Dietmar Fehr
Biographic Data
| ID | 1454329 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dietmar Fehr |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dietmar |
| FAMILY NAME | Fehr |
| SIGNATURE | FEHR D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Stuttgart |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9735-390X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Misperceiving economic success: Experimental Evidence on Meritocratic Beliefs and Inequality Acceptance
Meritocratic beliefs are often invoked as justification for inequality. We provide evidence on how meritocratic beliefs are shaped by economic rewards and how they contribute to the moral justification of inequality. In a large-scale survey experiment in the US, we show that economic rewards cause a change in beliefs about success depending on effort rather than luck. Exploiting exogenous variation in meritocratic beliefs in a two-stage analysis …
Poor and Rational: Decision-Making under Scarcity
Social Distance and Trust: Experimental Evidence from a Slum in Cairo
Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments
The effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good is examined. Participants are in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, they can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and compared to controls with random partner rematching. Results demonstrat…
Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments
The effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good is examined. Participants are in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, they can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and compared to controls with random partner rematching. Results demonstrat…
Social Distance and Trust: Experimental Evidence from a Slum in Cairo
Poor and Rational: Decision-Making under Scarcity
Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments
The effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good is examined. Participants are in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, they can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and compared to controls with random partner rematching. Results demonstrat…
Social Distance and Trust: Experimental Evidence from a Slum in Cairo
Poor and Rational: Decision-Making under Scarcity
Misperceiving economic success: Experimental Evidence on Meritocratic Beliefs and Inequality Acceptance
Meritocratic beliefs are often invoked as justification for inequality. We provide evidence on how meritocratic beliefs are shaped by economic rewards and how they contribute to the moral justification of inequality. In a large-scale survey experiment in the US, we show that economic rewards cause a change in beliefs about success depending on effort rather than luck. Exploiting exogenous variation in meritocratic beliefs in a two-stage analysis …
Economics (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works) · Income, Poverty, and Inequality (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Public economics (2 works)