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David S Scharfstein

Biographic Data

ID1456410
NAMEDavid S Scharfstein
GIVEN NAMESDavid S
FAMILY NAMEScharfstein
SIGNATURESCHARFSTEIN D S
AFFILIATIONSDai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Professor of Management, Sloan School, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS3
TOTAL CITATIONS18
WORKS AS AUTHOR3
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1996
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2010
H-INDEX2
  • The Squam Lake Report

    John H Cochrane, Douglas W Diamond et al.•BOOK•Squam Lake Report•2010

    A nonpartisan plan of action for fixing the global economy from fifteen of the world's leading economists In the fall of 2008, fifteen of the world's leading economists—representing the broadest spectrum of economic opinion—gathered at New Hampshire's Squam Lake. Their goal: the mapping of a long-term plan for financial regulation reform. The Squam Lake Report distills the wealth of insights from the ongoing collaboration that began at these meet…

  • Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and Organizations

    Open Access•Patrick Bolton, David S Scharfstein et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1998•Cited by: 2•References: 30

    Much of the modern research on firm boundaries, following Ronald Coase (1937), assumes that firms are run by owner-managers. This contrasts with the agency literature, following Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means (1932), that emphasizes the problems that arise when managers are not owners. In this paper, the authors argue that a richer theory of the firm should integrate Coase and Berle and Means. They illustrate this point by reexamining the oft-ci…

  • Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors

    Patrick Bolton, David S Scharfstein et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1996•Cited by: 16•References: 4

    Within an optimal contracting framework, the authors analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from. They also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern rule renegotiation of debt contracts. The key to the authors' analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default. Debt structures that lead…

  • Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors

    Patrick Bolton, David S Scharfstein et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1996•Cited by: 16•References: 4

    Within an optimal contracting framework, the authors analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from. They also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern rule renegotiation of debt contracts. The key to the authors' analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default. Debt structures that lead…

  • Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and Organizations

    Open Access•Patrick Bolton, David S Scharfstein et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1998•Cited by: 2•References: 30

    Much of the modern research on firm boundaries, following Ronald Coase (1937), assumes that firms are run by owner-managers. This contrasts with the agency literature, following Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means (1932), that emphasizes the problems that arise when managers are not owners. In this paper, the authors argue that a richer theory of the firm should integrate Coase and Berle and Means. They illustrate this point by reexamining the oft-ci…

  • Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors

    Patrick Bolton, David S Scharfstein et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1996•Cited by: 16•References: 4

    Within an optimal contracting framework, the authors analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from. They also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern rule renegotiation of debt contracts. The key to the authors' analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default. Debt structures that lead…

  • Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and Organizations

    Open Access•Patrick Bolton, David S Scharfstein et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1998•Cited by: 2•References: 30

    Much of the modern research on firm boundaries, following Ronald Coase (1937), assumes that firms are run by owner-managers. This contrasts with the agency literature, following Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means (1932), that emphasizes the problems that arise when managers are not owners. In this paper, the authors argue that a richer theory of the firm should integrate Coase and Berle and Means. They illustrate this point by reexamining the oft-ci…

  • The Squam Lake Report

    John H Cochrane, Douglas W Diamond et al.•BOOK•Squam Lake Report•2010

    A nonpartisan plan of action for fixing the global economy from fifteen of the world's leading economists In the fall of 2008, fifteen of the world's leading economists—representing the broadest spectrum of economic opinion—gathered at New Hampshire's Squam Lake. Their goal: the mapping of a long-term plan for financial regulation reform. The Squam Lake Report distills the wealth of insights from the ongoing collaboration that began at these meet…

Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (3 works) · Business (3 works) · Economics (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Agency cost (1 work) · Coase theorem (1 work) · Corporate Finance and Governance (1 work) · Corporate governance (1 work) · Corporate Insolvency and Governance (1 work)

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