Allyn Fives
Biographic Data
| ID | 1401705 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Allyn Fives |
| GIVEN NAMES | Allyn |
| FAMILY NAME | Fives |
| SIGNATURE | FIVES A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Ollscoil na Gaillimhe – University of Galway |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7435-2397 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 23 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 26 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 23 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Problems some deliberative democrats have with authority
An authoritative directive, when it has legitimacy, is a reason to exclude from consideration some of the reasons to act and not to act in this way. One is obliged to obey, even when one disagrees with the directive. Therefore, authority demands deference regarding how one acts, although one is free to think what one likes about that action. How can deference of this kind be compatible with freedom and rationality? That is the so-called moral pro…
On the Pluralist Critique of Authority
The moral problem of authority can be expressed as follows: how can authority, and the deference it entails, be compatible with freedom and rationality? The pluralist approach separates political obligation from authority. For pluralists, authority is both unjustifiable and unnecessary, and so legitimate political obligation, including the duty to obey the law, does not entail deference. I argue that it is possible to retain the pluralist commitm…
Authority, Plurality, and Anarchist Scepticism
According to A. John Simmons's anarchist scepticism, there is no duty to obey the law as things stand, as legal obligations have legitimacy only when voluntarily incurred by most or many citizens. However, an alternative, pluralist position is suggested by Simmons's sensitivity to the diversity of reasons and to the possibility of unresolved conflict. It shows that the grounds of legitimate authority are plural, and include distributive justice. …
Membership, obligation, and the communitarian thesis
Why do we have obligations to the community to which we happen to belong? For communitarians, membership does more than provide the context for asking this question. In fact, the simple fact of membership goes some way towards justifying our obligations. According to the strong version of the communitarian thesis, membership is the fundamental consideration justifying political obligation; but for the weaker version, membership is one considerati…
Edmund Burke's Value Pluralism
Given his commitment to toleration, Edmund Burke is rightly seen as a moral pluralist. What has largely gone unnoticed, however, is his value pluralism. Whereas moral pluralism refers to normative positions regarding what we have reason to do when faced with diverse considerations, value pluralism is a meta-ethical position regarding how we resolve conflicts between any number of reasons for action. Like Isaiah Berlin, Burke maintains both that w…
The Freedom To Do As We Please: A Strong Value Pluralist Conceptualization of Negative Freedom
Judith Shklar and the liberalism of fear
What does the work of Judith Shklar reveal to us about the proper role and limits of political theory? In particular, what are the implications of her arguments both for the way in which we should think of freedom and for the approach we should take to the resolution of moral conflicts? There is growing interest in Shklar's arguments, in particular the so-called liberalism of fear, characteristic of her mature work. She has become an important in…
Moral Conflict and Political Obligation in (Highly) Non-ideal Conditions
What the Victims of Tyranny Owe Each Other: On Judith Shklar’s Value Monism
The unnoticed monism of Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear
Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear, a political and philosophical standpoint that emerges in her mature work, has ostensibly two defining characteristics. It is a sceptical approach that puts cruelty first among the vices. For that reason, it is considered to be both set apart from mainstream liberalism, in particular the liberalism of J. S. Mill and John Rawls, but also an important source of influence for political realists and nonideal theoris…
Utopia and Pluralism: Demanding Too Much in the Name of Justice
In recent literature on utopianism, in particular non-ideal and realist work, the distinction between scepticism and non-scepticism has been to the fore. The main concern of this article, in contrast, is to show the importance of the distinction between pluralist and monist approaches. Firstly, pluralists can identify when utopian projects are guilty of demanding too much even when those projects are, all things considered, legitimate. Secondly, …
The radical fool of capitalism: On Jeremy Bentham, the Panopticon, and the Auto-icon
Jeremy Bentham’s definition of the ‘principle of utility,’ in the Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation, reads as follows: Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two s
Paternalism and moral conflict: A pluralist analysis of parental power
Paternalism involves exercising power over others, for their own good, and without their consent. In this paper, I argue, first, if parents do act paternalistically towards their children, this is a prima facie moral wrong, even if in a given situation it is justified, all things considered, so as to promote the good of the children. Second, paternalistic power is exercised only over those capable of agency and, therefore, over those with rights …
Global Distributive Justice
The previous chapter explored one way in which ideas about public reasoning and reasonableness, ideas adapted from the arguments of Rawls, can be applied to one practical issue, namely civic education programmes for young people. This chapter is again an exploration of the practical application and significance of those ideas, as it addresses the question of our moral obligations to the distant poor. The previous chapter also resulted in a more n…
Political Reason: Morality and the Public Sphere
In modern democracies, existing moral pluralism conflicts with a commitment to resolve political disputes by way of moral reasoning. Given this fact, how can there be moral resolutions to political di
Non-coercive promotion of values in civic education for democracy
This article explores the values that should be promoted in civic education for democracy and also how the promotion of values can be non-coercive. It will be argued that civic education should promote the values of reasonableness, mutual respect and fairness, but also that only public, political reasons count in attempting to justify the content of civic education. It will also be argued that the content of civic education may legitimately be br…
Accessing a hard to reach population: Reflections on research with young carers in Ireland
In keeping with developments in children's rights, research is increasingly including the views of children. Accessing a hard to reach population of children can, however, raise significant ethical and methodological challenges for researchers. Negotiating access through gatekeepers, securing parental consent and limits on confidentiality are central issues in the recruitment process of children. This paper is based on a qualitative study of youn…
Reasonableness, Pluralism, and Liberal Moral Doctrines
Reasonable, agonistic, or good: The character of a democrat
Postmodernists reject what they call the universalist-rationalist framework of liberalism. When they do defend liberal democracy, they do so in a contextualist manner (within a ‘form of life’) and on the basis of contestation (‘agonism’). Liberals are right to charge postmodernism with self-contradiction, relativism, and immoralism. It is also argued in this article that liberalism and postmodernism are incompatible, and therefore, they cannot be…
Applied Ethics and Social Problems: Moral Questions of Birth, Society and Death – By Tony Fitzpatrick
Human Flourishing: The Grounds of Moral Judgment
The Many Faces of Individualism
Virtue, justice and the human good: Non-Relative Communitarian Ethics and the Life of Religious Commitment1
What makes a person or life good? and what is it to be just? Political philosophy poses these questions. However, a further question follows from these two. Can we provide non-relativistic standard
Accessing a hard to reach population: Reflections on research with young carers in Ireland
In keeping with developments in children's rights, research is increasingly including the views of children. Accessing a hard to reach population of children can, however, raise significant ethical and methodological challenges for researchers. Negotiating access through gatekeepers, securing parental consent and limits on confidentiality are central issues in the recruitment process of children. This paper is based on a qualitative study of youn…
The Many Faces of Individualism
Paternalism and moral conflict: A pluralist analysis of parental power
Paternalism involves exercising power over others, for their own good, and without their consent. In this paper, I argue, first, if parents do act paternalistically towards their children, this is a prima facie moral wrong, even if in a given situation it is justified, all things considered, so as to promote the good of the children. Second, paternalistic power is exercised only over those capable of agency and, therefore, over those with rights …
Authority, Plurality, and Anarchist Scepticism
According to A. John Simmons's anarchist scepticism, there is no duty to obey the law as things stand, as legal obligations have legitimacy only when voluntarily incurred by most or many citizens. However, an alternative, pluralist position is suggested by Simmons's sensitivity to the diversity of reasons and to the possibility of unresolved conflict. It shows that the grounds of legitimate authority are plural, and include distributive justice. …
What the Victims of Tyranny Owe Each Other: On Judith Shklar’s Value Monism
Reasonable, agonistic, or good: The character of a democrat
Postmodernists reject what they call the universalist-rationalist framework of liberalism. When they do defend liberal democracy, they do so in a contextualist manner (within a ‘form of life’) and on the basis of contestation (‘agonism’). Liberals are right to charge postmodernism with self-contradiction, relativism, and immoralism. It is also argued in this article that liberalism and postmodernism are incompatible, and therefore, they cannot be…
Virtue, justice and the human good: Non-Relative Communitarian Ethics and the Life of Religious Commitment1
What makes a person or life good? and what is it to be just? Political philosophy poses these questions. However, a further question follows from these two. Can we provide non-relativistic standard
The Many Faces of Individualism
Virtue, justice and the human good: Non-Relative Communitarian Ethics and the Life of Religious Commitment1
What makes a person or life good? and what is it to be just? Political philosophy poses these questions. However, a further question follows from these two. Can we provide non-relativistic standard
Human Flourishing: The Grounds of Moral Judgment
Reasonable, agonistic, or good: The character of a democrat
Postmodernists reject what they call the universalist-rationalist framework of liberalism. When they do defend liberal democracy, they do so in a contextualist manner (within a ‘form of life’) and on the basis of contestation (‘agonism’). Liberals are right to charge postmodernism with self-contradiction, relativism, and immoralism. It is also argued in this article that liberalism and postmodernism are incompatible, and therefore, they cannot be…
Applied Ethics and Social Problems: Moral Questions of Birth, Society and Death – By Tony Fitzpatrick
Reasonableness, Pluralism, and Liberal Moral Doctrines
Accessing a hard to reach population: Reflections on research with young carers in Ireland
In keeping with developments in children's rights, research is increasingly including the views of children. Accessing a hard to reach population of children can, however, raise significant ethical and methodological challenges for researchers. Negotiating access through gatekeepers, securing parental consent and limits on confidentiality are central issues in the recruitment process of children. This paper is based on a qualitative study of youn…
Global Distributive Justice
The previous chapter explored one way in which ideas about public reasoning and reasonableness, ideas adapted from the arguments of Rawls, can be applied to one practical issue, namely civic education programmes for young people. This chapter is again an exploration of the practical application and significance of those ideas, as it addresses the question of our moral obligations to the distant poor. The previous chapter also resulted in a more n…
Political Reason: Morality and the Public Sphere
In modern democracies, existing moral pluralism conflicts with a commitment to resolve political disputes by way of moral reasoning. Given this fact, how can there be moral resolutions to political di
Non-coercive promotion of values in civic education for democracy
This article explores the values that should be promoted in civic education for democracy and also how the promotion of values can be non-coercive. It will be argued that civic education should promote the values of reasonableness, mutual respect and fairness, but also that only public, political reasons count in attempting to justify the content of civic education. It will also be argued that the content of civic education may legitimately be br…
Paternalism and moral conflict: A pluralist analysis of parental power
Paternalism involves exercising power over others, for their own good, and without their consent. In this paper, I argue, first, if parents do act paternalistically towards their children, this is a prima facie moral wrong, even if in a given situation it is justified, all things considered, so as to promote the good of the children. Second, paternalistic power is exercised only over those capable of agency and, therefore, over those with rights …
The radical fool of capitalism: On Jeremy Bentham, the Panopticon, and the Auto-icon
Jeremy Bentham’s definition of the ‘principle of utility,’ in the Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation, reads as follows: Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two s
Judith Shklar and the liberalism of fear
What does the work of Judith Shklar reveal to us about the proper role and limits of political theory? In particular, what are the implications of her arguments both for the way in which we should think of freedom and for the approach we should take to the resolution of moral conflicts? There is growing interest in Shklar's arguments, in particular the so-called liberalism of fear, characteristic of her mature work. She has become an important in…
Moral Conflict and Political Obligation in (Highly) Non-ideal Conditions
What the Victims of Tyranny Owe Each Other: On Judith Shklar’s Value Monism
The unnoticed monism of Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear
Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear, a political and philosophical standpoint that emerges in her mature work, has ostensibly two defining characteristics. It is a sceptical approach that puts cruelty first among the vices. For that reason, it is considered to be both set apart from mainstream liberalism, in particular the liberalism of J. S. Mill and John Rawls, but also an important source of influence for political realists and nonideal theoris…
Utopia and Pluralism: Demanding Too Much in the Name of Justice
In recent literature on utopianism, in particular non-ideal and realist work, the distinction between scepticism and non-scepticism has been to the fore. The main concern of this article, in contrast, is to show the importance of the distinction between pluralist and monist approaches. Firstly, pluralists can identify when utopian projects are guilty of demanding too much even when those projects are, all things considered, legitimate. Secondly, …
The Freedom To Do As We Please: A Strong Value Pluralist Conceptualization of Negative Freedom
Membership, obligation, and the communitarian thesis
Why do we have obligations to the community to which we happen to belong? For communitarians, membership does more than provide the context for asking this question. In fact, the simple fact of membership goes some way towards justifying our obligations. According to the strong version of the communitarian thesis, membership is the fundamental consideration justifying political obligation; but for the weaker version, membership is one considerati…
Edmund Burke's Value Pluralism
Given his commitment to toleration, Edmund Burke is rightly seen as a moral pluralist. What has largely gone unnoticed, however, is his value pluralism. Whereas moral pluralism refers to normative positions regarding what we have reason to do when faced with diverse considerations, value pluralism is a meta-ethical position regarding how we resolve conflicts between any number of reasons for action. Like Isaiah Berlin, Burke maintains both that w…
Authority, Plurality, and Anarchist Scepticism
According to A. John Simmons's anarchist scepticism, there is no duty to obey the law as things stand, as legal obligations have legitimacy only when voluntarily incurred by most or many citizens. However, an alternative, pluralist position is suggested by Simmons's sensitivity to the diversity of reasons and to the possibility of unresolved conflict. It shows that the grounds of legitimate authority are plural, and include distributive justice. …
On the Pluralist Critique of Authority
The moral problem of authority can be expressed as follows: how can authority, and the deference it entails, be compatible with freedom and rationality? The pluralist approach separates political obligation from authority. For pluralists, authority is both unjustifiable and unnecessary, and so legitimate political obligation, including the duty to obey the law, does not entail deference. I argue that it is possible to retain the pluralist commitm…
Problems some deliberative democrats have with authority
An authoritative directive, when it has legitimacy, is a reason to exclude from consideration some of the reasons to act and not to act in this way. One is obliged to obey, even when one disagrees with the directive. Therefore, authority demands deference regarding how one acts, although one is free to think what one likes about that action. How can deference of this kind be compatible with freedom and rationality? That is the so-called moral pro…
Sociology (22 works) · Political science (21 works) · Law (19 works) · Philosophy (18 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (18 works) · Epistemology (16 works) · Politics (13 works) · Law (12 works) · Law and economics (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works)