Robert T Foley
Biographic Data
| ID | 1471879 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Robert T Foley |
| GIVEN NAMES | Robert T |
| FAMILY NAME | Foley |
| SIGNATURE | FOLEY R T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Reader in Defence Studies, King's College London at the Joint Services Command and Staff College. |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 41 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The two-visual-systems hypothesis and the perspectival features of visual experience
Dumb donkeys or cunning foxes? Learning in the British and German armies during the Great War
The idea that the armies of the First World War were incapable of learning is one of the most enduring myths of the conflict. This image of ‘lions led by donkeys’ has proved difficult to modify, despite the sizeable scholarly literature on the tactical, technological and organizational adaptation and innovation undergone by all armies during the war. By examining the British and German armies as learning organizations during the war, this article…
A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916–1918
Using the German Army from 1916 to 1918 as a case study, this article demonstrates a different form of military innovation than has hitherto been analysed by literature on the subject. During World War I, the German Army innovated by spreading knowledge between units rather than up and downthe chain of command. Thus, this army used ‘horizontal innovation’, rather than vertical innovation to change how it fought in the midst of battle. Although co…
Transformation in contact: Learning the Lessons of Modern War
The US and British armies have faced intelligent and adaptive enemies in Iraq and continue to do so in Afghanistan. While both armies have proved adept at fighting high-intensity conflict, their initial performance against asymmetric threats and diffuse insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated how much each army had to learn about conducting counterinsurgency operations. This article examines one important means by which the US and Briti…
What's in a Name: The Development of Strategies of Attrition on the Western Front, 1914–1918
On 26 September 1914, Gerhard Tappen, the operations officer of the German High Command, wrote in his diary: “More and more, it appears that we have before us field fortifications across the entire
The Real Schlieffen Plan
In recent years Terence Zuber has maintained that the document commonly known as the ‘Schlieffen Plan’ was, in fact, no real war plan. This article takes issue with Zuber’s far-ranging conclusions. It examines his use of sources, places German war planning in its wider political context, and considers evidence overlooked by Zuber. It demonstrates how a fundamental shift occurred in Germany’s strategic situation in 1905 and how this shift led to c…
Preparing the German Army for the First World War: The Operational Ideas of Alfred von Schlieffen and Helmuth von Moltke the Younger
(2004). Preparing the German Army for the First World War: The Operational Ideas of Alfred von Schlieffen and Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. War & Society: Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 1-25
The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan
Transformation in contact: Learning the Lessons of Modern War
The US and British armies have faced intelligent and adaptive enemies in Iraq and continue to do so in Afghanistan. While both armies have proved adept at fighting high-intensity conflict, their initial performance against asymmetric threats and diffuse insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated how much each army had to learn about conducting counterinsurgency operations. This article examines one important means by which the US and Briti…
A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916–1918
Using the German Army from 1916 to 1918 as a case study, this article demonstrates a different form of military innovation than has hitherto been analysed by literature on the subject. During World War I, the German Army innovated by spreading knowledge between units rather than up and downthe chain of command. Thus, this army used ‘horizontal innovation’, rather than vertical innovation to change how it fought in the midst of battle. Although co…
Dumb donkeys or cunning foxes? Learning in the British and German armies during the Great War
The idea that the armies of the First World War were incapable of learning is one of the most enduring myths of the conflict. This image of ‘lions led by donkeys’ has proved difficult to modify, despite the sizeable scholarly literature on the tactical, technological and organizational adaptation and innovation undergone by all armies during the war. By examining the British and German armies as learning organizations during the war, this article…
The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan
The Real Schlieffen Plan
In recent years Terence Zuber has maintained that the document commonly known as the ‘Schlieffen Plan’ was, in fact, no real war plan. This article takes issue with Zuber’s far-ranging conclusions. It examines his use of sources, places German war planning in its wider political context, and considers evidence overlooked by Zuber. It demonstrates how a fundamental shift occurred in Germany’s strategic situation in 1905 and how this shift led to c…
The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan
Preparing the German Army for the First World War: The Operational Ideas of Alfred von Schlieffen and Helmuth von Moltke the Younger
(2004). Preparing the German Army for the First World War: The Operational Ideas of Alfred von Schlieffen and Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. War & Society: Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 1-25
The Real Schlieffen Plan
In recent years Terence Zuber has maintained that the document commonly known as the ‘Schlieffen Plan’ was, in fact, no real war plan. This article takes issue with Zuber’s far-ranging conclusions. It examines his use of sources, places German war planning in its wider political context, and considers evidence overlooked by Zuber. It demonstrates how a fundamental shift occurred in Germany’s strategic situation in 1905 and how this shift led to c…
What's in a Name: The Development of Strategies of Attrition on the Western Front, 1914–1918
On 26 September 1914, Gerhard Tappen, the operations officer of the German High Command, wrote in his diary: “More and more, it appears that we have before us field fortifications across the entire
Transformation in contact: Learning the Lessons of Modern War
The US and British armies have faced intelligent and adaptive enemies in Iraq and continue to do so in Afghanistan. While both armies have proved adept at fighting high-intensity conflict, their initial performance against asymmetric threats and diffuse insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated how much each army had to learn about conducting counterinsurgency operations. This article examines one important means by which the US and Briti…
A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916–1918
Using the German Army from 1916 to 1918 as a case study, this article demonstrates a different form of military innovation than has hitherto been analysed by literature on the subject. During World War I, the German Army innovated by spreading knowledge between units rather than up and downthe chain of command. Thus, this army used ‘horizontal innovation’, rather than vertical innovation to change how it fought in the midst of battle. Although co…
Dumb donkeys or cunning foxes? Learning in the British and German armies during the Great War
The idea that the armies of the First World War were incapable of learning is one of the most enduring myths of the conflict. This image of ‘lions led by donkeys’ has proved difficult to modify, despite the sizeable scholarly literature on the tactical, technological and organizational adaptation and innovation undergone by all armies during the war. By examining the British and German armies as learning organizations during the war, this article…
The two-visual-systems hypothesis and the perspectival features of visual experience
Political science (6 works) · History (5 works) · History (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Archaeology (4 works) · German (4 works) · Law (4 works) · World Wars: History, Literature, and Impact (4 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Sociology (3 works)