Michael C Jensen
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1456837 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Michael C Jensen |
| PRENOMES | Michael C |
| SOBRENOME | Jensen |
| ASSINATURA | JENSEN M C |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Rochester |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9084-1361 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 10 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 113 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1969 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2020 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Reaching for the stars
Moral Markets
Like nature itself, modern economic life is driven by relentless competition and unbridled selfishness. Or is it? Drawing on converging evidence from neuroscience, social science, biology, law, and philosophy, Moral Markets makes the case that modern market exchange works only because most people, most of the time, act virtuously. Competition and greed are certainly part of economics, but Moral Markets shows how the rules of market exchange have …
Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function
This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in corporate productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. The author argues that because it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a single‐valued objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that, in the absence of externalities and monopoly, soc…
Here there Be Tygers
Scholarly publishing and access to high-quality information may in fact be threatened, rather than improved, by the revolution in communications, particularly in a fully commercial Internet. The effects of the political revolution in Eastern Europe on scholarship and quality publishing are used as a touchstone of the dangers that occur when naïve revolutionaries make swift changes without fully recognizing the impact upon delicately balanced soci…
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
The authors' estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholding, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 changes in shareholder wealth. Although the incentives generated by stock ownership are large relative to pay and dismissal incentives, most CEOs hold trivial fractions of the firms' stock, and ownership levels have declined over the past fifty years. The …
Takeovers
Economists have accumulated considerable evidence and knowledge on the effects of the takeover market. Here, I focus on current aspects of the controversy. My assessment is that the market for corporate control is creating large benefits for shareholders and for the economy as a whole by loosening control over vast amounts of resources and enabling them to move more quickly to their highest-valued use. This is a healthy market in operation, on bo…
Agency Problems and Residual Claims
Rights and Production Functions
It is traditional in the theory of the to define the production opportunity set available to the in terms of its boundary-the maximum attainable set of output quantities for various input quantities, given the state of technology and knowledge. This boundary is the production function of the firm. One of our purposes here is to point up the dependence of suchproduction functions on the structure of property rights and contracting rights within wh…
Theory of the firm
The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
The authors' estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholding, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 changes in shareholder wealth. Although the incentives generated by stock ownership are large relative to pay and dismissal incentives, most CEOs hold trivial fractions of the firms' stock, and ownership levels have declined over the past fifty years. The …
Takeovers
Economists have accumulated considerable evidence and knowledge on the effects of the takeover market. Here, I focus on current aspects of the controversy. My assessment is that the market for corporate control is creating large benefits for shareholders and for the economy as a whole by loosening control over vast amounts of resources and enabling them to move more quickly to their highest-valued use. This is a healthy market in operation, on bo…
Reaching for the stars
The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information
Theory of the firm
Rights and Production Functions
It is traditional in the theory of the to define the production opportunity set available to the in terms of its boundary-the maximum attainable set of output quantities for various input quantities, given the state of technology and knowledge. This boundary is the production function of the firm. One of our purposes here is to point up the dependence of suchproduction functions on the structure of property rights and contracting rights within wh…
Agency Problems and Residual Claims
Takeovers
Economists have accumulated considerable evidence and knowledge on the effects of the takeover market. Here, I focus on current aspects of the controversy. My assessment is that the market for corporate control is creating large benefits for shareholders and for the economy as a whole by loosening control over vast amounts of resources and enabling them to move more quickly to their highest-valued use. This is a healthy market in operation, on bo…
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
The authors' estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholding, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 changes in shareholder wealth. Although the incentives generated by stock ownership are large relative to pay and dismissal incentives, most CEOs hold trivial fractions of the firms' stock, and ownership levels have declined over the past fifty years. The …
Here there Be Tygers
Scholarly publishing and access to high-quality information may in fact be threatened, rather than improved, by the revolution in communications, particularly in a fully commercial Internet. The effects of the political revolution in Eastern Europe on scholarship and quality publishing are used as a touchstone of the dangers that occur when naïve revolutionaries make swift changes without fully recognizing the impact upon delicately balanced soci…
Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function
This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in corporate productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. The author argues that because it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a single‐valued objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that, in the absence of externalities and monopoly, soc…
Moral Markets
Like nature itself, modern economic life is driven by relentless competition and unbridled selfishness. Or is it? Drawing on converging evidence from neuroscience, social science, biology, law, and philosophy, Moral Markets makes the case that modern market exchange works only because most people, most of the time, act virtuously. Competition and greed are certainly part of economics, but Moral Markets shows how the rules of market exchange have …
Reaching for the stars
Economics (9 obras) · Business (8 obras) · Political science (5 obras) · Corporate Finance and Governance (4 obras) · Corporate governance (4 obras) · Finance (3 obras) · Finance (3 obras) · Law (3 obras) · Microeconomics (3 obras) · Shareholder (3 obras)