Ulrike Heuer
Biographic Data
| ID | 1490134 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ulrike Heuer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ulrike |
| FAMILY NAME | Heuer |
| SIGNATURE | HEUER U |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Leeds |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9442-9734 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Owning failure
On some views of responsibility, the core case of actions for which we can be responsible are intentional actions or actions done for reasons. But our ordinary understanding of responsibility is broader: it includes responsibility for at least some failed actions when the failure is unintentional or inadvertent. I propose an account of responsibility for such failings based on the notion of control we have over our actions through skills and abil…
The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons
There is a wide-ranging discussion of two kinds of reasons for attitudes, which are sometimes called the right and wrong kinds of reasons. The distinction, some think, applies to a whole range of different attitudes such as beliefs and intentions, as well as pro-attitudes, e.g. admiration or desire, in similar ways. Explaining it may therefore contribute significantly to understanding the nature of reasons and normativity in general. This chapter…
Luck, Value, and Commitment
This collection comprises 11 essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003). Leading philosophers explore Williams's work on systematic moral theory moral luck, 'internalism', epistemology and intuitionism, and equality.
Promising-Part 1
The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise (the problem of 'bare wrongings'), and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume's famous discussion of the topic. There are two influential accounts of promising, and pr…
Promising - Part 2
The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise (the problem of 'bare wrongings'), and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume's famous discussion of the topic. In part 1, I showed that two main views of promising wh…
Beyond Wrong Reasons
The buck-passing account of value (BPA) is very fertile ground, which has given rise to a number of interpretations and controversies. It has originally been proposed by T.M. Scanlon as an analysis of value: according to it, being good ‘is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons.’1 And also: ‘being valuable is not a …
Explaining Reasons
The buck-passing account of values offers an explanation of the close relation of values and reasons for action: of why it is that the question whether something that is of value provides reasons is not ”open.” Being of value simply is, its defenders claim, a property that something has in virtue of its having other reason-providing properties. The generic idea of buck-passing is that the property of being good or being of value does not provide …
Raz on Values and Reasons
As a preliminary way of delineating two basic alternatives for mapping the relation between reasons and values, let me pose a Euthyphro style question: (1) Is something valuable because we have reason to behave in some way with respect to it? Or: (2) Do we have reason to behave in some way with respect to it because it is valuable? Though helpful for contrasting different approaches, this question is still multiply ambiguous. It may be interprete…
Reasons for Actions and Desires
Erwachsenenbildung in politischen Umbrüchen
Sind Wünsche Handlungsgründe
Desires are often taken to be the basis for all practical reasons. I introduce one of the most powerful arguments to sustain this view: the argument from motivation (sec. 1). In section 2, however, I develop an equally powerful objection to desire-based approaches showing that desires are not suited to accommodate the justificatory role of reasons. The objection suggests that at least one of the premises of the argument from motivation must presu…
Reasons for Actions and Desires
Promising-Part 1
The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise (the problem of 'bare wrongings'), and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume's famous discussion of the topic. There are two influential accounts of promising, and pr…
Erwachsenenbildung in politischen Umbrüchen
Sind Wünsche Handlungsgründe
Desires are often taken to be the basis for all practical reasons. I introduce one of the most powerful arguments to sustain this view: the argument from motivation (sec. 1). In section 2, however, I develop an equally powerful objection to desire-based approaches showing that desires are not suited to accommodate the justificatory role of reasons. The objection suggests that at least one of the premises of the argument from motivation must presu…
Erwachsenenbildung in politischen Umbrüchen
Raz on Values and Reasons
As a preliminary way of delineating two basic alternatives for mapping the relation between reasons and values, let me pose a Euthyphro style question: (1) Is something valuable because we have reason to behave in some way with respect to it? Or: (2) Do we have reason to behave in some way with respect to it because it is valuable? Though helpful for contrasting different approaches, this question is still multiply ambiguous. It may be interprete…
Reasons for Actions and Desires
Explaining Reasons
The buck-passing account of values offers an explanation of the close relation of values and reasons for action: of why it is that the question whether something that is of value provides reasons is not ”open.” Being of value simply is, its defenders claim, a property that something has in virtue of its having other reason-providing properties. The generic idea of buck-passing is that the property of being good or being of value does not provide …
Beyond Wrong Reasons
The buck-passing account of value (BPA) is very fertile ground, which has given rise to a number of interpretations and controversies. It has originally been proposed by T.M. Scanlon as an analysis of value: according to it, being good ‘is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons.’1 And also: ‘being valuable is not a …
Luck, Value, and Commitment
This collection comprises 11 essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003). Leading philosophers explore Williams's work on systematic moral theory moral luck, 'internalism', epistemology and intuitionism, and equality.
Promising-Part 1
The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise (the problem of 'bare wrongings'), and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume's famous discussion of the topic. There are two influential accounts of promising, and pr…
Promising - Part 2
The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise (the problem of 'bare wrongings'), and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume's famous discussion of the topic. In part 1, I showed that two main views of promising wh…
The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons
There is a wide-ranging discussion of two kinds of reasons for attitudes, which are sometimes called the right and wrong kinds of reasons. The distinction, some think, applies to a whole range of different attitudes such as beliefs and intentions, as well as pro-attitudes, e.g. admiration or desire, in similar ways. Explaining it may therefore contribute significantly to understanding the nature of reasons and normativity in general. This chapter…
Owning failure
On some views of responsibility, the core case of actions for which we can be responsible are intentional actions or actions done for reasons. But our ordinary understanding of responsibility is broader: it includes responsibility for at least some failed actions when the failure is unintentional or inadvertent. I propose an account of responsibility for such failings based on the notion of control we have over our actions through skills and abil…
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (7 works) · Free Will and Agency (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (3 works)