Cristina Bodea
Biographic Data
| ID | 1418533 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Cristina Bodea |
| GIVEN NAMES | Cristina |
| FAMILY NAME | Bodea |
| SIGNATURE | BODEA C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Michigan State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8666-3395 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 21 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 293 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 21 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 9 |
Expectations, Gender Bias, and Federal Reserve Talk
Global Treaties and Domestic Politics
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) define a set of investors’ rights and allow foreign investors to sue countries for policies that breach them. Political scientists typically study the extent to which that chastens policymaking in the context of health and environmental rules. We extend that literature to tax policy. We argue and show that BITs limit developing country governments’ tax intake. We further argue that umbrella clauses are an impo…
Central bank independence, income inequality and poverty
This paper examines whether the independence of central banks is related to income inequality and poverty. Following the 2008 financial crisis, independent central banks have been criticized that their actions contribute to an unequal income distribution. Yet, the case can also be made that such independence is orthogonal to income inequality or can even help mitigate it. As proxies for inequality, we employ five-year averages of the Gini coeffic…
Central bank independence in Latin America
In the last three decades, legal delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks (CBI) has achieved the status of a global norm of good governance. The recent backlash against this independence is an important but understudied trend. Our article analyzes the potential for delegation reversals with a focus on Latin America where CBI was effective in maintaining price stability, but placed important policy constraints on governments. We …
Fear of inflation and gender representation in central banking
Populism's rise in post‐communist countries
Do voters punish left‐wing parties that pursue neo‐liberal policies? We address the question in the context of post‐communist countries, where the left implemented significant and painful market‐oriented reforms. For the left, owning these reforms means backing away from its popular image and policy platform and plausibly generates two electorally consequential outcomes: a ‘brand dilution’ effect that weakens voters’ attachment to left parties an…
Do financial crises increase income inequality
Investor Rights versus Human Rights
This article argues that the broad and legally enforceable protection that bilateral investment treaties (BITs) offer to foreign investors worsens the human rights practices of developing countries. BITs lock in initial conditions attractive to investors that are linked to vertical investment flows and investment and trade competition. They also constrain the provision of welfare benefits or basic infrastructure. The lock-in and constraining effe…
Economic Institutions and Autocratic Breakdown
In dominant-party regimes, party cadres' participation in decision making constrains dictators from arbitrarily changing policy. Dominant-party regimes are also better at mobilizing supporters in exchange for extensive patronage. The conventional wisdom is that these two mechanisms work together to prolong dominant-party regimes. However, under certain conditions, the elite-level constraints restrict autocratic leaders' ability to engage in patro…
Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy
Independent central banks prefer balanced budgets due to the long-run connection between deficits and inflation, and can enforce their preference through interest rate increases and denial of credit to the government. This article argues that legal central bank independence (CBI) deters fiscal deficits predominantly in countries with rule of law and impartial contract enforcement, a free press and constraints on executive power. It further sugges…
Ethnic inequality and coups in sub-Saharan Africa
Does ethnic inequality breed coups? The recent literature on civil war shows both that inequality between ethnic groups induces war and, importantly, that civil wars and coups, although fundamentally different, are related. The literature on coups d'état, however, has yet to theorize and test the effect of ethnic inequality on coups. The link is plausible because many coups are 'ethnic coups', which depend on the capacity of plotters to mobilize …
Do Civil Wars, Coups and Riots Have the Same Structural Determinants
The literature on political instability focuses on institutional and leader survival or outcomes like civil wars and coups. We suggest that this approach overlooks lower levels of instability and that isolating outcomes understates the likelihood that they are manifestations of similar structural determinants. We extend the notion of instability to encompass jointly but distinctly civil wars, coups, and riots. Our explanation focuses on the role …
The Origins of Voluntary Compliance
The Origins of Voluntary Compliance
Voluntary compliance is an important aspect of strong tax regimes, but there is limited understanding of how social norms favoring compliance emerge. Using novel data from urban Nigeria, where tax enforcement is weak, this article shows that individuals with a positive experience of state services delivery are more likely to express belief in an unconditioned citizen obligation to pay tax. In addition to support for this fiscal exchange mechanism…
Oil and Civil Conflict
International Finance and Central Bank Independence
Research on central bank independence (CBI) focuses overwhelmingly on domestic causes and consequences. We consider CBI in relation to global finance. A first step links decisions to reform central bank legislation to a perceived need to attract capital in the form of foreign direct investment or sovereign borrowing. A second step models investors' actual decisions as a function of CBI. We test our argument on a sample of 78 countries (1974–2007)…
Price Stability and Central Bank Independence
Despite mixed empirical evidence, in the past two decades central bank independence (CBI) has been on the rise under the assumption that it ensures price stability. Using an encompassing theoretical approach and new yearly data for de jure CBI (seventy-eight countries, 1973–2008), we reexamine this relationship, distinguishing the role of printing less money (discipline) from the public's beliefs about the central bank's likely actions (credibili…
Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance
Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War
This paper argues that state weakness is broader than implied previously in the civil war literature, and that particular types of weakness in interaction with natural resources have aggravating or mitigating consequences for the risk of civil war. While in anocracies or unstable regimes natural resources can be expected to increase the risk of civil war, we suggest that resource wealth allows weak leaders to stabilize their relationship with the…
Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks
Theory and empirical evidence show that low inflation is a precondition for economic growth. Independent central banks and fixed exchange rates are institutional mechanisms that help keep inflation low by lending monetary policy credibility to governments. However, the two institutions are commonly analyzed as substitutes that tie the hands of inflation prone governments. Thus, the literature has difficulties describing why governments would adop…
Riots, Coups And Civil War
The most influential recent work on the determinants of civil wars found the factors associated with the grievance motivation to be largely irrelevant. Our paper subjects the results of this empirical work to further scrutiny by embedding the study of civil war in a more general analysis of varieties of violent contestation of political power within the borders of the state. Such an approach, we argue, will have important implications for how we …
The Origins of Voluntary Compliance
Voluntary compliance is an important aspect of strong tax regimes, but there is limited understanding of how social norms favoring compliance emerge. Using novel data from urban Nigeria, where tax enforcement is weak, this article shows that individuals with a positive experience of state services delivery are more likely to express belief in an unconditioned citizen obligation to pay tax. In addition to support for this fiscal exchange mechanism…
Price Stability and Central Bank Independence
Despite mixed empirical evidence, in the past two decades central bank independence (CBI) has been on the rise under the assumption that it ensures price stability. Using an encompassing theoretical approach and new yearly data for de jure CBI (seventy-eight countries, 1973–2008), we reexamine this relationship, distinguishing the role of printing less money (discipline) from the public's beliefs about the central bank's likely actions (credibili…
International Finance and Central Bank Independence
Research on central bank independence (CBI) focuses overwhelmingly on domestic causes and consequences. We consider CBI in relation to global finance. A first step links decisions to reform central bank legislation to a perceived need to attract capital in the form of foreign direct investment or sovereign borrowing. A second step models investors' actual decisions as a function of CBI. We test our argument on a sample of 78 countries (1974–2007)…
Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy
Independent central banks prefer balanced budgets due to the long-run connection between deficits and inflation, and can enforce their preference through interest rate increases and denial of credit to the government. This article argues that legal central bank independence (CBI) deters fiscal deficits predominantly in countries with rule of law and impartial contract enforcement, a free press and constraints on executive power. It further sugges…
Economic Institutions and Autocratic Breakdown
In dominant-party regimes, party cadres' participation in decision making constrains dictators from arbitrarily changing policy. Dominant-party regimes are also better at mobilizing supporters in exchange for extensive patronage. The conventional wisdom is that these two mechanisms work together to prolong dominant-party regimes. However, under certain conditions, the elite-level constraints restrict autocratic leaders' ability to engage in patro…
Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks
Theory and empirical evidence show that low inflation is a precondition for economic growth. Independent central banks and fixed exchange rates are institutional mechanisms that help keep inflation low by lending monetary policy credibility to governments. However, the two institutions are commonly analyzed as substitutes that tie the hands of inflation prone governments. Thus, the literature has difficulties describing why governments would adop…
Do Civil Wars, Coups and Riots Have the Same Structural Determinants
The literature on political instability focuses on institutional and leader survival or outcomes like civil wars and coups. We suggest that this approach overlooks lower levels of instability and that isolating outcomes understates the likelihood that they are manifestations of similar structural determinants. We extend the notion of instability to encompass jointly but distinctly civil wars, coups, and riots. Our explanation focuses on the role …
Oil and Civil Conflict
Investor Rights versus Human Rights
This article argues that the broad and legally enforceable protection that bilateral investment treaties (BITs) offer to foreign investors worsens the human rights practices of developing countries. BITs lock in initial conditions attractive to investors that are linked to vertical investment flows and investment and trade competition. They also constrain the provision of welfare benefits or basic infrastructure. The lock-in and constraining effe…
Populism's rise in post‐communist countries
Do voters punish left‐wing parties that pursue neo‐liberal policies? We address the question in the context of post‐communist countries, where the left implemented significant and painful market‐oriented reforms. For the left, owning these reforms means backing away from its popular image and policy platform and plausibly generates two electorally consequential outcomes: a ‘brand dilution’ effect that weakens voters’ attachment to left parties an…
Ethnic inequality and coups in sub-Saharan Africa
Does ethnic inequality breed coups? The recent literature on civil war shows both that inequality between ethnic groups induces war and, importantly, that civil wars and coups, although fundamentally different, are related. The literature on coups d'état, however, has yet to theorize and test the effect of ethnic inequality on coups. The link is plausible because many coups are 'ethnic coups', which depend on the capacity of plotters to mobilize …
Central bank independence in Latin America
In the last three decades, legal delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks (CBI) has achieved the status of a global norm of good governance. The recent backlash against this independence is an important but understudied trend. Our article analyzes the potential for delegation reversals with a focus on Latin America where CBI was effective in maintaining price stability, but placed important policy constraints on governments. We …
Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance
Do financial crises increase income inequality
Expectations, Gender Bias, and Federal Reserve Talk
Central bank independence, income inequality and poverty
This paper examines whether the independence of central banks is related to income inequality and poverty. Following the 2008 financial crisis, independent central banks have been criticized that their actions contribute to an unequal income distribution. Yet, the case can also be made that such independence is orthogonal to income inequality or can even help mitigate it. As proxies for inequality, we employ five-year averages of the Gini coeffic…
Riots, Coups And Civil War
The most influential recent work on the determinants of civil wars found the factors associated with the grievance motivation to be largely irrelevant. Our paper subjects the results of this empirical work to further scrutiny by embedding the study of civil war in a more general analysis of varieties of violent contestation of political power within the borders of the state. Such an approach, we argue, will have important implications for how we …
Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks
Theory and empirical evidence show that low inflation is a precondition for economic growth. Independent central banks and fixed exchange rates are institutional mechanisms that help keep inflation low by lending monetary policy credibility to governments. However, the two institutions are commonly analyzed as substitutes that tie the hands of inflation prone governments. Thus, the literature has difficulties describing why governments would adop…
Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War
This paper argues that state weakness is broader than implied previously in the civil war literature, and that particular types of weakness in interaction with natural resources have aggravating or mitigating consequences for the risk of civil war. While in anocracies or unstable regimes natural resources can be expected to increase the risk of civil war, we suggest that resource wealth allows weak leaders to stabilize their relationship with the…
Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance
Oil and Civil Conflict
International Finance and Central Bank Independence
Research on central bank independence (CBI) focuses overwhelmingly on domestic causes and consequences. We consider CBI in relation to global finance. A first step links decisions to reform central bank legislation to a perceived need to attract capital in the form of foreign direct investment or sovereign borrowing. A second step models investors' actual decisions as a function of CBI. We test our argument on a sample of 78 countries (1974–2007)…
Price Stability and Central Bank Independence
Despite mixed empirical evidence, in the past two decades central bank independence (CBI) has been on the rise under the assumption that it ensures price stability. Using an encompassing theoretical approach and new yearly data for de jure CBI (seventy-eight countries, 1973–2008), we reexamine this relationship, distinguishing the role of printing less money (discipline) from the public's beliefs about the central bank's likely actions (credibili…
Do Civil Wars, Coups and Riots Have the Same Structural Determinants
The literature on political instability focuses on institutional and leader survival or outcomes like civil wars and coups. We suggest that this approach overlooks lower levels of instability and that isolating outcomes understates the likelihood that they are manifestations of similar structural determinants. We extend the notion of instability to encompass jointly but distinctly civil wars, coups, and riots. Our explanation focuses on the role …
The Origins of Voluntary Compliance
The Origins of Voluntary Compliance
Voluntary compliance is an important aspect of strong tax regimes, but there is limited understanding of how social norms favoring compliance emerge. Using novel data from urban Nigeria, where tax enforcement is weak, this article shows that individuals with a positive experience of state services delivery are more likely to express belief in an unconditioned citizen obligation to pay tax. In addition to support for this fiscal exchange mechanism…
Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy
Independent central banks prefer balanced budgets due to the long-run connection between deficits and inflation, and can enforce their preference through interest rate increases and denial of credit to the government. This article argues that legal central bank independence (CBI) deters fiscal deficits predominantly in countries with rule of law and impartial contract enforcement, a free press and constraints on executive power. It further sugges…
Ethnic inequality and coups in sub-Saharan Africa
Does ethnic inequality breed coups? The recent literature on civil war shows both that inequality between ethnic groups induces war and, importantly, that civil wars and coups, although fundamentally different, are related. The literature on coups d'état, however, has yet to theorize and test the effect of ethnic inequality on coups. The link is plausible because many coups are 'ethnic coups', which depend on the capacity of plotters to mobilize …
Economic Institutions and Autocratic Breakdown
In dominant-party regimes, party cadres' participation in decision making constrains dictators from arbitrarily changing policy. Dominant-party regimes are also better at mobilizing supporters in exchange for extensive patronage. The conventional wisdom is that these two mechanisms work together to prolong dominant-party regimes. However, under certain conditions, the elite-level constraints restrict autocratic leaders' ability to engage in patro…
Investor Rights versus Human Rights
This article argues that the broad and legally enforceable protection that bilateral investment treaties (BITs) offer to foreign investors worsens the human rights practices of developing countries. BITs lock in initial conditions attractive to investors that are linked to vertical investment flows and investment and trade competition. They also constrain the provision of welfare benefits or basic infrastructure. The lock-in and constraining effe…
Do financial crises increase income inequality
Fear of inflation and gender representation in central banking
Populism's rise in post‐communist countries
Do voters punish left‐wing parties that pursue neo‐liberal policies? We address the question in the context of post‐communist countries, where the left implemented significant and painful market‐oriented reforms. For the left, owning these reforms means backing away from its popular image and policy platform and plausibly generates two electorally consequential outcomes: a ‘brand dilution’ effect that weakens voters’ attachment to left parties an…
Central bank independence in Latin America
In the last three decades, legal delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks (CBI) has achieved the status of a global norm of good governance. The recent backlash against this independence is an important but understudied trend. Our article analyzes the potential for delegation reversals with a focus on Latin America where CBI was effective in maintaining price stability, but placed important policy constraints on governments. We …
Global Treaties and Domestic Politics
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) define a set of investors’ rights and allow foreign investors to sue countries for policies that breach them. Political scientists typically study the extent to which that chastens policymaking in the context of health and environmental rules. We extend that literature to tax policy. We argue and show that BITs limit developing country governments’ tax intake. We further argue that umbrella clauses are an impo…
Central bank independence, income inequality and poverty
This paper examines whether the independence of central banks is related to income inequality and poverty. Following the 2008 financial crisis, independent central banks have been criticized that their actions contribute to an unequal income distribution. Yet, the case can also be made that such independence is orthogonal to income inequality or can even help mitigate it. As proxies for inequality, we employ five-year averages of the Gini coeffic…
Expectations, Gender Bias, and Federal Reserve Talk
Economics (19 works) · Political science (16 works) · Law (12 works) · Politics (10 works) · Law (9 works) · Independence (probability theory (8 works) · Monetary economics (8 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (7 works) · Democracy (6 works) · Global Financial Crisis and Policies (6 works)