Troy Jollimore
Biographic Data
| ID | 1357354 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Troy Jollimore |
| GIVEN NAMES | Troy |
| FAMILY NAME | Jollimore |
| SIGNATURE | JOLLIMORE T |
| AFFILIATIONS | California State University, Chico |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2909-4744 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Love and Its Place in Virtue
Love and Its Place in Virtue expands and refines the view of virtue ethics Christine Swanton has developed in such influential works as Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View and Target-Centered Virtue Ethics. Her wide-ranging discussion touches on a diverse range of topics, so let me acknowledge up front that in this brief review I will not be able to do it justice. I will focus on the issues that strike me as most interesting and most problematic, i…
The Rationality of Love
Should We Want to Be Loved Unconditionally and Forever
People often say that romantic love should be unconditional, and they often want romantic love to last forever. These claims and desires are presumably linked: part of the reason it would be good for love to be unconditional is that it is assumed that such love, being detached from changing conditions, would last forever. This article argues that there are, indeed, kinds of unconditional and permanent love that are worth wanting, but also kinds t…
Anxious feelings, anxious friends
Morality, Perspective, and Fantasy
A response to Sarah Buss's article, ‘Some Musings about the Limits of an Ethics that Can Be Applied,’ focusing on issues connected with Buss’s claims about human insignificance, and the indifference to self that the recognition of insignificance allegedly engenders
Love as “Something in Between”
Many philosophical accounts of love hold that love is a thoroughly arational phenomenon, that it is not a response to value, or that we do not love for reasons. This chapter argues these accounts are mistaken: when we love we are typically responding to positive qualities of the beloved, and in rendering our love appropriate and intelligible these qualities provide reasons for love. However, the role of reasons in love is highly complex. This is,…
“Sketches of landscapes”
Is it possible to do philosophy by writing lyric poems—or reading them? How can a poem be genuinely philosophical, and can a philosophical poem do something that straightforward philosophical writing cannot do? Some have suggested that poems and philosophical writings have different aims and are subject to different and conflicting demands, which would render it difficult if not impossible to write a successful philosophical poem. I suggest that …
At Lake Scugog
Creating cosmopolitans
Why Is Instrumental Rationality Rational
It is relatively common for philosophers to doubt whether we have any reason to act as morality requires. But it is very difficult to find philosophers who are willing to doubt, in a similar way, the idea that we have reason to act as instrumental rationality requires; reason, that is, to take effective steps toward attaining the ends we have accepted as our own. The inference from the fact that a certain action is an effective means of satisfyin…
Goldstick on the ‘Two Hats’ Problem
The indirect-strategy consequentialist recommends that the consequentialist agent develop certain non-consequentialist feelings and dispositions. It is difficult to see, however, how such an agent could knowingly do this, given her moral beliefs. Goldstick has argued that the problem is not particular to consequentialism; deontologists, too, are obliged to admit the possibility of mental divisions of this sort. I argue, however, that the type of …
Friendship and agent-relative morality
First Published in 2001. Morality is viewed as a demanding and unsympathetic taskmaster, and as an external, foreign, even alien force. The moral life, on such a view, is a labor not of love, but of duty. One of the guiding intuitions of this book is that this picture of morality is deeply and pervasively wrong. Morality is not an external or alien force and is not at all disconnected from the agent’s values, or from her good. Indeed, what is mor…
Creating cosmopolitans
Why Is Instrumental Rationality Rational
It is relatively common for philosophers to doubt whether we have any reason to act as morality requires. But it is very difficult to find philosophers who are willing to doubt, in a similar way, the idea that we have reason to act as instrumental rationality requires; reason, that is, to take effective steps toward attaining the ends we have accepted as our own. The inference from the fact that a certain action is an effective means of satisfyin…
Goldstick on the ‘Two Hats’ Problem
The indirect-strategy consequentialist recommends that the consequentialist agent develop certain non-consequentialist feelings and dispositions. It is difficult to see, however, how such an agent could knowingly do this, given her moral beliefs. Goldstick has argued that the problem is not particular to consequentialism; deontologists, too, are obliged to admit the possibility of mental divisions of this sort. I argue, however, that the type of …
Friendship and agent-relative morality
First Published in 2001. Morality is viewed as a demanding and unsympathetic taskmaster, and as an external, foreign, even alien force. The moral life, on such a view, is a labor not of love, but of duty. One of the guiding intuitions of this book is that this picture of morality is deeply and pervasively wrong. Morality is not an external or alien force and is not at all disconnected from the agent’s values, or from her good. Indeed, what is mor…
Goldstick on the ‘Two Hats’ Problem
The indirect-strategy consequentialist recommends that the consequentialist agent develop certain non-consequentialist feelings and dispositions. It is difficult to see, however, how such an agent could knowingly do this, given her moral beliefs. Goldstick has argued that the problem is not particular to consequentialism; deontologists, too, are obliged to admit the possibility of mental divisions of this sort. I argue, however, that the type of …
Why Is Instrumental Rationality Rational
It is relatively common for philosophers to doubt whether we have any reason to act as morality requires. But it is very difficult to find philosophers who are willing to doubt, in a similar way, the idea that we have reason to act as instrumental rationality requires; reason, that is, to take effective steps toward attaining the ends we have accepted as our own. The inference from the fact that a certain action is an effective means of satisfyin…
Creating cosmopolitans
At Lake Scugog
“Sketches of landscapes”
Is it possible to do philosophy by writing lyric poems—or reading them? How can a poem be genuinely philosophical, and can a philosophical poem do something that straightforward philosophical writing cannot do? Some have suggested that poems and philosophical writings have different aims and are subject to different and conflicting demands, which would render it difficult if not impossible to write a successful philosophical poem. I suggest that …
Love as “Something in Between”
Many philosophical accounts of love hold that love is a thoroughly arational phenomenon, that it is not a response to value, or that we do not love for reasons. This chapter argues these accounts are mistaken: when we love we are typically responding to positive qualities of the beloved, and in rendering our love appropriate and intelligible these qualities provide reasons for love. However, the role of reasons in love is highly complex. This is,…
Morality, Perspective, and Fantasy
A response to Sarah Buss's article, ‘Some Musings about the Limits of an Ethics that Can Be Applied,’ focusing on issues connected with Buss’s claims about human insignificance, and the indifference to self that the recognition of insignificance allegedly engenders
Anxious feelings, anxious friends
Should We Want to Be Loved Unconditionally and Forever
People often say that romantic love should be unconditional, and they often want romantic love to last forever. These claims and desires are presumably linked: part of the reason it would be good for love to be unconditional is that it is assumed that such love, being detached from changing conditions, would last forever. This article argues that there are, indeed, kinds of unconditional and permanent love that are worth wanting, but also kinds t…
The Rationality of Love
Love and Its Place in Virtue
Love and Its Place in Virtue expands and refines the view of virtue ethics Christine Swanton has developed in such influential works as Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View and Target-Centered Virtue Ethics. Her wide-ranging discussion touches on a diverse range of topics, so let me acknowledge up front that in this brief review I will not be able to do it justice. I will focus on the issues that strike me as most interesting and most problematic, i…
Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (7 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Social Psychology (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Art (4 works) · Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Literature (4 works)