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Peter A Diamond

Biographic Data

ID1455077
NAMEPeter A Diamond
GIVEN NAMESPeter A
FAMILY NAMEDiamond
SIGNATUREDIAMOND P A
AFFILIATIONSMassachusetts Institute of Technology
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS13
TOTAL CITATIONS302
WORKS AS AUTHOR13
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1965
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2005
H-INDEX4
  • Saving Social Security

    Peter A Diamond, Peter R Orszag•BOOK•Saving Social Security•2005

  • Saving Social Security

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2005•Cited by: 3•References: 1

    Social Security is one of America's most successful government programs. It has helped millions of Americans avoid poverty in old age. To be sure, the program faces a long-term deficit and is in need of updating. But Social Security's long-term financial health can be restored: the projected deficit is small enough that it can be eliminated through a progressive reform that combines modest benefit reductions and revenue increases

  • Proposals to Restructure Social Security

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1996•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    This paper discusses five proposed changes in Social Security: indexing the normal retirement age to life expectancy (as Sweden is doing); investing part of the trust funds in private securities; partial privatization (as has been proposed by Senators Kerrey and Simpson, Sweden is doing and Mexico has done); replacing Social Security by individually mandated savings (as was done in Chile in 1981); and mandating employer provided retirement saving…

  • Two Improvements on the Clinton Framework

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, J Seidemann•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1994

    Under the Clinton proposal, states choose a single payer or large regional alliances, where individuals choose from all plans in the market. This should give the high administrative costs of individual choice, not those of group choice. States should have another option--small alliances offering limited, group-based choice. Clinton proposes comprehensive insurance for all, with courts enforcing coverage for all medically necessary services not ex…

  • Contingent Valuation

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1994•Cited by: 167•References: 6

    Without market outcomes for comparison, internal consistency tests, particularly adding-up tests, are needed for credibility. When tested, contingent valuation has failed. Proponents find surveys tested poorly done. To the authors' knowledge, no survey has passed these tests. The 'embedding effect' is the similarity of willingness-to-pay responses that theory suggests (and sometimes requires) be different. This problem has long been recognized bu…

  • Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium

    Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1982•Cited by: 67•References: 1

    Equilibrium is analyzed for a simple barter model with identical risk-neutral agents where trade is coordinated by a stochastic matching process. It is shown that there are multiple steady-state rational expectations equilibria, with all non-corner solution equilibria inefficient. This implies that an economy with this type of trade friction does not have a unique natural rate of unemployment

  • Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment, and Efficiency

    Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1981•Cited by: 17

    With imperfect job information flows, it is plausible that the distribution of job offerings becomes more attractive when there are more vacancies and more unemployed. With word-of-mouth communication, this condition is derived. Given this condition, steady-state equilibrium is not efficient, with welfare increased by the introduction of unemployment compensation even though all agents are risk neutral. In this way workers become more selective i…

  • The Role of a Stock Market in a General Equilibrium Model With Technological Uncertainty

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•CHAPTER•Uncertainty in economics•1978

  • Uncertainty in economics

    Peter A Diamond, Michael Rothschild•BOOK•Uncertainty in economics•1978

  • Increases in risk and in risk aversion

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Theory•1974

  • A model of price adjustment

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Theory•1971

  • Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparison of Utility

    Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1967•Cited by: 45

  • On the Cost of Tax-exempt Bonds

    Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1965

  • Contingent Valuation

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1994•Cited by: 167•References: 6

    Without market outcomes for comparison, internal consistency tests, particularly adding-up tests, are needed for credibility. When tested, contingent valuation has failed. Proponents find surveys tested poorly done. To the authors' knowledge, no survey has passed these tests. The 'embedding effect' is the similarity of willingness-to-pay responses that theory suggests (and sometimes requires) be different. This problem has long been recognized bu…

  • Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium

    Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1982•Cited by: 67•References: 1

    Equilibrium is analyzed for a simple barter model with identical risk-neutral agents where trade is coordinated by a stochastic matching process. It is shown that there are multiple steady-state rational expectations equilibria, with all non-corner solution equilibria inefficient. This implies that an economy with this type of trade friction does not have a unique natural rate of unemployment

  • Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparison of Utility

    Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1967•Cited by: 45

  • Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment, and Efficiency

    Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1981•Cited by: 17

    With imperfect job information flows, it is plausible that the distribution of job offerings becomes more attractive when there are more vacancies and more unemployed. With word-of-mouth communication, this condition is derived. Given this condition, steady-state equilibrium is not efficient, with welfare increased by the introduction of unemployment compensation even though all agents are risk neutral. In this way workers become more selective i…

  • Saving Social Security

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2005•Cited by: 3•References: 1

    Social Security is one of America's most successful government programs. It has helped millions of Americans avoid poverty in old age. To be sure, the program faces a long-term deficit and is in need of updating. But Social Security's long-term financial health can be restored: the projected deficit is small enough that it can be eliminated through a progressive reform that combines modest benefit reductions and revenue increases

  • Proposals to Restructure Social Security

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1996•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    This paper discusses five proposed changes in Social Security: indexing the normal retirement age to life expectancy (as Sweden is doing); investing part of the trust funds in private securities; partial privatization (as has been proposed by Senators Kerrey and Simpson, Sweden is doing and Mexico has done); replacing Social Security by individually mandated savings (as was done in Chile in 1981); and mandating employer provided retirement saving…

  • On the Cost of Tax-exempt Bonds

    Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1965

  • Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparison of Utility

    Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1967•Cited by: 45

  • A model of price adjustment

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Theory•1971

  • Increases in risk and in risk aversion

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Theory•1974

  • The Role of a Stock Market in a General Equilibrium Model With Technological Uncertainty

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•CHAPTER•Uncertainty in economics•1978

  • Uncertainty in economics

    Peter A Diamond, Michael Rothschild•BOOK•Uncertainty in economics•1978

  • Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment, and Efficiency

    Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1981•Cited by: 17

    With imperfect job information flows, it is plausible that the distribution of job offerings becomes more attractive when there are more vacancies and more unemployed. With word-of-mouth communication, this condition is derived. Given this condition, steady-state equilibrium is not efficient, with welfare increased by the introduction of unemployment compensation even though all agents are risk neutral. In this way workers become more selective i…

  • Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium

    Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1982•Cited by: 67•References: 1

    Equilibrium is analyzed for a simple barter model with identical risk-neutral agents where trade is coordinated by a stochastic matching process. It is shown that there are multiple steady-state rational expectations equilibria, with all non-corner solution equilibria inefficient. This implies that an economy with this type of trade friction does not have a unique natural rate of unemployment

  • Two Improvements on the Clinton Framework

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, J Seidemann•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1994

    Under the Clinton proposal, states choose a single payer or large regional alliances, where individuals choose from all plans in the market. This should give the high administrative costs of individual choice, not those of group choice. States should have another option--small alliances offering limited, group-based choice. Clinton proposes comprehensive insurance for all, with courts enforcing coverage for all medically necessary services not ex…

  • Contingent Valuation

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1994•Cited by: 167•References: 6

    Without market outcomes for comparison, internal consistency tests, particularly adding-up tests, are needed for credibility. When tested, contingent valuation has failed. Proponents find surveys tested poorly done. To the authors' knowledge, no survey has passed these tests. The 'embedding effect' is the similarity of willingness-to-pay responses that theory suggests (and sometimes requires) be different. This problem has long been recognized bu…

  • Proposals to Restructure Social Security

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1996•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    This paper discusses five proposed changes in Social Security: indexing the normal retirement age to life expectancy (as Sweden is doing); investing part of the trust funds in private securities; partial privatization (as has been proposed by Senators Kerrey and Simpson, Sweden is doing and Mexico has done); replacing Social Security by individually mandated savings (as was done in Chile in 1981); and mandating employer provided retirement saving…

  • Saving Social Security

    Peter A Diamond, Peter R Orszag•BOOK•Saving Social Security•2005

  • Saving Social Security

    Open Access•Peter A Diamond, Peter Dia­mond et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2005•Cited by: 3•References: 1

    Social Security is one of America's most successful government programs. It has helped millions of Americans avoid poverty in old age. To be sure, the program faces a long-term deficit and is in need of updating. But Social Security's long-term financial health can be restored: the projected deficit is small enough that it can be eliminated through a progressive reform that combines modest benefit reductions and revenue increases

Economics (9 works) · Economic theories and models (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Market economy (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Politics (3 works)

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