Rafael Treibich
Biographic Data
| ID | 1456405 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rafael Treibich |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rafael |
| FAMILY NAME | Treibich |
| SIGNATURE | TREIBICH R |
| AFFILIATIONS | École Polytechnique |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3000-2010 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
A Model of Repeated Collective Decisions
Optimal Voting Rules Under Participation Constraints
Voting correctly in lab elections with monetary incentives
Whether people make the right choice when they vote for a given candidate or party and what factors affect the capacity to vote correctly have been recurrent questions in the political science literature. This paper contributes to this debate by looking at how the complexity of the electoral context affects voters’ capacity to vote correctly. Correct voting is defined as a vote that maximizes one’s payoffs in lab elections with monetary incentive…
Optimal Apportionment
This paper provides a theoretical foundation that supports the degressive proportionality principle in apportionment problems, such as the allocation of seats in a federal parliament. The utility assigned by an individual to a constitutional rule is a function of the frequency with which each collective decision matches the individual’s own will. The core of the argument is that, if the function is concave, then classical utilitarianism at the so…
Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment
Optimal Apportionment
This paper provides a theoretical foundation that supports the degressive proportionality principle in apportionment problems, such as the allocation of seats in a federal parliament. The utility assigned by an individual to a constitutional rule is a function of the frequency with which each collective decision matches the individual’s own will. The core of the argument is that, if the function is concave, then classical utilitarianism at the so…
Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment
Voting correctly in lab elections with monetary incentives
Whether people make the right choice when they vote for a given candidate or party and what factors affect the capacity to vote correctly have been recurrent questions in the political science literature. This paper contributes to this debate by looking at how the complexity of the electoral context affects voters’ capacity to vote correctly. Correct voting is defined as a vote that maximizes one’s payoffs in lab elections with monetary incentive…
Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment
Optimal Apportionment
This paper provides a theoretical foundation that supports the degressive proportionality principle in apportionment problems, such as the allocation of seats in a federal parliament. The utility assigned by an individual to a constitutional rule is a function of the frequency with which each collective decision matches the individual’s own will. The core of the argument is that, if the function is concave, then classical utilitarianism at the so…
Voting correctly in lab elections with monetary incentives
Whether people make the right choice when they vote for a given candidate or party and what factors affect the capacity to vote correctly have been recurrent questions in the political science literature. This paper contributes to this debate by looking at how the complexity of the electoral context affects voters’ capacity to vote correctly. Correct voting is defined as a vote that maximizes one’s payoffs in lab elections with monetary incentive…
Optimal Voting Rules Under Participation Constraints
A Model of Repeated Collective Decisions
Economics (5 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Apportionment (2 works) · Business (2 works) · Cardinal voting systems (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works)