Alexander Teytelboym
Biographic Data
| ID | 1454637 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alexander Teytelboym |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alexander |
| FAMILY NAME | Teytelboym |
| SIGNATURE | TEYTELBOYM A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oxford |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6570-1903 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 16 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Economic complexity and the green economy
Which countries are likely to have the productive capabilities to thrive in the green economy? How might countries reorient their existing industrial structures to be more competitive in an environmentally friendly world? To investigate these questions, this paper develops a novel methodology for measuring productive capabilities to the green economy. By constructing a new comprehensive dataset of traded green products and drawing on economic com…
The Equilibrium Existence Duality
We show that with indivisible goods, the existence of competitive equilibrium fundamentally depends on agents’ substitution effects, not their income effects. Our equilibrium existence duality allows us to transport results on the existence of competitive equilibrium from settings with transferable utility to settings with income effects. One consequence is that net substitutability—which is a strictly weaker condition than gross substitutability…
Central bank digital currencies risk becoming a digital Leviathan
Matching Systems for Refugees
Matching Systems for Refugees
Executive Summary 1 Design of matching systems between refugees and states or local areas is emerging as one of the most promising solutions to problems in refugee resettlement. We describe the basics of two-sided matching theory used in a number of allocation problems, such as school choice, where both sides need to agree to the match. We then explain how these insights can be applied to international refugee matching in the context of the Europ…
The International Refugee Match: A System that Respects Refugees’ Preferences and the Priorities of States
There is an urgent need to overcome the political deadlock preventing states substantively participating in burden-sharing in the international refugee regime, and, in particular, finding solutions to the European refugee crisis. We propose a centralised clearinghouse -a 'two-sided matching system' -to match refugees with states. Drawing on the success of matching in domains, such as education and healthcare, we outline the principles underlying …
The Local Refugee Match: Aligning Refugees’ Preferences with the Capacities and Priorities of Localities
Once refugees are granted protection in a particular host country, there is little concern about where in that country they are settled. Yet this matters enormously for refugees’ chances to prosper in the new country and for the willingness of the local community to welcome them. We propose a centralized clearinghouse—a ‘two-sided matching system’—to match refugees with localities. Drawing on the success of matching in domains such as public scho…
Social groups and social network formation
The International Refugee Match: A System that Respects Refugees’ Preferences and the Priorities of States
There is an urgent need to overcome the political deadlock preventing states substantively participating in burden-sharing in the international refugee regime, and, in particular, finding solutions to the European refugee crisis. We propose a centralised clearinghouse -a 'two-sided matching system' -to match refugees with states. Drawing on the success of matching in domains, such as education and healthcare, we outline the principles underlying …
The Local Refugee Match: Aligning Refugees’ Preferences with the Capacities and Priorities of Localities
Once refugees are granted protection in a particular host country, there is little concern about where in that country they are settled. Yet this matters enormously for refugees’ chances to prosper in the new country and for the willingness of the local community to welcome them. We propose a centralized clearinghouse—a ‘two-sided matching system’—to match refugees with localities. Drawing on the success of matching in domains such as public scho…
Matching Systems for Refugees
Executive Summary 1 Design of matching systems between refugees and states or local areas is emerging as one of the most promising solutions to problems in refugee resettlement. We describe the basics of two-sided matching theory used in a number of allocation problems, such as school choice, where both sides need to agree to the match. We then explain how these insights can be applied to international refugee matching in the context of the Europ…
The Equilibrium Existence Duality
We show that with indivisible goods, the existence of competitive equilibrium fundamentally depends on agents’ substitution effects, not their income effects. Our equilibrium existence duality allows us to transport results on the existence of competitive equilibrium from settings with transferable utility to settings with income effects. One consequence is that net substitutability—which is a strictly weaker condition than gross substitutability…
Social groups and social network formation
Matching Systems for Refugees
Matching Systems for Refugees
Executive Summary 1 Design of matching systems between refugees and states or local areas is emerging as one of the most promising solutions to problems in refugee resettlement. We describe the basics of two-sided matching theory used in a number of allocation problems, such as school choice, where both sides need to agree to the match. We then explain how these insights can be applied to international refugee matching in the context of the Europ…
The International Refugee Match: A System that Respects Refugees’ Preferences and the Priorities of States
There is an urgent need to overcome the political deadlock preventing states substantively participating in burden-sharing in the international refugee regime, and, in particular, finding solutions to the European refugee crisis. We propose a centralised clearinghouse -a 'two-sided matching system' -to match refugees with states. Drawing on the success of matching in domains, such as education and healthcare, we outline the principles underlying …
The Local Refugee Match: Aligning Refugees’ Preferences with the Capacities and Priorities of Localities
Once refugees are granted protection in a particular host country, there is little concern about where in that country they are settled. Yet this matters enormously for refugees’ chances to prosper in the new country and for the willingness of the local community to welcome them. We propose a centralized clearinghouse—a ‘two-sided matching system’—to match refugees with localities. Drawing on the success of matching in domains such as public scho…
Economic complexity and the green economy
Which countries are likely to have the productive capabilities to thrive in the green economy? How might countries reorient their existing industrial structures to be more competitive in an environmentally friendly world? To investigate these questions, this paper develops a novel methodology for measuring productive capabilities to the green economy. By constructing a new comprehensive dataset of traded green products and drawing on economic com…
The Equilibrium Existence Duality
We show that with indivisible goods, the existence of competitive equilibrium fundamentally depends on agents’ substitution effects, not their income effects. Our equilibrium existence duality allows us to transport results on the existence of competitive equilibrium from settings with transferable utility to settings with income effects. One consequence is that net substitutability—which is a strictly weaker condition than gross substitutability…
Central bank digital currencies risk becoming a digital Leviathan
Economics (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Matching (statistics (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Refugee (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Law (3 works)