Vincent P Crawford
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1454735 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Vincent P Crawford |
| PRENOMES | Vincent P |
| SOBRENOME | Crawford |
| ASSINATURA | CRAWFORD V P |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0532-0305 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 22 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1979 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Expectations-based reference-dependence and labor supply
New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior
In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of non…
Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of Strategic Interaction
One cannot, without empirical evidence, deduce what understandings can be perceived in a nonzero-sum game of maneuver any more than one can prove, by purely formal deduction, that a particular joke is bound to be funny.Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict its equilibria; selecting one using common sense, equilibrium refinements, dynamic arguments, or convenience; comparing the selected equilibrium with stylized facts and intuitions about ou…
Superfairness
Journal Article Superfairness: Applications and Theory Get access Superfairness: Applications and Theory. By WILLIAM J. BAUMOL with contributions by Dietrich Fischer. (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: The MIT Press, 1986. Pp. xi + 266. à £19.95 hardback.) Vincent P. Crawford Vincent P. Crawford University of California, San Diego Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue 387,…
Dynamic Games and Dynamic Contract Theory
The article provides a survey and exposition of recent developments in dynamic noncooperative game theory and dynamic contract theory. In realistic models of economic relationships, complex long-term agreements may be mutually beneficial; legal enforcement of contracts is difficult or impossible; assymmetries of information place limits on the use of other enforcement techniques; and competitive forces are too weak to prevent strategic behavior f…
Strategic Information Transmission
This paper develops a model of strategic communication, in which a better-informed Sender (S) sends a possibly noisy signal to a Receiver (R), who then takes an action that determines the welfare of both. We characterize the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria under standard assumptions, and show that equilibrium signaling always takes a strikingly simple form, in which S partitions the support of the (scalar) variable that represents his private inf…
A Comment on Farber's Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration
In a recent article in this journal, Henry Farber (1980) provided an interesting analysis of final-offer compulsory arbitration, showing how bargainers' attitudes toward risk interact with arbitral uncertainty to determine their equilibrium final offers and the size of the contract zone. The purpose of this note is to supplement Farber's analysis by correcting an error in the interpretation of the Rothschild-Stiglitz definition of increasing risk…
A Note on the Zeuthen-Harsanyi Theory of Bargaining
This article shows that the conclusions of the Zeuthen-Harsanyi theory of bargaining, which is widely regarded as an alternative justification for Nash's solution of the bargaining problem, can be extremely sensitive to small changes in the assumption that both bargainers have identical perceptions of the costs of disagreement. Whether this is the case depends on whether bargainers' priors about those costs are optimistic, in a sense made precise…
On Compulsory-Arbitration Schemes
This paper studies the settlements generated by several variants of a compulsory-arbitration scheme called ``final-offer arbitration'' (FOA). Some of these are now in use in several states, and one has been recommended by Clifford Donn as an improvement on existing schemes. Under reasonable economic assumptions, two versions of FOA now being used are equivalent to imposing z̄, the settlement the arbitrator would impose in conventional compulsory …
On Compulsory-Arbitration Schemes
This paper studies the settlements generated by several variants of a compulsory-arbitration scheme called ``final-offer arbitration'' (FOA). Some of these are now in use in several states, and one has been recommended by Clifford Donn as an improvement on existing schemes. Under reasonable economic assumptions, two versions of FOA now being used are equivalent to imposing z̄, the settlement the arbitrator would impose in conventional compulsory …
Superfairness
Journal Article Superfairness: Applications and Theory Get access Superfairness: Applications and Theory. By WILLIAM J. BAUMOL with contributions by Dietrich Fischer. (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: The MIT Press, 1986. Pp. xi + 266. à £19.95 hardback.) Vincent P. Crawford Vincent P. Crawford University of California, San Diego Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue 387,…
Dynamic Games and Dynamic Contract Theory
The article provides a survey and exposition of recent developments in dynamic noncooperative game theory and dynamic contract theory. In realistic models of economic relationships, complex long-term agreements may be mutually beneficial; legal enforcement of contracts is difficult or impossible; assymmetries of information place limits on the use of other enforcement techniques; and competitive forces are too weak to prevent strategic behavior f…
A Comment on Farber's Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration
In a recent article in this journal, Henry Farber (1980) provided an interesting analysis of final-offer compulsory arbitration, showing how bargainers' attitudes toward risk interact with arbitral uncertainty to determine their equilibrium final offers and the size of the contract zone. The purpose of this note is to supplement Farber's analysis by correcting an error in the interpretation of the Rothschild-Stiglitz definition of increasing risk…
On Compulsory-Arbitration Schemes
This paper studies the settlements generated by several variants of a compulsory-arbitration scheme called ``final-offer arbitration'' (FOA). Some of these are now in use in several states, and one has been recommended by Clifford Donn as an improvement on existing schemes. Under reasonable economic assumptions, two versions of FOA now being used are equivalent to imposing z̄, the settlement the arbitrator would impose in conventional compulsory …
A Note on the Zeuthen-Harsanyi Theory of Bargaining
This article shows that the conclusions of the Zeuthen-Harsanyi theory of bargaining, which is widely regarded as an alternative justification for Nash's solution of the bargaining problem, can be extremely sensitive to small changes in the assumption that both bargainers have identical perceptions of the costs of disagreement. Whether this is the case depends on whether bargainers' priors about those costs are optimistic, in a sense made precise…
Strategic Information Transmission
This paper develops a model of strategic communication, in which a better-informed Sender (S) sends a possibly noisy signal to a Receiver (R), who then takes an action that determines the welfare of both. We characterize the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria under standard assumptions, and show that equilibrium signaling always takes a strikingly simple form, in which S partitions the support of the (scalar) variable that represents his private inf…
A Comment on Farber's Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration
In a recent article in this journal, Henry Farber (1980) provided an interesting analysis of final-offer compulsory arbitration, showing how bargainers' attitudes toward risk interact with arbitral uncertainty to determine their equilibrium final offers and the size of the contract zone. The purpose of this note is to supplement Farber's analysis by correcting an error in the interpretation of the Rothschild-Stiglitz definition of increasing risk…
Dynamic Games and Dynamic Contract Theory
The article provides a survey and exposition of recent developments in dynamic noncooperative game theory and dynamic contract theory. In realistic models of economic relationships, complex long-term agreements may be mutually beneficial; legal enforcement of contracts is difficult or impossible; assymmetries of information place limits on the use of other enforcement techniques; and competitive forces are too weak to prevent strategic behavior f…
Superfairness
Journal Article Superfairness: Applications and Theory Get access Superfairness: Applications and Theory. By WILLIAM J. BAUMOL with contributions by Dietrich Fischer. (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: The MIT Press, 1986. Pp. xi + 266. à £19.95 hardback.) Vincent P. Crawford Vincent P. Crawford University of California, San Diego Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue 387,…
Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of Strategic Interaction
One cannot, without empirical evidence, deduce what understandings can be perceived in a nonzero-sum game of maneuver any more than one can prove, by purely formal deduction, that a particular joke is bound to be funny.Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict its equilibria; selecting one using common sense, equilibrium refinements, dynamic arguments, or convenience; comparing the selected equilibrium with stylized facts and intuitions about ou…
New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior
In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of non…
Expectations-based reference-dependence and labor supply
Computer Science (8 obras) · Economics (7 obras) · Mathematical economics (4 obras) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 obras) · Economic theories and models (3 obras) · Game Theory and Applications (3 obras) · Law (3 obras) · Law (3 obras) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (3 obras) · Mathematics (3 obras)