, and can better explain cases of playing devil's advocate
E.J. Lowe and Ontology
Journal Article E.J. Lowe and Ontology Get access E.J. Lowe and Ontology, Edited By Mirosław Szatkowski. (New York, Oxford: Routledge, 2022. Pp. 326. Price £130.00.) J T M Miller J T M Miller University of Durham, UK Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Issue 3, July 2023, Pages 877–881, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad013 Published: 14 February 2023
Hyperintensionality and Ontological Categories
In this paper, I discuss how to distinguish between ontological categories and ordinary categories. Using an argument against van Inwagen’s proposed account of what makes a category ontological as a springboard, I argue that if ontological categories are modally robust, then ontological categories need to be understood hyperintensionally. This conclusion opens up a wide range of new ways to define ‘ontological category’, and I close by briefly ou…
How to Misspell ‘Paris’
One feature of language is that we are able to make mistakes in our use of language. Amongst other sorts of mistakes, we can misspeak, misspell, missign, or misunderstand. Given this, it seems that our metaphysics of words should be flexible enough to accommodate such mistakes. It has been argued that a nominalist account of words cannot accommodate the phenomenon of misspelling. I sketch a nominalist trope-bundle view of words that can
The metaphysics of puns
In this paper, I aim to discuss what puns, metaphysically, are. I argue that the type-token view of words leads to an indeterminacy problem when we consider puns. I then outline an alternative account of puns, based on recent nominalist views of words, that does not suffer from this indeterminacy
‘Water’ and ‘Water’
Putnam’s Twin-Earth thought experiment has been hugely influential as an argument in favor of semantic externalism. In this article, I argue that the Twin-Earth thought experiment relies on some previously unnoticed metaphysical assumptions about how to individuate words. My aim is not to argue that semantic externalism is false. Rather I aim to show that Putnam’s thought experiment is only effective as an argument for semantic externalism if we …
There are no uninstantiated words
Kaplan ([1990]. “Words.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64: 93–119; [2011]. “Words on Words.” The Journal of Philosophy 108 (9): 504–529) argues that there are no unspoken words. Hawthorne and Lepore ([2011]. “On Words.” The Journal of Philosophy 108 (9): 447–485) put forward examples that purport to show that there can be such words. Here, I argue that Kaplan is correct, if we grant him a minor variation. While Hawthorne and Lepore migh…
Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Ontology (5 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation (3 works)