Lennart Maschmeyer
Biographic Data
| ID | 1417554 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lennart Maschmeyer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lennart |
| FAMILY NAME | Maschmeyer |
| SIGNATURE | MASCHMEYER L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Georgia Institute of Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4666-2387 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 47 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Deception and Detection: Why Artificial Intelligence Empowers Cyber Defense over Offense
Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to automate key tasks in the life cycle of a cyber operation. Many have predicted that AI will revolutionize cyber conflict by enabling offense automation for faster, stealthier, and more damaging attacks. But the revolution has not happened, even though highly capable AI models have been available for several years. This article explains why: There is a gap between defense and offense when it comes …
Sand in the gears: Sabotage in world politics
Sabotage is ubiquitous but little understood in international relations. Sabotage, especially in terms of attacks on infrastructure and property, has increased in recent years and has taken a more central role in national security discourse across Europe. Unfortunately, scholarship is underdeveloped and fragmented across disciplinary silos, leading to conceptual confusion about the nature and scope of sabotage as a form of statecraft. This articl…
If it bleeps it leads? Media coverage on cyber conflict and misperception
What determines media coverage on cyber conflict (CC)? Media bias fostering misperception is a well-established problem in conflict reporting. Because of the secrecy and complexity surrounding cyber operations (COs), where most data moreover come from marketing publications by private sector firms, this problem is likely to be especially pronounced in reporting on cyber threats. Because media reporting shapes public perception, such bias can shap…
Donetsk don’t tell – ‘hybrid war’ in Ukraine and the limits of social media influence operations
Many fear that social media enable more potent influence operations than traditional mass media. This belief is widely shared yet rarely tested. We challenge this emerging wisdom by comparing social media and television as vectors for influence operations targeting Ukraine. This article develops a theoretical framework based on media structure, showing how and why decentralized and centralized media offer distinct opportunities and challenges for…
A new and better quiet option? Strategies of subversion and cyber conflict
Theorizing on cyber conflict has moved from warfare to conflict short of war, but strategic thought has not kept pace. This article argues cyber conflict is subversive, builds on intelligence scholarship to identify strategies of subversion, and examines their applicability in cyber conflict. It distinguishes three subversive strategies: manipulation, erosion and overthrow. The analysis shows cyber operations can only implement one of these strat…
Subversion, cyber operations, and reverse structural power in world politics
The Russian-sponsored influence campaign targeting the 2016 US Presidential Elections surprised policy-makers and scholars, highlighting a gap in theories of (cyber) power. Russia had used information technologies to project power, yet more subtly than prevailing militarized conceptions of cyber power predicted. Rather than causing damage and disruption, it turned sources of American power into vulnerabilities. Recent scholarship emphasizes this …
The Subversive Trilemma: Why Cyber Operations Fall Short of Expectations
Although cyber conflict has existed for thirty years, the strategic utility of cyber operations remains unclear. Many expect cyber operations to provide independent utility in both warfare and low-intensity competition. Underlying these expectations are broadly shared assumptions that information technology increases operational effectiveness. But a growing body of research shows how cyber operations tend to fall short of their promise. The reaso…
A tale of two cybers - how threat reporting by cybersecurity firms systematically underrepresents threats to civil society
Public and academic knowledge of cyber conflict relies heavily on data from commercial threat reporting. There are reasons to be concerned that these data provide a distorted view of cyber threat activity. Commercial cybersecurity firms only focus on a subset of the universe of threats, and they only report publicly on a subset of the subset. High end threats to high-profile victims are prioritized in commercial reporting while threats to civil s…
Shaping not Signaling: Understanding Cyber Operations as a Means of Espionage, Attack, and Destabilization
In The Hacker and the State, Ben Buchanan argues that policymakers and scholars err in conceptualizing cyber operations as a means of signaling. These operations are instead primarily useful as clandestine means of shaping the global environment. Whereas signaling broadcasts preferences (e.g., via threats or assurances) to facilitate better bargaining outcomes (Schelling 1966), shaping involves (covert) meddling in an adversary's affairs to produ…
The Subversive Trilemma: Why Cyber Operations Fall Short of Expectations
Although cyber conflict has existed for thirty years, the strategic utility of cyber operations remains unclear. Many expect cyber operations to provide independent utility in both warfare and low-intensity competition. Underlying these expectations are broadly shared assumptions that information technology increases operational effectiveness. But a growing body of research shows how cyber operations tend to fall short of their promise. The reaso…
A tale of two cybers - how threat reporting by cybersecurity firms systematically underrepresents threats to civil society
Public and academic knowledge of cyber conflict relies heavily on data from commercial threat reporting. There are reasons to be concerned that these data provide a distorted view of cyber threat activity. Commercial cybersecurity firms only focus on a subset of the universe of threats, and they only report publicly on a subset of the subset. High end threats to high-profile victims are prioritized in commercial reporting while threats to civil s…
Subversion, cyber operations, and reverse structural power in world politics
The Russian-sponsored influence campaign targeting the 2016 US Presidential Elections surprised policy-makers and scholars, highlighting a gap in theories of (cyber) power. Russia had used information technologies to project power, yet more subtly than prevailing militarized conceptions of cyber power predicted. Rather than causing damage and disruption, it turned sources of American power into vulnerabilities. Recent scholarship emphasizes this …
If it bleeps it leads? Media coverage on cyber conflict and misperception
What determines media coverage on cyber conflict (CC)? Media bias fostering misperception is a well-established problem in conflict reporting. Because of the secrecy and complexity surrounding cyber operations (COs), where most data moreover come from marketing publications by private sector firms, this problem is likely to be especially pronounced in reporting on cyber threats. Because media reporting shapes public perception, such bias can shap…
A new and better quiet option? Strategies of subversion and cyber conflict
Theorizing on cyber conflict has moved from warfare to conflict short of war, but strategic thought has not kept pace. This article argues cyber conflict is subversive, builds on intelligence scholarship to identify strategies of subversion, and examines their applicability in cyber conflict. It distinguishes three subversive strategies: manipulation, erosion and overthrow. The analysis shows cyber operations can only implement one of these strat…
Donetsk don’t tell – ‘hybrid war’ in Ukraine and the limits of social media influence operations
Many fear that social media enable more potent influence operations than traditional mass media. This belief is widely shared yet rarely tested. We challenge this emerging wisdom by comparing social media and television as vectors for influence operations targeting Ukraine. This article develops a theoretical framework based on media structure, showing how and why decentralized and centralized media offer distinct opportunities and challenges for…
Sand in the gears: Sabotage in world politics
Sabotage is ubiquitous but little understood in international relations. Sabotage, especially in terms of attacks on infrastructure and property, has increased in recent years and has taken a more central role in national security discourse across Europe. Unfortunately, scholarship is underdeveloped and fragmented across disciplinary silos, leading to conceptual confusion about the nature and scope of sabotage as a form of statecraft. This articl…
A tale of two cybers - how threat reporting by cybersecurity firms systematically underrepresents threats to civil society
Public and academic knowledge of cyber conflict relies heavily on data from commercial threat reporting. There are reasons to be concerned that these data provide a distorted view of cyber threat activity. Commercial cybersecurity firms only focus on a subset of the universe of threats, and they only report publicly on a subset of the subset. High end threats to high-profile victims are prioritized in commercial reporting while threats to civil s…
Shaping not Signaling: Understanding Cyber Operations as a Means of Espionage, Attack, and Destabilization
In The Hacker and the State, Ben Buchanan argues that policymakers and scholars err in conceptualizing cyber operations as a means of signaling. These operations are instead primarily useful as clandestine means of shaping the global environment. Whereas signaling broadcasts preferences (e.g., via threats or assurances) to facilitate better bargaining outcomes (Schelling 1966), shaping involves (covert) meddling in an adversary's affairs to produ…
The Subversive Trilemma: Why Cyber Operations Fall Short of Expectations
Although cyber conflict has existed for thirty years, the strategic utility of cyber operations remains unclear. Many expect cyber operations to provide independent utility in both warfare and low-intensity competition. Underlying these expectations are broadly shared assumptions that information technology increases operational effectiveness. But a growing body of research shows how cyber operations tend to fall short of their promise. The reaso…
Donetsk don’t tell – ‘hybrid war’ in Ukraine and the limits of social media influence operations
Many fear that social media enable more potent influence operations than traditional mass media. This belief is widely shared yet rarely tested. We challenge this emerging wisdom by comparing social media and television as vectors for influence operations targeting Ukraine. This article develops a theoretical framework based on media structure, showing how and why decentralized and centralized media offer distinct opportunities and challenges for…
A new and better quiet option? Strategies of subversion and cyber conflict
Theorizing on cyber conflict has moved from warfare to conflict short of war, but strategic thought has not kept pace. This article argues cyber conflict is subversive, builds on intelligence scholarship to identify strategies of subversion, and examines their applicability in cyber conflict. It distinguishes three subversive strategies: manipulation, erosion and overthrow. The analysis shows cyber operations can only implement one of these strat…
Subversion, cyber operations, and reverse structural power in world politics
The Russian-sponsored influence campaign targeting the 2016 US Presidential Elections surprised policy-makers and scholars, highlighting a gap in theories of (cyber) power. Russia had used information technologies to project power, yet more subtly than prevailing militarized conceptions of cyber power predicted. Rather than causing damage and disruption, it turned sources of American power into vulnerabilities. Recent scholarship emphasizes this …
If it bleeps it leads? Media coverage on cyber conflict and misperception
What determines media coverage on cyber conflict (CC)? Media bias fostering misperception is a well-established problem in conflict reporting. Because of the secrecy and complexity surrounding cyber operations (COs), where most data moreover come from marketing publications by private sector firms, this problem is likely to be especially pronounced in reporting on cyber threats. Because media reporting shapes public perception, such bias can shap…
Sand in the gears: Sabotage in world politics
Sabotage is ubiquitous but little understood in international relations. Sabotage, especially in terms of attacks on infrastructure and property, has increased in recent years and has taken a more central role in national security discourse across Europe. Unfortunately, scholarship is underdeveloped and fragmented across disciplinary silos, leading to conceptual confusion about the nature and scope of sabotage as a form of statecraft. This articl…
Deception and Detection: Why Artificial Intelligence Empowers Cyber Defense over Offense
Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to automate key tasks in the life cycle of a cyber operation. Many have predicted that AI will revolutionize cyber conflict by enabling offense automation for faster, stealthier, and more damaging attacks. But the revolution has not happened, even though highly capable AI models have been available for several years. This article explains why: There is a gap between defense and offense when it comes …
Political science (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies (6 works) · Computer security (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Public relations (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Politics (4 works)