Michael D Whinston
Biographic Data
| ID | 1456123 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael D Whinston |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael D |
| FAMILY NAME | Whinston |
| SIGNATURE | WHINSTON M D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Harvard University Press |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1986 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies
We study merger policy in a dynamic computational model in which firms can reduce costs through investment or through mergers. Firms invest or propose mergers according to the profitability of these strategies. An antitrust authority can block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy for an antitrust authority that cannot commit to its future policy and approves mergers as they are proposed. We find that the optimal policy can differ s…
Dynamic Merger Review
We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority toward horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger may affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, whose characteristics may not yet be known. We identify conditions under which discounted expected consumer surplus is maximized by using a completely myopic merger review policy that ap…
Taking the Dogma out of Econometrics
Without a doubt, there has been a "credibility revolution" in applied econometrics. One contributing development has been in the improvement and increased use in data analysis of "structural methods"; that is, the use of models based in economic theory. Structural modeling attempts to use data to identify the parameters of an underlying economic model, based on models of individual choice or aggregate relations derived from them. Structural estim…
Exclusive Dealing
In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon of exclusive dealing, and we explore the motivations for and effects of its use. For a broad class of models, we characterize the outcome of a contracting game in which manufacturers may employ exclusive dealing provisions in their contracts. We then apply this characterization to a sequence of specialized settings. We demonstrate that exclusionary contractual provi…
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
In many examples of competitive bidding (e.g., government construction contracting) the relevant object is either partially divisible or ill-defined, in contrast to much of the recent theoretical work on auctions. In this paper we consider a more general class of auctions, in which bidders name a “menu” of offers for various possible actions (allocations) available to the auctioneer. We focus upon “first-price” menu auctions under the assumption …
Common Agency
Free Entry and Social Inefficiency
Previous articles have noted the possibility of socially ineficient levels of entry in markets in whichJirms must incurjixed set-up costs upon entry. This article identijies thefundamental and intuitive forces that lie behind these entry biases. If an entrant causes incumbentJirms to reduce output, entry is more desirable to the entrant than it is to society. There is therefore a tendency toward excessive entry in homogeneous product markets. The…
Exclusive Dealing
In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon of exclusive dealing, and we explore the motivations for and effects of its use. For a broad class of models, we characterize the outcome of a contracting game in which manufacturers may employ exclusive dealing provisions in their contracts. We then apply this characterization to a sequence of specialized settings. We demonstrate that exclusionary contractual provi…
Taking the Dogma out of Econometrics
Without a doubt, there has been a "credibility revolution" in applied econometrics. One contributing development has been in the improvement and increased use in data analysis of "structural methods"; that is, the use of models based in economic theory. Structural modeling attempts to use data to identify the parameters of an underlying economic model, based on models of individual choice or aggregate relations derived from them. Structural estim…
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies
We study merger policy in a dynamic computational model in which firms can reduce costs through investment or through mergers. Firms invest or propose mergers according to the profitability of these strategies. An antitrust authority can block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy for an antitrust authority that cannot commit to its future policy and approves mergers as they are proposed. We find that the optimal policy can differ s…
Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
In many examples of competitive bidding (e.g., government construction contracting) the relevant object is either partially divisible or ill-defined, in contrast to much of the recent theoretical work on auctions. In this paper we consider a more general class of auctions, in which bidders name a “menu” of offers for various possible actions (allocations) available to the auctioneer. We focus upon “first-price” menu auctions under the assumption …
Common Agency
Free Entry and Social Inefficiency
Previous articles have noted the possibility of socially ineficient levels of entry in markets in whichJirms must incurjixed set-up costs upon entry. This article identijies thefundamental and intuitive forces that lie behind these entry biases. If an entrant causes incumbentJirms to reduce output, entry is more desirable to the entrant than it is to society. There is therefore a tendency toward excessive entry in homogeneous product markets. The…
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
Exclusive Dealing
In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon of exclusive dealing, and we explore the motivations for and effects of its use. For a broad class of models, we characterize the outcome of a contracting game in which manufacturers may employ exclusive dealing provisions in their contracts. We then apply this characterization to a sequence of specialized settings. We demonstrate that exclusionary contractual provi…
Dynamic Merger Review
We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority toward horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger may affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, whose characteristics may not yet be known. We identify conditions under which discounted expected consumer surplus is maximized by using a completely myopic merger review policy that ap…
Taking the Dogma out of Econometrics
Without a doubt, there has been a "credibility revolution" in applied econometrics. One contributing development has been in the improvement and increased use in data analysis of "structural methods"; that is, the use of models based in economic theory. Structural modeling attempts to use data to identify the parameters of an underlying economic model, based on models of individual choice or aggregate relations derived from them. Structural estim…
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies
We study merger policy in a dynamic computational model in which firms can reduce costs through investment or through mergers. Firms invest or propose mergers according to the profitability of these strategies. An antitrust authority can block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy for an antitrust authority that cannot commit to its future policy and approves mergers as they are proposed. We find that the optimal policy can differ s…
Economics (7 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (4 works) · Business (4 works) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (3 works) · Industrial organization (3 works) · Market economy (3 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (3 works) · Welfare (3 works)