Sascha Kurz
Biographic Data
| ID | 1456070 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sascha Kurz |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sascha |
| FAMILY NAME | Kurz |
| SIGNATURE | KURZ S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bayreuth |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4597-2041 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Advances in Collective Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives for the 21st Century
Advances in Collective Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives for the 21st Century
Axiomatizations for the Shapley–Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
A note on the growth of the dimension in complete simple games
On the Democratic Weights of Nations
Which voting weights ought to be allocated to single delegates of differently sized groups from a democratic fairness perspective? We operationalize the one person, one vote principle by demanding every individual's influence on collective decisions to be equal a priori. The analysis differs from previous ones by considering intervals of alternatives. New reasons lead to an old conclusion: weights should be proportional to the square root of cons…
Optimal Opinion Control: The Campaign Problem
Opinion dynamics is nowadays a very common field of research. In this article we formulate and then study a novel, namely strategic perspective on such dynamics: There are the usual 'normal' agents that update their opinions, for instance according the well-known bounded confidence mechanism. But, additionally, there is at least one strategic agent. That agent uses opinions as freely selectable strategies to get control on the dynamics: The strat…
Optimal Opinion Control: The Campaign Problem
On minimum integer representations of weighted games
On the Democratic Weights of Nations
Which voting weights ought to be allocated to single delegates of differently sized groups from a democratic fairness perspective? We operationalize the one person, one vote principle by demanding every individual's influence on collective decisions to be equal a priori. The analysis differs from previous ones by considering intervals of alternatives. New reasons lead to an old conclusion: weights should be proportional to the square root of cons…
On minimum integer representations of weighted games
Optimal Opinion Control: The Campaign Problem
On minimum integer representations of weighted games
Optimal Opinion Control: The Campaign Problem
Opinion dynamics is nowadays a very common field of research. In this article we formulate and then study a novel, namely strategic perspective on such dynamics: There are the usual 'normal' agents that update their opinions, for instance according the well-known bounded confidence mechanism. But, additionally, there is at least one strategic agent. That agent uses opinions as freely selectable strategies to get control on the dynamics: The strat…
On the Democratic Weights of Nations
Which voting weights ought to be allocated to single delegates of differently sized groups from a democratic fairness perspective? We operationalize the one person, one vote principle by demanding every individual's influence on collective decisions to be equal a priori. The analysis differs from previous ones by considering intervals of alternatives. New reasons lead to an old conclusion: weights should be proportional to the square root of cons…
Axiomatizations for the Shapley–Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
A note on the growth of the dimension in complete simple games
Advances in Collective Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives for the 21st Century
Advances in Collective Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives for the 21st Century
Game Theory and Applications (5 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Complex Network Analysis Techniques (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence in Games (1 works)