Netanel Flamer
Biographic Data
| ID | 1493773 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Netanel Flamer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Netanel |
| FAMILY NAME | Flamer |
| SIGNATURE | FLAMER N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Bar-Ilan University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9593-8012 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Asymmetric Battle of Wits
Deception is an important element in many conflicts. However, its role in asymmetric warfare has some unique characteristics. The 35-year-old ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas is a perfect example of asymmetry. Israel is a country with significantly greater and better military, technological, and intelligence capabilities than Hamas, who aspire to reduce these capabilities by striking at Israel’s weak points. Throughout the years of confl…
The neglected war
Between 1985 and 2000, a war took place in southern Lebanon, although until recently, it was rarely recognised as a war in its own right. After withdrawing from Lebanon, Israel established a ‘secur...
Learning the proxy
Hizballah's Intelligence Collection Leading Up to and During the 2006 War With Israel
This study aims to shed light on a phenomenon that has yet to be extensively researched—how a violent nonstate actor builds intelligence-gathering capabilities in preparation for war and how these capabilities are utilized during the conflict. Drawing on sources in four languages, many of which are primary, the research examines how Hizballah developed its intelligence collection capabilities between 2000 and 2006 and how it employed them in the …
Missing the Spoiler
The article examines how Israel related to the threat that Hamas posed to the peace process, both during the talks that led to the signing of the Declaration of Principles (December 1992–September 1993) and then until the signing of the Oslo 2 agreement (September 1995). The Israeli negotiators and leaders were locked into the idea that the PLO would “deal with Hamas” because of its clear interest to do so. During the talks, however, there was no…
‘The enemy teaches us how to operate’
This article explores a new aspect of Hamas’s exploitation of the media: open source intelligence (OSINT). Based mostly on primary sources from within Hamas, the article describes how, through OSINT, Hamas has obtained valuable information for its operations and has successfully learned about various military and civilian aspects of Israel and the Israel Defense Forces in a readily available, simple, and inexpensive manner. The article goes on to…
“An Asymmetric Doubling”
As part of its intelligence warfare against Israel, Hamas made the identification and targeting of collaborators with Israel a top priority. During those years, the Hamas practice was to apply different degrees of detention and torture of those suspected of collaborating. However, in some cases, Hamas chose a different tactic of exploiting collaborators to transform a threat into an opportunity. Hamas turned some collaborators into double agents,…
Projective Psychological Warfare (PPW)
Hamas invests vast resources in propaganda for a number of diverse audiences, harnessing the communications channels it operates on different media platforms. Over the course of the many years of the Israel-Hamas confrontation, the organization has waged psychological warfare and an ongoing propaganda war against Israeli society, seeking to influence Israelis’ perceptions and feelings. However, there is reason to doubt the effectiveness of this a…
Communication covers the media
Hezbollah has been active in the media since its inception. This article seeks to characterize a meeting between two efforts of Hezbollah in this space: publishing information on its behalf on the variety of platforms it operates and collecting information from the Israeli media. As part of the research, approximately 600 articles examined that Hezbollah collected from the Israeli media, translated, and published as part of the Ein ila al-aa'do s…
Offsetting the offset
As the inherently weaker party in an asymmetric conflict with a state, most non-state actors tend to revert to an offsetting strategy to neutralise the adversary’s advantages and exploit its vulnerabilities. To counter this strategy stronger parties might adopt a strategy defined in the article as an ‘Offsetting the Offset Strategy’ (OTOS). By exploring Israel’s OTOS vis-à-vis Hamas during the May 2021 Gaza war, this article illustrates and analy…
Hezbollah and Hamas’s main platforms for recruiting and handling of human sources after 2006
Like any military power, violent non-state actors operate intelligence, including human intelligence (HUMINT), to suit their needs. The article aims to explore the primary methods used by Hezbollah and Hamas in recruiting and handling human sources since the mid-2000s, illustrating each method with several case studies. An examination of these methods may shed light on a significant aspect of the intelligence war waged by Hezbollah and Hamas agai…
Israel approaches the nuclear threshold
The article focuses on the internal debate in the US Administration as Israel Approached and passed the Nuclear threshold in 1968–1969. The article is based on recently released American Defense and State Departments documents and also on Presidential and National Security Advisor documents hitherto unavailable
Offsetting the offset
As the inherently weaker party in an asymmetric conflict with a state, most non-state actors tend to revert to an offsetting strategy to neutralise the adversary’s advantages and exploit its vulnerabilities. To counter this strategy stronger parties might adopt a strategy defined in the article as an ‘Offsetting the Offset Strategy’ (OTOS). By exploring Israel’s OTOS vis-à-vis Hamas during the May 2021 Gaza war, this article illustrates and analy…
Missing the Spoiler
The article examines how Israel related to the threat that Hamas posed to the peace process, both during the talks that led to the signing of the Declaration of Principles (December 1992–September 1993) and then until the signing of the Oslo 2 agreement (September 1995). The Israeli negotiators and leaders were locked into the idea that the PLO would “deal with Hamas” because of its clear interest to do so. During the talks, however, there was no…
Israel approaches the nuclear threshold
The article focuses on the internal debate in the US Administration as Israel Approached and passed the Nuclear threshold in 1968–1969. The article is based on recently released American Defense and State Departments documents and also on Presidential and National Security Advisor documents hitherto unavailable
Offsetting the offset
As the inherently weaker party in an asymmetric conflict with a state, most non-state actors tend to revert to an offsetting strategy to neutralise the adversary’s advantages and exploit its vulnerabilities. To counter this strategy stronger parties might adopt a strategy defined in the article as an ‘Offsetting the Offset Strategy’ (OTOS). By exploring Israel’s OTOS vis-à-vis Hamas during the May 2021 Gaza war, this article illustrates and analy…
Hezbollah and Hamas’s main platforms for recruiting and handling of human sources after 2006
Like any military power, violent non-state actors operate intelligence, including human intelligence (HUMINT), to suit their needs. The article aims to explore the primary methods used by Hezbollah and Hamas in recruiting and handling human sources since the mid-2000s, illustrating each method with several case studies. An examination of these methods may shed light on a significant aspect of the intelligence war waged by Hezbollah and Hamas agai…
‘The enemy teaches us how to operate’
This article explores a new aspect of Hamas’s exploitation of the media: open source intelligence (OSINT). Based mostly on primary sources from within Hamas, the article describes how, through OSINT, Hamas has obtained valuable information for its operations and has successfully learned about various military and civilian aspects of Israel and the Israel Defense Forces in a readily available, simple, and inexpensive manner. The article goes on to…
“An Asymmetric Doubling”
As part of its intelligence warfare against Israel, Hamas made the identification and targeting of collaborators with Israel a top priority. During those years, the Hamas practice was to apply different degrees of detention and torture of those suspected of collaborating. However, in some cases, Hamas chose a different tactic of exploiting collaborators to transform a threat into an opportunity. Hamas turned some collaborators into double agents,…
Projective Psychological Warfare (PPW)
Hamas invests vast resources in propaganda for a number of diverse audiences, harnessing the communications channels it operates on different media platforms. Over the course of the many years of the Israel-Hamas confrontation, the organization has waged psychological warfare and an ongoing propaganda war against Israeli society, seeking to influence Israelis’ perceptions and feelings. However, there is reason to doubt the effectiveness of this a…
Communication covers the media
Hezbollah has been active in the media since its inception. This article seeks to characterize a meeting between two efforts of Hezbollah in this space: publishing information on its behalf on the variety of platforms it operates and collecting information from the Israeli media. As part of the research, approximately 600 articles examined that Hezbollah collected from the Israeli media, translated, and published as part of the Ein ila al-aa'do s…
Missing the Spoiler
The article examines how Israel related to the threat that Hamas posed to the peace process, both during the talks that led to the signing of the Declaration of Principles (December 1992–September 1993) and then until the signing of the Oslo 2 agreement (September 1995). The Israeli negotiators and leaders were locked into the idea that the PLO would “deal with Hamas” because of its clear interest to do so. During the talks, however, there was no…
Learning the proxy
Hizballah's Intelligence Collection Leading Up to and During the 2006 War With Israel
This study aims to shed light on a phenomenon that has yet to be extensively researched—how a violent nonstate actor builds intelligence-gathering capabilities in preparation for war and how these capabilities are utilized during the conflict. Drawing on sources in four languages, many of which are primary, the research examines how Hizballah developed its intelligence collection capabilities between 2000 and 2006 and how it employed them in the …
Asymmetric Battle of Wits
Deception is an important element in many conflicts. However, its role in asymmetric warfare has some unique characteristics. The 35-year-old ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas is a perfect example of asymmetry. Israel is a country with significantly greater and better military, technological, and intelligence capabilities than Hamas, who aspire to reduce these capabilities by striking at Israel’s weak points. Throughout the years of confl…
The neglected war
Between 1985 and 2000, a war took place in southern Lebanon, although until recently, it was rarely recognised as a war in its own right. After withdrawing from Lebanon, Israel established a ‘secur...
Political science (9 works) · Law (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies (6 works) · Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts (6 works) · Computer security (4 works) · Criminology (4 works) · History (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence (4 works)