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Amy J Sepinwall

Biographic Data

ID1490397
NAMEAmy J Sepinwall
GIVEN NAMESAmy J
FAMILY NAMESepinwall
SIGNATURESEPINWALL A J
AFFILIATIONSCalifornia University of Pennsylvania
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS3
TOTAL CITATIONS2
AUTHOR COUNT3
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2016
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2022
H-INDEX1
  • Shared Guilt among Intimates

    Amy J Sepinwall, Amy Sepinwall•ARTICLE•International Journal of…•2022

    This paper seeks to vindicate a common but philosophically puzzling phenomenon: Sometimes, a person experiences extreme guilt in relation to a wrong that their loved one has committed, even though they are not at fault for that wrong. Guilt in these cases violates a foundational principle in our moral lives – viz., the fault principle. On that principle, one is blameworthy for a wrong only if one is at fault with respect to that wrong. Insofar as…

  • Complicity and hypocrisy

    Open Access•Nicolas Cornell, Amy J Sepinwall et al.•ARTICLE•Politics Philosophy & Economics•2020•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    This article offers a justification for accommodating claims of conscience. The standard justification points to the pain that acting against one’s conscience entails. But that defense cannot make sense of the state’s refusal to accommodate individuals where the law interferes with their deeply meaningful but nonmoral projects. An alternative justification, we argue, arises once one recognizes the connection between conscience and moral address: …

  • Corporate Moral Responsibility

    Open Access•Amy J Sepinwall•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2016•Cited by: 1•References: 63

    This essay provides a critical overview of the debate about corporate moral responsibility (CMR). Parties to the debate address whether corporations are the kinds of entities that can be blamed when they cause unjustified harm. Proponents of CMR argue that corporations satisfy the conditions for moral agency and so they are fit for blame. Their opponents respond that corporations lack one or more of the capacities necessary for moral agency. I re…

  • Complicity and hypocrisy

    Open Access•Nicolas Cornell, Amy J Sepinwall et al.•ARTICLE•Politics Philosophy & Economics•2020•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    This article offers a justification for accommodating claims of conscience. The standard justification points to the pain that acting against one’s conscience entails. But that defense cannot make sense of the state’s refusal to accommodate individuals where the law interferes with their deeply meaningful but nonmoral projects. An alternative justification, we argue, arises once one recognizes the connection between conscience and moral address: …

  • Corporate Moral Responsibility

    Open Access•Amy J Sepinwall•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2016•Cited by: 1•References: 63

    This essay provides a critical overview of the debate about corporate moral responsibility (CMR). Parties to the debate address whether corporations are the kinds of entities that can be blamed when they cause unjustified harm. Proponents of CMR argue that corporations satisfy the conditions for moral agency and so they are fit for blame. Their opponents respond that corporations lack one or more of the capacities necessary for moral agency. I re…

  • Corporate Moral Responsibility

    Open Access•Amy J Sepinwall•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2016•Cited by: 1•References: 63

    This essay provides a critical overview of the debate about corporate moral responsibility (CMR). Parties to the debate address whether corporations are the kinds of entities that can be blamed when they cause unjustified harm. Proponents of CMR argue that corporations satisfy the conditions for moral agency and so they are fit for blame. Their opponents respond that corporations lack one or more of the capacities necessary for moral agency. I re…

  • Complicity and hypocrisy

    Open Access•Nicolas Cornell, Amy J Sepinwall et al.•ARTICLE•Politics Philosophy & Economics•2020•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    This article offers a justification for accommodating claims of conscience. The standard justification points to the pain that acting against one’s conscience entails. But that defense cannot make sense of the state’s refusal to accommodate individuals where the law interferes with their deeply meaningful but nonmoral projects. An alternative justification, we argue, arises once one recognizes the connection between conscience and moral address: …

  • Shared Guilt among Intimates

    Amy J Sepinwall, Amy Sepinwall•ARTICLE•International Journal of…•2022

    This paper seeks to vindicate a common but philosophically puzzling phenomenon: Sometimes, a person experiences extreme guilt in relation to a wrong that their loved one has committed, even though they are not at fault for that wrong. Guilt in these cases violates a foundational principle in our moral lives – viz., the fault principle. On that principle, one is blameworthy for a wrong only if one is at fault with respect to that wrong. Insofar as…

Epistemology (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Blame (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Law (2 works)

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