Jørgen Juel Andersen
Biographic Data
| ID | 1456672 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jørgen Juel Andersen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jørgen Juel |
| FAMILY NAME | Andersen |
| SIGNATURE | ANDERSEN J J |
| AFFILIATIONS | BI Norwegian Business School |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 170 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Oil Price Shocks and Conflict Escalation: Onshore versus Offshore
We reconsider the relationship between oil and conflict, focusing on the location of oil resources. In a panel of 132 countries over the period 1962-2009, we show that oil windfalls escalate conflict in onshore-rich countries, while they de-escalate conflict in offshore-rich countries. We use a model to illustrate how these opposite effects can be explained by a fighting capacity mechanism, whereby the government can use offshore oil income to in…
Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts
Do elites capture foreign aid? This paper documents that aid disbursements to highly aid-dependent countries coincide with sharp increases in bank deposits in offshore financial centers known for bank secrecy and private wealth management but not in other financial centers. The estimates are not confounded by contemporaneous shocks—such as civil conflicts, natural disasters, and financial crises—and are robust to instrumenting using predetermined…
The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber–Menaldo Analysis
The claim that oil wealth tends to block democratic transitions has recently been challenged by Haber and Menaldo, who use historical data going back to 1800 and conclude there is no “resource curse.” We revisit their data and models, and show they might be correct for the period before the 1970s, but since about 1980, there has been a pronounced resource curse. We argue that oil wealth only became a hindrance to democratic transitions after the …
Oil and political survival
Costs of taxation and the size of government
Constitutions and the resource curse
The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber–Menaldo Analysis
The claim that oil wealth tends to block democratic transitions has recently been challenged by Haber and Menaldo, who use historical data going back to 1800 and conclude there is no “resource curse.” We revisit their data and models, and show they might be correct for the period before the 1970s, but since about 1980, there has been a pronounced resource curse. We argue that oil wealth only became a hindrance to democratic transitions after the …
Oil and political survival
Constitutions and the resource curse
Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts
Do elites capture foreign aid? This paper documents that aid disbursements to highly aid-dependent countries coincide with sharp increases in bank deposits in offshore financial centers known for bank secrecy and private wealth management but not in other financial centers. The estimates are not confounded by contemporaneous shocks—such as civil conflicts, natural disasters, and financial crises—and are robust to instrumenting using predetermined…
Oil Price Shocks and Conflict Escalation: Onshore versus Offshore
We reconsider the relationship between oil and conflict, focusing on the location of oil resources. In a panel of 132 countries over the period 1962-2009, we show that oil windfalls escalate conflict in onshore-rich countries, while they de-escalate conflict in offshore-rich countries. We use a model to illustrate how these opposite effects can be explained by a fighting capacity mechanism, whereby the government can use offshore oil income to in…
Costs of taxation and the size of government
Constitutions and the resource curse
Oil and political survival
Costs of taxation and the size of government
The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber–Menaldo Analysis
The claim that oil wealth tends to block democratic transitions has recently been challenged by Haber and Menaldo, who use historical data going back to 1800 and conclude there is no “resource curse.” We revisit their data and models, and show they might be correct for the period before the 1970s, but since about 1980, there has been a pronounced resource curse. We argue that oil wealth only became a hindrance to democratic transitions after the …
Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts
Do elites capture foreign aid? This paper documents that aid disbursements to highly aid-dependent countries coincide with sharp increases in bank deposits in offshore financial centers known for bank secrecy and private wealth management but not in other financial centers. The estimates are not confounded by contemporaneous shocks—such as civil conflicts, natural disasters, and financial crises—and are robust to instrumenting using predetermined…
Oil Price Shocks and Conflict Escalation: Onshore versus Offshore
We reconsider the relationship between oil and conflict, focusing on the location of oil resources. In a panel of 132 countries over the period 1962-2009, we show that oil windfalls escalate conflict in onshore-rich countries, while they de-escalate conflict in offshore-rich countries. We use a model to illustrate how these opposite effects can be explained by a fighting capacity mechanism, whereby the government can use offshore oil income to in…
Economics (6 works) · Natural Resources and Economic Development (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Democracy (3 works) · Market economy (3 works) · Natural resource (3 works) · Resource (disambiguation (3 works)