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David Scharfstein

Biographic Data

ID1470969
NAMEDavid Scharfstein
GIVEN NAMESDavid
FAMILY NAMEScharfstein
SIGNATURESCHARFSTEIN D
AFFILIATIONSNational Bureau of Economic Research
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS6
TOTAL CITATIONS31
AUTHOR COUNT6
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1991
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2013
H-INDEX2
  • The Growth of Finance

    Open Access•Robin Greenwood, David Scharfstein•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2013•Cited by: 13•References: 34

    The US financial services industry grew from 4.9 percent of GDP in 1980 to 7.9 percent of GDP in 2007. A sizeable portion of the growth can be explained by rising asset management fees, which in turn were driven by increases in the valuation of tradable assets, particularly equity. Another important factor was growth in fees associated with an expansion in household credit, particularly fees associated with residential mortgages. This expansion w…

  • The Squam Lake Report

    John H Cochrane, Douglas W Diamond et al.•BOOK•Squam Lake Report•2010

    A nonpartisan plan of action for fixing the global economy from fifteen of the world's leading economists In the fall of 2008, fifteen of the world's leading economists—representing the broadest spectrum of economic opinion—gathered at New Hampshire's Squam Lake. Their goal: the mapping of a long-term plan for financial regulation reform. The Squam Lake Report distills the wealth of insights from the ongoing collaboration that began at these meet…

  • Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

    Open Access•Victoria Ivashina, David Scharfstein•ARTICLE•Journal of Financial Economics•2010

  • Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and Organizations

    Open Access•Patrick Bolton, David S Scharfstein et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1998•Cited by: 2•References: 30

    Much of the modern research on firm boundaries, following Ronald Coase (1937), assumes that firms are run by owner-managers. This contrasts with the agency literature, following Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means (1932), that emphasizes the problems that arise when managers are not owners. In this paper, the authors argue that a richer theory of the firm should integrate Coase and Berle and Means. They illustrate this point by reexamining the oft-ci…

  • Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors

    Patrick Bolton, David S Scharfstein et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1996•Cited by: 16•References: 4

    Within an optimal contracting framework, the authors analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from. They also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern rule renegotiation of debt contracts. The key to the authors' analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default. Debt structures that lead…

  • Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment

    Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap et al.•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1991

    This paper presents evidence suggesting that information and incentive problems in the capital market affect investment. We come to this conclusion by examining two sets of Japanese firms. The first set has close financial ties to large Japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external finance and are likely to be well informed about the firm. The second set of firms has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faces greater problem…

  • Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors

    Patrick Bolton, David S Scharfstein et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1996•Cited by: 16•References: 4

    Within an optimal contracting framework, the authors analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from. They also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern rule renegotiation of debt contracts. The key to the authors' analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default. Debt structures that lead…

  • The Growth of Finance

    Open Access•Robin Greenwood, David Scharfstein•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2013•Cited by: 13•References: 34

    The US financial services industry grew from 4.9 percent of GDP in 1980 to 7.9 percent of GDP in 2007. A sizeable portion of the growth can be explained by rising asset management fees, which in turn were driven by increases in the valuation of tradable assets, particularly equity. Another important factor was growth in fees associated with an expansion in household credit, particularly fees associated with residential mortgages. This expansion w…

  • Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and Organizations

    Open Access•Patrick Bolton, David S Scharfstein et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1998•Cited by: 2•References: 30

    Much of the modern research on firm boundaries, following Ronald Coase (1937), assumes that firms are run by owner-managers. This contrasts with the agency literature, following Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means (1932), that emphasizes the problems that arise when managers are not owners. In this paper, the authors argue that a richer theory of the firm should integrate Coase and Berle and Means. They illustrate this point by reexamining the oft-ci…

  • Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment

    Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap et al.•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1991

    This paper presents evidence suggesting that information and incentive problems in the capital market affect investment. We come to this conclusion by examining two sets of Japanese firms. The first set has close financial ties to large Japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external finance and are likely to be well informed about the firm. The second set of firms has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faces greater problem…

  • Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors

    Patrick Bolton, David S Scharfstein et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1996•Cited by: 16•References: 4

    Within an optimal contracting framework, the authors analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from. They also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern rule renegotiation of debt contracts. The key to the authors' analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default. Debt structures that lead…

  • Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and Organizations

    Open Access•Patrick Bolton, David S Scharfstein et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1998•Cited by: 2•References: 30

    Much of the modern research on firm boundaries, following Ronald Coase (1937), assumes that firms are run by owner-managers. This contrasts with the agency literature, following Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means (1932), that emphasizes the problems that arise when managers are not owners. In this paper, the authors argue that a richer theory of the firm should integrate Coase and Berle and Means. They illustrate this point by reexamining the oft-ci…

  • The Squam Lake Report

    John H Cochrane, Douglas W Diamond et al.•BOOK•Squam Lake Report•2010

    A nonpartisan plan of action for fixing the global economy from fifteen of the world's leading economists In the fall of 2008, fifteen of the world's leading economists—representing the broadest spectrum of economic opinion—gathered at New Hampshire's Squam Lake. Their goal: the mapping of a long-term plan for financial regulation reform. The Squam Lake Report distills the wealth of insights from the ongoing collaboration that began at these meet…

  • Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

    Open Access•Victoria Ivashina, David Scharfstein•ARTICLE•Journal of Financial Economics•2010

  • The Growth of Finance

    Open Access•Robin Greenwood, David Scharfstein•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2013•Cited by: 13•References: 34

    The US financial services industry grew from 4.9 percent of GDP in 1980 to 7.9 percent of GDP in 2007. A sizeable portion of the growth can be explained by rising asset management fees, which in turn were driven by increases in the valuation of tradable assets, particularly equity. Another important factor was growth in fees associated with an expansion in household credit, particularly fees associated with residential mortgages. This expansion w…

Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (6 works) · Business (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Finance (4 works) · Monetary economics (4 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Financial system (3 works) · Creditor (2 works) · Debt (2 works)

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