Elena V Mclean
Biographic Data
| ID | 1418317 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Elena V Mclean |
| GIVEN NAMES | Elena V |
| FAMILY NAME | Mclean |
| SIGNATURE | MCLEAN E V |
| AFFILIATIONS | University at Buffalo, State University of New York |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0512-7495 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 25 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 256 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 25 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
How bureaucratic competition shapes foreign aid allocation
What explains aid allocation–donor interests or recipient needs? This research debate has generated a number of studies, which generally conclude that both motivations matter. One limitation of this literature is that donor governments are conceptualized as unitary actors with coherent preferences. In this study, we relax this assumption and focus on the interests and interactions of bureaucratic agencies within a donor government. We argue that …
Clearing the air
The effect of economic coercion on companies’ foreign direct investment decisions
Existing research on the relationship between economic coercion and foreign direct investment suggests that sanctions have no effect on investments in targeted countries or may even encourage investment inflows. A key limitation of this research, however, is its aggregate country-level focus, which fails to capture company-level decision-making processes and factors shaping them. In contrast, this paper evaluates multinational companies’ investme…
Looking for advice
Renewable energy policies and household solid fuel dependence
Expecting the Unexpected
This study examines the relationship between disaster risks and interstate conflict. We argue that in disaster-prone areas actors’ rational expectations about the likelihood and magnitude of potential future disasters can make conflict more likely. The relationship emerges when future disasters are viewed as shocks that are expected to shift the relative power balance among states. If large enough, such expected shifts can generate commitment pro…
Economic Sanctions and Government Spending Adjustments
Economic sanctions research suggests that sanctioned countries’ overall economic costs tend to be low. This article argues that, despite this, sanction costs can force the governments of these countries to reallocate budget resources from low-priority spending categories to other categories in an effort to minimize their political costs. One such low-priority category is disaster preparedness and mitigation. The authors show that economic sanctio…
Do sanctions spell disaster? Economic sanctions, political institutions, and technological safety
Sanctions restrict or terminate economic relations between two or more countries, directly and negatively influencing sanctioned countries’ companies. We argue that sanctions are similar to recessions—both reduce economic activity in affected countries. Less economic activity results in a lower accident risk as companies use their productive facilities less. Reduced revenues also force companies to adjust by cutting costs, which includes spending…
The Political Economy of Carbon Capture and Storage Technology Adoption
Carbon sequestration through capture and storage in subsurface porous geologic formations is one potential method for mitigating the problem of climate change due to emission of anthropogenic CO 2 . In fact, in a world highly dependent on energy derived from hydrocarbons and coal, carbon capture and storage may represent the most promising approach to maintaining industrial development in the present period, while implementing other solutions tha…
Household dependence on solid cooking fuels in Peru
Lead Exposure in Low and Middle-Income Countries
Lead exposure is a legacy issue that continues to affect vulnerable population groups globally, but particularly in low and middle-income countries (LMICS). We take a multi-disciplinary approach to examine the patterns of lead exposure in these countries, discuss the underlying injustices and socio-political causes, and the economic costs that are associated with exposure. We conclude with some lessons we drew from our discussion of lead across t…
Country-level analysis of household fuel transitions
Political Relations, Leader Stability, and Economic Coercion
Countries use economic sanctions as a way to force their opponents to make policy concessions. Such external pressure may, as the designers of sanctions often intend, affect the degree of domestic support for the target's political leaders. It may even threaten the leaders’ survival in office. We investigate how these dual pressures—preference for policy concessions and concern about target leaders’ political future—shape the use of sanctions in …
Withdrawn
Public Support for Economic Sanctions
What are the determinants of public support for the government’s foreign policy? We shed light on this question using experiments investigating public support for economic sanctions. Our results suggest that humanitarian concerns are associated with individuals’ decisions to support the use of sanctions against a target country. We find that high levels of public pain in the target country have a negative relationship with the likelihood of suppo…
Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns
Although states rarely use economic sanctions specifically to combat transnational terrorism, potential targets of sanctions often face terrorist campaigns within their territory. States may avoid using sanctions against states with terrorists for fear of weakening target states excessively, thereby indirectly strengthening terrorist groups. However, this argument has not been subjected to rigorous empirical testing. This study presents a theoret…
Natural Disasters and the Size of Nations
What is the relationship between natural disasters and country size? Is an increasing likelihood of environmental shocks linked to political integration or secessionism? We argue that natural disasters are associated with a decline in country size. This relationship arises because costs generated by disasters are higher for citizens located farther away from the political center of a country, and costs are amplified as disasters affect a larger a…
Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent
Can economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policymakers argue that sanctions can deter state sponsorship, but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that governments are often uncertain if foreign states are truly sponsors versus hosts, and cannot perfectly determine the type of foreign support terrorists are receiving. We argue that this uncertainty, coupled with th…
A strategic theory of international environmental assistance
Over the past three decades multilateral financial aid has become an important institutional arrangement enabling environmental cooperation between developed and developing countries. However, previous research suggests that financial institutions are largely ineffective in achieving environmental goals. I show that financial assistance can be successful in increasing recipients’ contributions to environmental programs, thereby promoting environm…
Multilateral Aid and Domestic Economic Interests
Existing studies of foreign aid suggest that donor countries' economic groups, such as exporters, should be generally opposed to multilateral aid because multilateral flows do not allow donor countries to tie their aid implicitly or explicitly to the promotion of their domestic economic interests. However, economic groups can actually benefit from some types of multilateral aid, and this serves as an incentive for donor governments to support int…
Designing foreign policy
The literature on economic sanctions has long studied sender countries' policymaking as a simple choice between imposing sanctions to extract concessions from the targeted country and doing nothing. We depart from this simplifying assumption and analyze sanctions as a multifaceted foreign policy instrument. We argue that senders design sanction policies in response to policy preferences of two domestic constituencies. Voters expect a response to …
Inducing independence
Legal reforms matter for economic growth and democratic consolidation. As part of the “second-generation reforms”, international financial institutions have sought to build the rule of law by funding a vast array of legal and judicial reform projects throughout the developing world. Yet aside from scattered anecdotal evidence, the general effects of international assistance on legal reform and the rule of law remain poorly understood. This articl…
Coercion, Information, and the Success of Sanction Threats
This article explores when and why sanction threats succeed in extracting concessions from the targeted country. We focus on two different, albeit not mutually exclusive, mechanisms that can explain the success of sanction threats. The first mechanism relates to incomplete information regarding the sanctioner's determination to impose sanctions and suggests that threats help to extract concessions by revealing the sanctioner's resolve. The second…
The Kyoto Protocol
The politics of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol may suggest a two-level game; yet, our quantitative analysis shows that ratification constraints did not affect bargaining over the Protocol, nor did bargaining outcomes affect ratification. The politics of the Kyoto Protocol are best understood as an example of the 'Europeanization' of international politics: European countries subordinate their domestic politics to international cooperation, and the …
Friends or Foes? Major Trading Partners and the Success of Economic Sanctions
What is the relationship between international cooperation and the success of economic sanctions? Although it is commonly assumed that international cooperation is an important condition for the effectiveness of sanctions, empirical results have been mixed. We focus on the role of the sanctioned country's major trading partners and develop a theoretical model that shows how their actions can affect the probability of sanctions success by raising …
Friends or Foes? Major Trading Partners and the Success of Economic Sanctions
What is the relationship between international cooperation and the success of economic sanctions? Although it is commonly assumed that international cooperation is an important condition for the effectiveness of sanctions, empirical results have been mixed. We focus on the role of the sanctioned country's major trading partners and develop a theoretical model that shows how their actions can affect the probability of sanctions success by raising …
Coercion, Information, and the Success of Sanction Threats
This article explores when and why sanction threats succeed in extracting concessions from the targeted country. We focus on two different, albeit not mutually exclusive, mechanisms that can explain the success of sanction threats. The first mechanism relates to incomplete information regarding the sanctioner's determination to impose sanctions and suggests that threats help to extract concessions by revealing the sanctioner's resolve. The second…
Multilateral Aid and Domestic Economic Interests
Existing studies of foreign aid suggest that donor countries' economic groups, such as exporters, should be generally opposed to multilateral aid because multilateral flows do not allow donor countries to tie their aid implicitly or explicitly to the promotion of their domestic economic interests. However, economic groups can actually benefit from some types of multilateral aid, and this serves as an incentive for donor governments to support int…
Economic Sanctions and Government Spending Adjustments
Economic sanctions research suggests that sanctioned countries’ overall economic costs tend to be low. This article argues that, despite this, sanction costs can force the governments of these countries to reallocate budget resources from low-priority spending categories to other categories in an effort to minimize their political costs. One such low-priority category is disaster preparedness and mitigation. The authors show that economic sanctio…
Designing foreign policy
The literature on economic sanctions has long studied sender countries' policymaking as a simple choice between imposing sanctions to extract concessions from the targeted country and doing nothing. We depart from this simplifying assumption and analyze sanctions as a multifaceted foreign policy instrument. We argue that senders design sanction policies in response to policy preferences of two domestic constituencies. Voters expect a response to …
Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns
Although states rarely use economic sanctions specifically to combat transnational terrorism, potential targets of sanctions often face terrorist campaigns within their territory. States may avoid using sanctions against states with terrorists for fear of weakening target states excessively, thereby indirectly strengthening terrorist groups. However, this argument has not been subjected to rigorous empirical testing. This study presents a theoret…
The Kyoto Protocol
The politics of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol may suggest a two-level game; yet, our quantitative analysis shows that ratification constraints did not affect bargaining over the Protocol, nor did bargaining outcomes affect ratification. The politics of the Kyoto Protocol are best understood as an example of the 'Europeanization' of international politics: European countries subordinate their domestic politics to international cooperation, and the …
Political Relations, Leader Stability, and Economic Coercion
Countries use economic sanctions as a way to force their opponents to make policy concessions. Such external pressure may, as the designers of sanctions often intend, affect the degree of domestic support for the target's political leaders. It may even threaten the leaders’ survival in office. We investigate how these dual pressures—preference for policy concessions and concern about target leaders’ political future—shape the use of sanctions in …
Country-level analysis of household fuel transitions
Public Support for Economic Sanctions
What are the determinants of public support for the government’s foreign policy? We shed light on this question using experiments investigating public support for economic sanctions. Our results suggest that humanitarian concerns are associated with individuals’ decisions to support the use of sanctions against a target country. We find that high levels of public pain in the target country have a negative relationship with the likelihood of suppo…
Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent
Can economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policymakers argue that sanctions can deter state sponsorship, but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that governments are often uncertain if foreign states are truly sponsors versus hosts, and cannot perfectly determine the type of foreign support terrorists are receiving. We argue that this uncertainty, coupled with th…
A strategic theory of international environmental assistance
Over the past three decades multilateral financial aid has become an important institutional arrangement enabling environmental cooperation between developed and developing countries. However, previous research suggests that financial institutions are largely ineffective in achieving environmental goals. I show that financial assistance can be successful in increasing recipients’ contributions to environmental programs, thereby promoting environm…
Natural Disasters and the Size of Nations
What is the relationship between natural disasters and country size? Is an increasing likelihood of environmental shocks linked to political integration or secessionism? We argue that natural disasters are associated with a decline in country size. This relationship arises because costs generated by disasters are higher for citizens located farther away from the political center of a country, and costs are amplified as disasters affect a larger a…
Expecting the Unexpected
This study examines the relationship between disaster risks and interstate conflict. We argue that in disaster-prone areas actors’ rational expectations about the likelihood and magnitude of potential future disasters can make conflict more likely. The relationship emerges when future disasters are viewed as shocks that are expected to shift the relative power balance among states. If large enough, such expected shifts can generate commitment pro…
Do sanctions spell disaster? Economic sanctions, political institutions, and technological safety
Sanctions restrict or terminate economic relations between two or more countries, directly and negatively influencing sanctioned countries’ companies. We argue that sanctions are similar to recessions—both reduce economic activity in affected countries. Less economic activity results in a lower accident risk as companies use their productive facilities less. Reduced revenues also force companies to adjust by cutting costs, which includes spending…
Household dependence on solid cooking fuels in Peru
Clearing the air
The effect of economic coercion on companies’ foreign direct investment decisions
Existing research on the relationship between economic coercion and foreign direct investment suggests that sanctions have no effect on investments in targeted countries or may even encourage investment inflows. A key limitation of this research, however, is its aggregate country-level focus, which fails to capture company-level decision-making processes and factors shaping them. In contrast, this paper evaluates multinational companies’ investme…
Inducing independence
Legal reforms matter for economic growth and democratic consolidation. As part of the “second-generation reforms”, international financial institutions have sought to build the rule of law by funding a vast array of legal and judicial reform projects throughout the developing world. Yet aside from scattered anecdotal evidence, the general effects of international assistance on legal reform and the rule of law remain poorly understood. This articl…
Friends or Foes? Major Trading Partners and the Success of Economic Sanctions
What is the relationship between international cooperation and the success of economic sanctions? Although it is commonly assumed that international cooperation is an important condition for the effectiveness of sanctions, empirical results have been mixed. We focus on the role of the sanctioned country's major trading partners and develop a theoretical model that shows how their actions can affect the probability of sanctions success by raising …
The Kyoto Protocol
The politics of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol may suggest a two-level game; yet, our quantitative analysis shows that ratification constraints did not affect bargaining over the Protocol, nor did bargaining outcomes affect ratification. The politics of the Kyoto Protocol are best understood as an example of the 'Europeanization' of international politics: European countries subordinate their domestic politics to international cooperation, and the …
Inducing independence
Legal reforms matter for economic growth and democratic consolidation. As part of the “second-generation reforms”, international financial institutions have sought to build the rule of law by funding a vast array of legal and judicial reform projects throughout the developing world. Yet aside from scattered anecdotal evidence, the general effects of international assistance on legal reform and the rule of law remain poorly understood. This articl…
Coercion, Information, and the Success of Sanction Threats
This article explores when and why sanction threats succeed in extracting concessions from the targeted country. We focus on two different, albeit not mutually exclusive, mechanisms that can explain the success of sanction threats. The first mechanism relates to incomplete information regarding the sanctioner's determination to impose sanctions and suggests that threats help to extract concessions by revealing the sanctioner's resolve. The second…
Designing foreign policy
The literature on economic sanctions has long studied sender countries' policymaking as a simple choice between imposing sanctions to extract concessions from the targeted country and doing nothing. We depart from this simplifying assumption and analyze sanctions as a multifaceted foreign policy instrument. We argue that senders design sanction policies in response to policy preferences of two domestic constituencies. Voters expect a response to …
A strategic theory of international environmental assistance
Over the past three decades multilateral financial aid has become an important institutional arrangement enabling environmental cooperation between developed and developing countries. However, previous research suggests that financial institutions are largely ineffective in achieving environmental goals. I show that financial assistance can be successful in increasing recipients’ contributions to environmental programs, thereby promoting environm…
Multilateral Aid and Domestic Economic Interests
Existing studies of foreign aid suggest that donor countries' economic groups, such as exporters, should be generally opposed to multilateral aid because multilateral flows do not allow donor countries to tie their aid implicitly or explicitly to the promotion of their domestic economic interests. However, economic groups can actually benefit from some types of multilateral aid, and this serves as an incentive for donor governments to support int…
Public Support for Economic Sanctions
What are the determinants of public support for the government’s foreign policy? We shed light on this question using experiments investigating public support for economic sanctions. Our results suggest that humanitarian concerns are associated with individuals’ decisions to support the use of sanctions against a target country. We find that high levels of public pain in the target country have a negative relationship with the likelihood of suppo…
Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns
Although states rarely use economic sanctions specifically to combat transnational terrorism, potential targets of sanctions often face terrorist campaigns within their territory. States may avoid using sanctions against states with terrorists for fear of weakening target states excessively, thereby indirectly strengthening terrorist groups. However, this argument has not been subjected to rigorous empirical testing. This study presents a theoret…
Natural Disasters and the Size of Nations
What is the relationship between natural disasters and country size? Is an increasing likelihood of environmental shocks linked to political integration or secessionism? We argue that natural disasters are associated with a decline in country size. This relationship arises because costs generated by disasters are higher for citizens located farther away from the political center of a country, and costs are amplified as disasters affect a larger a…
Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent
Can economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policymakers argue that sanctions can deter state sponsorship, but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that governments are often uncertain if foreign states are truly sponsors versus hosts, and cannot perfectly determine the type of foreign support terrorists are receiving. We argue that this uncertainty, coupled with th…
Withdrawn
Lead Exposure in Low and Middle-Income Countries
Lead exposure is a legacy issue that continues to affect vulnerable population groups globally, but particularly in low and middle-income countries (LMICS). We take a multi-disciplinary approach to examine the patterns of lead exposure in these countries, discuss the underlying injustices and socio-political causes, and the economic costs that are associated with exposure. We conclude with some lessons we drew from our discussion of lead across t…
Country-level analysis of household fuel transitions
Political Relations, Leader Stability, and Economic Coercion
Countries use economic sanctions as a way to force their opponents to make policy concessions. Such external pressure may, as the designers of sanctions often intend, affect the degree of domestic support for the target's political leaders. It may even threaten the leaders’ survival in office. We investigate how these dual pressures—preference for policy concessions and concern about target leaders’ political future—shape the use of sanctions in …
The Political Economy of Carbon Capture and Storage Technology Adoption
Carbon sequestration through capture and storage in subsurface porous geologic formations is one potential method for mitigating the problem of climate change due to emission of anthropogenic CO 2 . In fact, in a world highly dependent on energy derived from hydrocarbons and coal, carbon capture and storage may represent the most promising approach to maintaining industrial development in the present period, while implementing other solutions tha…
Household dependence on solid cooking fuels in Peru
Do sanctions spell disaster? Economic sanctions, political institutions, and technological safety
Sanctions restrict or terminate economic relations between two or more countries, directly and negatively influencing sanctioned countries’ companies. We argue that sanctions are similar to recessions—both reduce economic activity in affected countries. Less economic activity results in a lower accident risk as companies use their productive facilities less. Reduced revenues also force companies to adjust by cutting costs, which includes spending…
Renewable energy policies and household solid fuel dependence
Expecting the Unexpected
This study examines the relationship between disaster risks and interstate conflict. We argue that in disaster-prone areas actors’ rational expectations about the likelihood and magnitude of potential future disasters can make conflict more likely. The relationship emerges when future disasters are viewed as shocks that are expected to shift the relative power balance among states. If large enough, such expected shifts can generate commitment pro…
Economic Sanctions and Government Spending Adjustments
Economic sanctions research suggests that sanctioned countries’ overall economic costs tend to be low. This article argues that, despite this, sanction costs can force the governments of these countries to reallocate budget resources from low-priority spending categories to other categories in an effort to minimize their political costs. One such low-priority category is disaster preparedness and mitigation. The authors show that economic sanctio…
Looking for advice
Clearing the air
The effect of economic coercion on companies’ foreign direct investment decisions
Existing research on the relationship between economic coercion and foreign direct investment suggests that sanctions have no effect on investments in targeted countries or may even encourage investment inflows. A key limitation of this research, however, is its aggregate country-level focus, which fails to capture company-level decision-making processes and factors shaping them. In contrast, this paper evaluates multinational companies’ investme…
How bureaucratic competition shapes foreign aid allocation
What explains aid allocation–donor interests or recipient needs? This research debate has generated a number of studies, which generally conclude that both motivations matter. One limitation of this literature is that donor governments are conceptualized as unitary actors with coherent preferences. In this study, we relax this assumption and focus on the interests and interactions of bureaucratic agencies within a donor government. We argue that …
Economics (25 works) · Political science (21 works) · Business (15 works) · Politics (14 works) · Law (13 works) · Economic Sanctions and International Relations (11 works) · Law (11 works) · Economic growth (10 works) · Sanctions (10 works) · Economic sanctions (9 works)