Georges Dionne
Biographic Data
| ID | 1455459 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Georges Dionne |
| GIVEN NAMES | Georges |
| FAMILY NAME | Dionne |
| SIGNATURE | DIONNE G |
| AFFILIATIONS | HEC Montréal |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0578-1083 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1985 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Featured Cover
The cover image is based on the Research Article Hierarchical random-effects model for the insurance pricing of vehicles belonging to a fleet by Denise Desjardins et al., https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.2949
Hierarchical random‐effects model for the insurance pricing of vehicles belonging to a fleet
We propose a count‐data model with hierarchical random effects for the posterior insurance ratemaking of vehicles belonging to a fleet, by allowing random effects for the fleet, the vehicles, and time. We derive a simple closed‐form ratemaking formula based on a hierarchical random‐effects specification. We estimate the corresponding econometric model and compute insurance premiums according to the past experience of both the vehicle and the flee…
Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving
Road safety policies often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations to promote safe driving—for example, fines, experience rating, and point-record driver's licenses. We analyze the effectiveness of these mechanisms in promoting safe driving. We derive their theoretical properties with respect to contract time and accumulated demerit points. These properties are tested empirically with data from the Quebec public insurance plan. We fi…
New Evidence on the Determinants of Absenteeism Using Linked Employer-Employee Data
This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of absenteeism. The authors extend the typical labor-leisure model used to analyze the decision to skip work to include firm-level policy variables relevant to the absenteeism decision and uncertainty about the cost of absenteeism. Estimates based on data from Statistics Canada's Workplace Employee Survey (1999-2002), with controls for observed and unobserved demographic, job, and firm characte…
Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent Claims
Insurance fraud is now recognized as a significant resource-allocation problem in many markets. The object of this study is to verify how straight deductible contracts may affect the equilibrium level of falsification in automobile insurance. This type of contract is observed in many markets, even if it is not optimal under costly state falsification. A higher deductible may create incentives to fraud or cheat, particularly when the insured antic…
Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market
Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation
With asymmetric information, full commitment to long-term contracts may permit markets to approach first-best allocations. However, commitment can be undermined by opportunistic behavior, notably renegotiation. The authors reexamine commitment in insurance markets. They present an alternative model (which extends Jean-Jaques Laffont and Jean Tirole's procurement model to address uncertainty and competition), which involves semipooling in the firs…
Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard
Two types of moral hazard have been determined. The first type is related to self-prevention activities affecting probabilities of accidents. The second type relates to the agent's activities whenever the accident occurs. The authors' objective consists of presenting an empirical measure of the significance of this second type of moral hazard in the workers' compensation market. The main challenge in isolating moral hazard consists of dividing in…
An Empirical Analysis of Moral Hazard and Experience Rating
For many years, economists and actuaries have studied multiperiod insurance contracts independently and differently. The aim of this article is to reduce the gap between empirical studies on the determination of insurance premiums and theoretical studies on moral hazard and experience rating. The first objective is to verify empirically the proposition that past experience is a good predictor of risk by using data from a random sample consisting …
Description and Analysis of the Quebec Automobile Insurance Plan
This paper presents a review of the main characteristics of the Quebec Automobile Insurance Plan, with emphasis on both the compensation and the pricing of insurance. After discussing the effects of the introduction of this plan on accidents, estimates of the statistical relationship between drivers' past experience and current probabilities of accident are derived and their use to increase the incentives for road safety is considered
Patient mobility for elective surgical interventions
New Evidence on the Determinants of Absenteeism Using Linked Employer-Employee Data
This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of absenteeism. The authors extend the typical labor-leisure model used to analyze the decision to skip work to include firm-level policy variables relevant to the absenteeism decision and uncertainty about the cost of absenteeism. Estimates based on data from Statistics Canada's Workplace Employee Survey (1999-2002), with controls for observed and unobserved demographic, job, and firm characte…
Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market
Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation
With asymmetric information, full commitment to long-term contracts may permit markets to approach first-best allocations. However, commitment can be undermined by opportunistic behavior, notably renegotiation. The authors reexamine commitment in insurance markets. They present an alternative model (which extends Jean-Jaques Laffont and Jean Tirole's procurement model to address uncertainty and competition), which involves semipooling in the firs…
Description and Analysis of the Quebec Automobile Insurance Plan
This paper presents a review of the main characteristics of the Quebec Automobile Insurance Plan, with emphasis on both the compensation and the pricing of insurance. After discussing the effects of the introduction of this plan on accidents, estimates of the statistical relationship between drivers' past experience and current probabilities of accident are derived and their use to increase the incentives for road safety is considered
Patient mobility for elective surgical interventions
Patient mobility for elective surgical interventions
Description and Analysis of the Quebec Automobile Insurance Plan
This paper presents a review of the main characteristics of the Quebec Automobile Insurance Plan, with emphasis on both the compensation and the pricing of insurance. After discussing the effects of the introduction of this plan on accidents, estimates of the statistical relationship between drivers' past experience and current probabilities of accident are derived and their use to increase the incentives for road safety is considered
An Empirical Analysis of Moral Hazard and Experience Rating
For many years, economists and actuaries have studied multiperiod insurance contracts independently and differently. The aim of this article is to reduce the gap between empirical studies on the determination of insurance premiums and theoretical studies on moral hazard and experience rating. The first objective is to verify empirically the proposition that past experience is a good predictor of risk by using data from a random sample consisting …
Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard
Two types of moral hazard have been determined. The first type is related to self-prevention activities affecting probabilities of accidents. The second type relates to the agent's activities whenever the accident occurs. The authors' objective consists of presenting an empirical measure of the significance of this second type of moral hazard in the workers' compensation market. The main challenge in isolating moral hazard consists of dividing in…
Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation
With asymmetric information, full commitment to long-term contracts may permit markets to approach first-best allocations. However, commitment can be undermined by opportunistic behavior, notably renegotiation. The authors reexamine commitment in insurance markets. They present an alternative model (which extends Jean-Jaques Laffont and Jean Tirole's procurement model to address uncertainty and competition), which involves semipooling in the firs…
Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent Claims
Insurance fraud is now recognized as a significant resource-allocation problem in many markets. The object of this study is to verify how straight deductible contracts may affect the equilibrium level of falsification in automobile insurance. This type of contract is observed in many markets, even if it is not optimal under costly state falsification. A higher deductible may create incentives to fraud or cheat, particularly when the insured antic…
Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market
New Evidence on the Determinants of Absenteeism Using Linked Employer-Employee Data
This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of absenteeism. The authors extend the typical labor-leisure model used to analyze the decision to skip work to include firm-level policy variables relevant to the absenteeism decision and uncertainty about the cost of absenteeism. Estimates based on data from Statistics Canada's Workplace Employee Survey (1999-2002), with controls for observed and unobserved demographic, job, and firm characte…
Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving
Road safety policies often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations to promote safe driving—for example, fines, experience rating, and point-record driver's licenses. We analyze the effectiveness of these mechanisms in promoting safe driving. We derive their theoretical properties with respect to contract time and accumulated demerit points. These properties are tested empirically with data from the Quebec public insurance plan. We fi…
Featured Cover
The cover image is based on the Research Article Hierarchical random-effects model for the insurance pricing of vehicles belonging to a fleet by Denise Desjardins et al., https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.2949
Hierarchical random‐effects model for the insurance pricing of vehicles belonging to a fleet
We propose a count‐data model with hierarchical random effects for the posterior insurance ratemaking of vehicles belonging to a fleet, by allowing random effects for the fleet, the vehicles, and time. We derive a simple closed‐form ratemaking formula based on a hierarchical random‐effects specification. We estimate the corresponding econometric model and compute insurance premiums according to the past experience of both the vehicle and the flee…
Economics (10 works) · Actuarial science (8 works) · Business (7 works) · Insurance and Financial Risk Management (7 works) · Econometrics (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Automobile insurance (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Healthcare Policy and Management (4 works) · Incentive (4 works)