Barry Nalebuff
Biographic Data
| ID | 1470610 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Barry Nalebuff |
| GIVEN NAMES | Barry |
| FAMILY NAME | Nalebuff |
| SIGNATURE | NALEBUFF B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Assistant Professor of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6290-7009 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 94 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 15 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1983 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Follow the Leader
Using state-by-state voting data for U.S. presidential elections, we observe that voter turnout is a positive function of predicted closeness. To explain the strategic component of political participation, we develop a follow-the-leader model. Political leaders expend effort according to their chance of being pivotal, which depends on the expected closeness of the race (at both state and national levels) and how voters respond to their effort. St…
An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes
Many researchers, following Kenneth Arrow's lead, have concerned themselves with stating various desirable or undesirable criteria and attempting to classify vote-counting systems. This paper moves away from theoretical discussions: the authors illustrate and motivate a variety of alternatives to plurality rule. The authors demonstrate by example how these alternatives, such as min-max majority and single transferable vote, work and where they fa…
Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World
This paper considers the role of reputation and signaling in establishing deterrence. The cost-benefit calculations of rational deterrence are extended to allow for incomplete or imperfect information. The author uses requirements of a sequential equilibrium (and its refinements) to impose consistency restrictions on how strategic players signal a reputation for strength. This provides a way to interpret potentially misleading reputations and off…
Puzzles
This issue of puzzles can only be described as eclectic. The topics of the puzzles range from medical statistics to TV game shows to Las Vegas slot machines to squash to running around in squares. As usual, most puzzle answers are at the back. However, the first and last puzzles are unsolved. I offer a conjecture for one—the right answer could prove quite valuable
Puzzles
This is my ninth and last column of puzzles
Puzzles
This feature begins with three puzzles motivated by the paradox of the “greener envelope,” which was described in detail in the Winter 1989 issue. Following these exchange paradoxes are two longer puzzles, also with answers provided at the end. The longer puzzles focus on externality problems: how to design social conventions and toll systems to minimize inefficient waiting in line. Answers can be found at the end of the problems
Puzzles
The Puzzles feature in this issue is devoted to answering a puzzle that appeared in the Spring 1988 issue: "The Other Person's Envelope is Always Greener." The response to this puzzle was overwhelming. Below, I recap the problem and then discuss the myriad of proposed solutions
Puzzles
As usual, this feature begins with several speed puzzles; answers can be found at the end of the problems. Following is one longer puzzle for which readers are challenged to submit their own answer. The puzzles in this issue focus on everything from diversifying strategies in naval warfare to ordering in restaurants to finding the quickest way around Delhi. The column ends with reader mail, including submitted solutions to Schelling's Poison Pill…
Puzzles
In presenting economic puzzles, I have three goals in mind: some puzzles are chosen to stimulate research; others offer examples that will help undergraduate and graduate teaching; all should provide quality distractions during seminars. This feature begins with reader's comments on the first “Puzzles.” Next are several speed puzzles, with answers provided at the end. Here we have two Fischer Black problems in finance and a dot game from Richard …
Minimal Nuclear Deterrence
This article develops a rational theory of minimal nuclear deterrence: What is the minimal amount of weapons needed to maintain a stable balance of power? By searching for the requirements of minimal nuclear deterrence, we hope to gain a better understanding of how to proceed with arms reduction without compromising the value of deterrence
Puzzles
In presenting economic puzzles, I have three goals in mind: some puzzles are chosen to stimulate research; others offer examples that will help undergraduate and graduate teaching; all should provide quality distractions during seminars. As usual, this feature begins with several speed puzzles; answers can be found at the end of the problems. Following are several longer puzzles, for which readers are challenged to submit their own answers. The p…
Puzzles
Each "Puzzles" will begin with a few speed problems. These puzzles have answers provided in the same issue. Puzzles 1 and 2 will give you a chance to get up to speed. Then, we continue with longer puzzles taken from two very broadly defined categories: strategy puzzles and theory puzzles. Strategy puzzles will give the readers an opportunity to compete against each other in problems of coordination and competition. The third puzzle, a noisy priso…
Puzzles
In presenting economic puzzles, I have three goals in mind: some puzzles are chosen to stimulate research; others offer examples that will help undergraduate and graduate teaching; all should provide quality distractions during seminars. As usual, this feature begins with several speed puzzles, with answers provided at the end of the problems. Following are several longer puzzles, for which readers are challenged to submit their own answers. The …
Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence
The defense of the United States and the defense of Europe ultimately rely on a threat to use nuclear weapons if all else fails. This type of deterrence cannot be based on a cold rational calculation that nuclear retaliation for any attack is assured. Nuclear war is irrational; it would destroy that which we are trying to save. To threaten nuclear war, therefore, is equally irrational. Nuclear deterrence becomes credible only when there exists th…
Prizes and Incentives
This article analyzes the role of competitive compensation schemes (in which pay depends on relative performance) in economies with imperfect information. These compensation schemes have desirable risk, incentive, and flexibility properties; they provide for an automatic adjustment of rewards and incentives in response to common changes in the environment. When environmental uncertainty is large, such schemes are shown to be preferable to individ…
Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World
This paper considers the role of reputation and signaling in establishing deterrence. The cost-benefit calculations of rational deterrence are extended to allow for incomplete or imperfect information. The author uses requirements of a sequential equilibrium (and its refinements) to impose consistency restrictions on how strategic players signal a reputation for strength. This provides a way to interpret potentially misleading reputations and off…
Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence
The defense of the United States and the defense of Europe ultimately rely on a threat to use nuclear weapons if all else fails. This type of deterrence cannot be based on a cold rational calculation that nuclear retaliation for any attack is assured. Nuclear war is irrational; it would destroy that which we are trying to save. To threaten nuclear war, therefore, is equally irrational. Nuclear deterrence becomes credible only when there exists th…
An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes
Many researchers, following Kenneth Arrow's lead, have concerned themselves with stating various desirable or undesirable criteria and attempting to classify vote-counting systems. This paper moves away from theoretical discussions: the authors illustrate and motivate a variety of alternatives to plurality rule. The authors demonstrate by example how these alternatives, such as min-max majority and single transferable vote, work and where they fa…
Minimal Nuclear Deterrence
This article develops a rational theory of minimal nuclear deterrence: What is the minimal amount of weapons needed to maintain a stable balance of power? By searching for the requirements of minimal nuclear deterrence, we hope to gain a better understanding of how to proceed with arms reduction without compromising the value of deterrence
Puzzles
The Puzzles feature in this issue is devoted to answering a puzzle that appeared in the Spring 1988 issue: "The Other Person's Envelope is Always Greener." The response to this puzzle was overwhelming. Below, I recap the problem and then discuss the myriad of proposed solutions
Puzzles
In presenting economic puzzles, I have three goals in mind: some puzzles are chosen to stimulate research; others offer examples that will help undergraduate and graduate teaching; all should provide quality distractions during seminars. As usual, this feature begins with several speed puzzles, with answers provided at the end of the problems. Following are several longer puzzles, for which readers are challenged to submit their own answers. The …
Puzzles
In presenting economic puzzles, I have three goals in mind: some puzzles are chosen to stimulate research; others offer examples that will help undergraduate and graduate teaching; all should provide quality distractions during seminars. As usual, this feature begins with several speed puzzles; answers can be found at the end of the problems. Following are several longer puzzles, for which readers are challenged to submit their own answers. The p…
Prizes and Incentives
This article analyzes the role of competitive compensation schemes (in which pay depends on relative performance) in economies with imperfect information. These compensation schemes have desirable risk, incentive, and flexibility properties; they provide for an automatic adjustment of rewards and incentives in response to common changes in the environment. When environmental uncertainty is large, such schemes are shown to be preferable to individ…
Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence
The defense of the United States and the defense of Europe ultimately rely on a threat to use nuclear weapons if all else fails. This type of deterrence cannot be based on a cold rational calculation that nuclear retaliation for any attack is assured. Nuclear war is irrational; it would destroy that which we are trying to save. To threaten nuclear war, therefore, is equally irrational. Nuclear deterrence becomes credible only when there exists th…
Puzzles
Each "Puzzles" will begin with a few speed problems. These puzzles have answers provided in the same issue. Puzzles 1 and 2 will give you a chance to get up to speed. Then, we continue with longer puzzles taken from two very broadly defined categories: strategy puzzles and theory puzzles. Strategy puzzles will give the readers an opportunity to compete against each other in problems of coordination and competition. The third puzzle, a noisy priso…
Puzzles
In presenting economic puzzles, I have three goals in mind: some puzzles are chosen to stimulate research; others offer examples that will help undergraduate and graduate teaching; all should provide quality distractions during seminars. As usual, this feature begins with several speed puzzles, with answers provided at the end of the problems. Following are several longer puzzles, for which readers are challenged to submit their own answers. The …
Puzzles
As usual, this feature begins with several speed puzzles; answers can be found at the end of the problems. Following is one longer puzzle for which readers are challenged to submit their own answer. The puzzles in this issue focus on everything from diversifying strategies in naval warfare to ordering in restaurants to finding the quickest way around Delhi. The column ends with reader mail, including submitted solutions to Schelling's Poison Pill…
Puzzles
In presenting economic puzzles, I have three goals in mind: some puzzles are chosen to stimulate research; others offer examples that will help undergraduate and graduate teaching; all should provide quality distractions during seminars. This feature begins with reader's comments on the first “Puzzles.” Next are several speed puzzles, with answers provided at the end. Here we have two Fischer Black problems in finance and a dot game from Richard …
Minimal Nuclear Deterrence
This article develops a rational theory of minimal nuclear deterrence: What is the minimal amount of weapons needed to maintain a stable balance of power? By searching for the requirements of minimal nuclear deterrence, we hope to gain a better understanding of how to proceed with arms reduction without compromising the value of deterrence
Puzzles
In presenting economic puzzles, I have three goals in mind: some puzzles are chosen to stimulate research; others offer examples that will help undergraduate and graduate teaching; all should provide quality distractions during seminars. As usual, this feature begins with several speed puzzles; answers can be found at the end of the problems. Following are several longer puzzles, for which readers are challenged to submit their own answers. The p…
Puzzles
This feature begins with three puzzles motivated by the paradox of the “greener envelope,” which was described in detail in the Winter 1989 issue. Following these exchange paradoxes are two longer puzzles, also with answers provided at the end. The longer puzzles focus on externality problems: how to design social conventions and toll systems to minimize inefficient waiting in line. Answers can be found at the end of the problems
Puzzles
The Puzzles feature in this issue is devoted to answering a puzzle that appeared in the Spring 1988 issue: "The Other Person's Envelope is Always Greener." The response to this puzzle was overwhelming. Below, I recap the problem and then discuss the myriad of proposed solutions
Puzzles
This issue of puzzles can only be described as eclectic. The topics of the puzzles range from medical statistics to TV game shows to Las Vegas slot machines to squash to running around in squares. As usual, most puzzle answers are at the back. However, the first and last puzzles are unsolved. I offer a conjecture for one—the right answer could prove quite valuable
Puzzles
This is my ninth and last column of puzzles
Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World
This paper considers the role of reputation and signaling in establishing deterrence. The cost-benefit calculations of rational deterrence are extended to allow for incomplete or imperfect information. The author uses requirements of a sequential equilibrium (and its refinements) to impose consistency restrictions on how strategic players signal a reputation for strength. This provides a way to interpret potentially misleading reputations and off…
An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes
Many researchers, following Kenneth Arrow's lead, have concerned themselves with stating various desirable or undesirable criteria and attempting to classify vote-counting systems. This paper moves away from theoretical discussions: the authors illustrate and motivate a variety of alternatives to plurality rule. The authors demonstrate by example how these alternatives, such as min-max majority and single transferable vote, work and where they fa…
Follow the Leader
Using state-by-state voting data for U.S. presidential elections, we observe that voter turnout is a positive function of predicted closeness. To explain the strategic component of political participation, we develop a follow-the-leader model. Political leaders expend effort according to their chance of being pivotal, which depends on the expected closeness of the race (at both state and national levels) and how voters respond to their effort. St…
Economics (13 works) · Computer Science (11 works) · Political science (10 works) · Law (8 works) · Law and economics (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Game Theory and Applications (4 works)