Hilde Henriksen Waage
Biographic Data
| ID | 1417186 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hilde Henriksen Waage |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hilde Henriksen |
| FAMILY NAME | Waage |
| SIGNATURE | WAAGE H H |
| AFFILIATIONS | PRIO |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 35 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 28 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 35 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1995 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
En evig spoiler? Syria i det regionale og internasjonale spillet i Midtøsten
I desember 2024 raste Assad-regimet i Syria sammen som et korthus. Opprørslederen Ahmed al-Sharaa, tidligere medlem av IS og al-Qaida, ble president. I Midtøsten ble ikke bare kortene stokket om, men de ble også delt ut på nytt. I etterkrigstiden hadde Syria som oftest spilt en destruktiv rolle som spoiler. Syria hadde ikke klart å etablere gode og stabile relasjoner til de andre landene i Midtøsten, men hadde snarere havnet i en rekke konflikter…
Drømmekanalen
I løpet av de siste tiår har det blitt gjort omfattende forskning på hvilken rolle Norge spilte i fredsprosessen i Midtøsten. Det har blitt undersøkt hvordan denne rollen har blitt framstilt av aktørene selv og av dem som har stått dem nær, og hvordan både de og norske myndigheter har framstilt og forklart denne rollen. Disse forestillingene har vist seg svært tunge å rokke ved, til tross for at det har blitt avdekket lag på lag med nye opplysnin…
Norge som fredsnasjon og krigsmakt etter 1945
Fra Israels til palestinernes beste venn
Etter 1948 var Norge en av Israels aller beste venner. Palestinernes skjebne vakte ingen interesse. De var glemt. Etter krigen i 1967 forandret disse holdningene seg. Israel var blitt en okkupasjonsmakt. Det palestinske flyktningproblemet var like uløst. PLO hadde også endret politikk, var blitt langt mer kompromissvillig og gikk inn for en tostatsløsning. Like fullt hadde Norge den mest restriktive politikken overfor PLO i hele Vest-Europa. Førs…
Ties that bind
This article explores the largely overlooked triangular relations among the United States, Iran and Israel during the 1960s, and unveils the gradual entanglement of the three regimes. With its focus on the smaller states, it reveals that Iran and Israel actively sought to influence the development of their relations to the United States, as well as their situation in the Middle East. Starting around 1963, Iran and Israel developed a set of shared…
The Grimness of the Alternatives
In 1977, United States president Jimmy Carter wanted a comprehensive peace for the Middle East. Amid the devastating civil war in Lebanon, Israel had found common ground with Christian militias and turned against the Palestinians. However, Carter's peace had to include Israel, and his persistent headache was to get the Jewish state to accept his suggestions, be it in Lebanon or in the negotiations with Egypt. Thus, Carter had to sacrifice any her…
En brikke ingen turte røre
Hvorfor bidro Norge med militære styrker til United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) i 1978? Hvorfor trakk ikke Norge sine styrker ut da det viste seg at nordmennene ikke hadde noen mulighet til å oppfylle FNs mandat, og da situasjonen på bakken gikk fra vondt til verre og var direkte farlig for norsk militært personell? Litteraturen rundt årsakene til at norske soldater ble sendt på FN-oppdrag, har vært sentrert rundt to motiver: sikker…
Stew in Their Own Juice
As Israeli forces besieged Beirut in the summer of 1982, the United States inserted itself into the Lebanese civil war (1975–90) as a mediator and peacekeeper. Projecting itself as an honest broker, the Reagan administration saw a peaceful Lebanon as a stepping-stone to further the Arab-Israeli peace process. Reagan’s overriding priority was to expel Soviet influence from the Middle East, and he saw Israel as a “strategic partner” in this venture…
Master of the Game
How and why did the Richard Nixon Administration end up with an Iran policy more in line with the preferences of the Shah of Iran than of the United States? At its onset, the Administration did not have a clearly defined or formalised Persian Gulf policy. Attempts to create over-arching guidelines regarding American conduct toward Iran were of little consequence, as the pro-Iranian inclinations of leading decision-makers led to day-to-day decisio…
A Careful Minuet
During the spring of 1976, the Syrian army unexpectedly intervened in the Lebanese civil war. Syria’s President Hafez al-Assad had shifted his allegiances, abandoning his Muslim–Palestinian partners and joining the conflict in order to prevent the Christians from losing. Assad feared that if the PLO managed to tip the balance of power in Lebanon in its favour, an Israeli response would be inevitable. Following his move to prevent this, Israel did…
Facing Assad. American Diplomacy Toward Syria, 1973–1977
In the wake of the 1973 October War, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad led the United States and Syria in reviving their long-dead diplomatic relationship. This process began amidst the diplomatic effort that would lead to the unprecedented Syrian–Israeli Disengagement Agreement of 1974, matured in the difficult period of stalemate that followed, and produced a paradoxical diplomatic concord as Syria, Israe…
A Balancing Pretence
King Hussein of Jordan was often at odds with his less conciliatory counterparts in the Arab world. He was one of the few Arab leaders who engaged and communicated with Israel. The administration of US President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted to ensure the continuation of Hussein’s moderate line towards Israel and sold weapons to Jordan. However, providing military support to an Arab state when the vast majority of Americans favoured Israel involved si…
Cementing a State of Belligerency
After the Arab states’ devastating defeat in the 1948 war with Israel, Syria refused to give in without a fight. Syria held on to several bridgeheads inside the former Palestine. Proving as skillful as their Israeli opponents at the game of contradictory arguments, the Syrians steadfastly refused to concede to Israel’s demands. The negotiations in 1949 eventually resulted in a demilitarized zone on the Syrian-Israeli border, and with it a state o…
Weak Third Parties and Ripening
Can weak third parties contribute to ripening conflicts for resolution despite their lack of leverage? According to the core principles of ripeness theory, mediators with leverage have a clear advantage when it comes to ripening. What is often overlooked in the literature, however, is the important ways a weak mediator can contribute to ripening as well. This article explores two noteworthy cases of weak third party ripening – the Norwegian roles…
Mission Impossible
On 23 November 1967, Gunnar Jarring, a Swedish diplomat, was appointed the United Nations Special Representative to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Security Council had decided to launch a peace effort in the Middle East following the Six-Day War in June 1967. Israel had won a sweeping victory, and the Arab states had suffered a devastating loss. After the war, Israel controlled a territory almost three and a half times the size of the country its…
The Palestine Option
Were the Palestinians anything more than simply a refugee problem? Since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the USA had pretty much ignored this haunting question. However, as the Palestinian guerrillas’ wide-ranging armed struggle seemed to be approaching a climax in 1970, U.S. policy makers were forced to reassess whether they might also need to view the Palestinian issue as a political problem. In April to May of that year, U.S. Stat…
Finishing the Enterprise’
During 1948–9, Israeli leaders placed considerable importance on the country's efforts to secure membership in the United Nations (UN). Israel's foreign relations at the time, however, were complicated not only by the country's lack of UN membership. Israel was also at war with its Arab neighbours, and the newly created state was thus without clear borders and faced with several unresolved political problems with clear international ramifications…
Coercive Diplomacy
The Arab states suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of Israel during the first Arab–Israeli war. Immediately following the war, Israel made brilliant and shrewd use of diplomacy to achieve its goals at the negotiating table, much as it had previously used armed force. Israel refused to negotiate with a united Arab negotiation team, preferring to isolate the states, picking them off one after the other. The Israeli–Transjordanian talks diffe…
Securing the State
Between early 1947 and May 1948, the Zionist movement went from being a non-state actor representing the minority population within the territory of the British Mandate of Palestine to establishing the State of Israel, which would be recognised almost instantaneously by the world's two Superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a result, however, was never a given. What processes allowed a non-state actor, the Zionist movement, to …
Powerful State, Powerless Mediator
The Arab–Israeli War of 1948 produced complex questions that needed to be solved to obtain peace. Whereas the Arab states suffered humiliating defeats, Israel was the undisputed winner, expanding and solidifying its power. For the Palestinians, the outcome was catastrophic. Between 600,000 and 760,000 Palestinians fled, becoming refugees on the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and in surrounding Arab states. Palestinian society collapsed and Palestine …
The Winner Takes All
Why is there no peace between Israel and the Palestinians? This article draws the line all the way back to the very first Arab-Israeli negotiations. In 1949, on the Island of Rhodes, UN mediator Ralph Bunche negotiated an armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt. The outcome of the first Arab-Israeli war constituted the immediate context for the negotiations and was important for the final outcome. Israel had won; the Arab states had lost the…
Postscript to Oslo
In Norway, the secret negotiations culminating in the 1993 Oslo agreement are still seen as a shining moment in the nation9s history, so when the files of the entire process were discovered to be missing from government archives, a minor public scandal erupted. After laying out the Oslo ““myth”” and its cast of characters, the author recounts the story of the disappearance of the files, new revelations concerning their scope, and the (thus far un…
The ‘Minnow’ and the ‘Whale’
The signing of the Oslo Agreement on 13 September 1993 revealed to an astonished world the extent to which the small state of Norway had contributed to one of the most serious attempts at reaching
N orway's R ole in the M iddle E ast P eace T alks
This article focuses on the secret ““back channel”” negotiations that led to the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo agreement of September 1993. The author traces the evolution of Norway's role from low-key facilitator to active mediator, paralleling the upgrading of the channel from an informal exploratory bridge-building exercise to official negotiations at the highest level. In detailing the unfolding of the talks and the Norwegian actors…
Book Notes
N orway's R ole in the M iddle E ast P eace T alks
This article focuses on the secret ““back channel”” negotiations that led to the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo agreement of September 1993. The author traces the evolution of Norway's role from low-key facilitator to active mediator, paralleling the upgrading of the channel from an informal exploratory bridge-building exercise to official negotiations at the highest level. In detailing the unfolding of the talks and the Norwegian actors…
The ‘Minnow’ and the ‘Whale’
The signing of the Oslo Agreement on 13 September 1993 revealed to an astonished world the extent to which the small state of Norway had contributed to one of the most serious attempts at reaching
How Norway Became One of Israel's Best Friends
After its founding in 1948, Israel was to become much more than just a state that Norway was on friendly terms with. It became one that Norway officially supported in the UN and enjoyed good diplomatic relations with. Enormous admiration was felt towards the little country - not only in Norway's more religious and conservative circles, but notably within the labour and trade movements, within the governing Labour Party and the government itself. …
Weak Third Parties and Ripening
Can weak third parties contribute to ripening conflicts for resolution despite their lack of leverage? According to the core principles of ripeness theory, mediators with leverage have a clear advantage when it comes to ripening. What is often overlooked in the literature, however, is the important ways a weak mediator can contribute to ripening as well. This article explores two noteworthy cases of weak third party ripening – the Norwegian roles…
Securing the State
Between early 1947 and May 1948, the Zionist movement went from being a non-state actor representing the minority population within the territory of the British Mandate of Palestine to establishing the State of Israel, which would be recognised almost instantaneously by the world's two Superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a result, however, was never a given. What processes allowed a non-state actor, the Zionist movement, to …
The Winner Takes All
Why is there no peace between Israel and the Palestinians? This article draws the line all the way back to the very first Arab-Israeli negotiations. In 1949, on the Island of Rhodes, UN mediator Ralph Bunche negotiated an armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt. The outcome of the first Arab-Israeli war constituted the immediate context for the negotiations and was important for the final outcome. Israel had won; the Arab states had lost the…
Postscript to Oslo
In Norway, the secret negotiations culminating in the 1993 Oslo agreement are still seen as a shining moment in the nation9s history, so when the files of the entire process were discovered to be missing from government archives, a minor public scandal erupted. After laying out the Oslo ““myth”” and its cast of characters, the author recounts the story of the disappearance of the files, new revelations concerning their scope, and the (thus far un…
Facing Assad. American Diplomacy Toward Syria, 1973–1977
In the wake of the 1973 October War, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad led the United States and Syria in reviving their long-dead diplomatic relationship. This process began amidst the diplomatic effort that would lead to the unprecedented Syrian–Israeli Disengagement Agreement of 1974, matured in the difficult period of stalemate that followed, and produced a paradoxical diplomatic concord as Syria, Israe…
Finishing the Enterprise’
During 1948–9, Israeli leaders placed considerable importance on the country's efforts to secure membership in the United Nations (UN). Israel's foreign relations at the time, however, were complicated not only by the country's lack of UN membership. Israel was also at war with its Arab neighbours, and the newly created state was thus without clear borders and faced with several unresolved political problems with clear international ramifications…
Book Notes
Book Notes
Book Notes
Book Notes
Book Notes
Norway and a major international crisis
This article reviews Norway's policy during the Suez crisis in 1956, how the policy was formed and how it can be explained. Emphasis is put on the decision‐making process and on the role of the powerful Norwegian Shipowners’ Association. It also discusses Norway's most important interests and considerations in policy formation, and how they were balanced. Norway's Suez policy is seen in connection with the close relations with Israel, which could…
Book Notes
Book Notes
How Norway Became One of Israel's Best Friends
After its founding in 1948, Israel was to become much more than just a state that Norway was on friendly terms with. It became one that Norway officially supported in the UN and enjoyed good diplomatic relations with. Enormous admiration was felt towards the little country - not only in Norway's more religious and conservative circles, but notably within the labour and trade movements, within the governing Labour Party and the government itself. …
Book Notes
Book Notes
N orway's R ole in the M iddle E ast P eace T alks
This article focuses on the secret ““back channel”” negotiations that led to the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo agreement of September 1993. The author traces the evolution of Norway's role from low-key facilitator to active mediator, paralleling the upgrading of the channel from an informal exploratory bridge-building exercise to official negotiations at the highest level. In detailing the unfolding of the talks and the Norwegian actors…
The ‘Minnow’ and the ‘Whale’
The signing of the Oslo Agreement on 13 September 1993 revealed to an astonished world the extent to which the small state of Norway had contributed to one of the most serious attempts at reaching
Postscript to Oslo
In Norway, the secret negotiations culminating in the 1993 Oslo agreement are still seen as a shining moment in the nation9s history, so when the files of the entire process were discovered to be missing from government archives, a minor public scandal erupted. After laying out the Oslo ““myth”” and its cast of characters, the author recounts the story of the disappearance of the files, new revelations concerning their scope, and the (thus far un…
Powerful State, Powerless Mediator
The Arab–Israeli War of 1948 produced complex questions that needed to be solved to obtain peace. Whereas the Arab states suffered humiliating defeats, Israel was the undisputed winner, expanding and solidifying its power. For the Palestinians, the outcome was catastrophic. Between 600,000 and 760,000 Palestinians fled, becoming refugees on the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and in surrounding Arab states. Palestinian society collapsed and Palestine …
The Winner Takes All
Why is there no peace between Israel and the Palestinians? This article draws the line all the way back to the very first Arab-Israeli negotiations. In 1949, on the Island of Rhodes, UN mediator Ralph Bunche negotiated an armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt. The outcome of the first Arab-Israeli war constituted the immediate context for the negotiations and was important for the final outcome. Israel had won; the Arab states had lost the…
Coercive Diplomacy
The Arab states suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of Israel during the first Arab–Israeli war. Immediately following the war, Israel made brilliant and shrewd use of diplomacy to achieve its goals at the negotiating table, much as it had previously used armed force. Israel refused to negotiate with a united Arab negotiation team, preferring to isolate the states, picking them off one after the other. The Israeli–Transjordanian talks diffe…
Securing the State
Between early 1947 and May 1948, the Zionist movement went from being a non-state actor representing the minority population within the territory of the British Mandate of Palestine to establishing the State of Israel, which would be recognised almost instantaneously by the world's two Superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a result, however, was never a given. What processes allowed a non-state actor, the Zionist movement, to …
Finishing the Enterprise’
During 1948–9, Israeli leaders placed considerable importance on the country's efforts to secure membership in the United Nations (UN). Israel's foreign relations at the time, however, were complicated not only by the country's lack of UN membership. Israel was also at war with its Arab neighbours, and the newly created state was thus without clear borders and faced with several unresolved political problems with clear international ramifications…
The Palestine Option
Were the Palestinians anything more than simply a refugee problem? Since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the USA had pretty much ignored this haunting question. However, as the Palestinian guerrillas’ wide-ranging armed struggle seemed to be approaching a climax in 1970, U.S. policy makers were forced to reassess whether they might also need to view the Palestinian issue as a political problem. In April to May of that year, U.S. Stat…
Weak Third Parties and Ripening
Can weak third parties contribute to ripening conflicts for resolution despite their lack of leverage? According to the core principles of ripeness theory, mediators with leverage have a clear advantage when it comes to ripening. What is often overlooked in the literature, however, is the important ways a weak mediator can contribute to ripening as well. This article explores two noteworthy cases of weak third party ripening – the Norwegian roles…
Mission Impossible
On 23 November 1967, Gunnar Jarring, a Swedish diplomat, was appointed the United Nations Special Representative to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Security Council had decided to launch a peace effort in the Middle East following the Six-Day War in June 1967. Israel had won a sweeping victory, and the Arab states had suffered a devastating loss. After the war, Israel controlled a territory almost three and a half times the size of the country its…
A Balancing Pretence
King Hussein of Jordan was often at odds with his less conciliatory counterparts in the Arab world. He was one of the few Arab leaders who engaged and communicated with Israel. The administration of US President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted to ensure the continuation of Hussein’s moderate line towards Israel and sold weapons to Jordan. However, providing military support to an Arab state when the vast majority of Americans favoured Israel involved si…
Cementing a State of Belligerency
After the Arab states’ devastating defeat in the 1948 war with Israel, Syria refused to give in without a fight. Syria held on to several bridgeheads inside the former Palestine. Proving as skillful as their Israeli opponents at the game of contradictory arguments, the Syrians steadfastly refused to concede to Israel’s demands. The negotiations in 1949 eventually resulted in a demilitarized zone on the Syrian-Israeli border, and with it a state o…
Facing Assad. American Diplomacy Toward Syria, 1973–1977
In the wake of the 1973 October War, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad led the United States and Syria in reviving their long-dead diplomatic relationship. This process began amidst the diplomatic effort that would lead to the unprecedented Syrian–Israeli Disengagement Agreement of 1974, matured in the difficult period of stalemate that followed, and produced a paradoxical diplomatic concord as Syria, Israe…
Political science (24 works) · Law (18 works) · Law (17 works) · History (16 works) · Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies (13 works) · Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts (13 works) · Politics (13 works) · History (11 works) · Ancient history (10 works) · Computer Science (10 works)