Gigi Kwik Gronvall
Biographic Data
| ID | 1493862 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gigi Kwik Gronvall |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gigi Kwik |
| FAMILY NAME | Gronvall |
| SIGNATURE | GRONVALL G K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2514-146X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
International Cooperation & Assistance in the Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention
Over the past 50 years, attention has intensified on Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) Article X, which obligates states parties to provide international cooperation and assistance (ICA) and ensure the broadest accessibility of biology for peaceful purposes. In the absence of a treaty protocol and institutional support, Article X's scope of activities and standard for compliance remain up to the interpretation of each state party. The…
Diplomacy disrupted
In 2022, Russia invoked Articles V and VI of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), requesting a formal meeting to discuss, and subsequent investigation of, alleged U.S.-funded biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine. Such allegations have been dismissed as false by scholars and diplomats alike, many of whom have argued that Russia’s actions represented an abuse of BTWC provisions and risked undermining the Convention. However, fe…
BWC confidence-building measures
In the absence of a treaty protocol or verification regime, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) instituted confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a mechanism to increase confidence in compliance by enhancing transparency and mitigating ambiguities regarding states parties’ biological activities. While a promising tool to support treaty compliance, low participation, concerns regarding the completeness and accuracy of CBM submissions…
The Contested Origin of Sars-CoV-2
This article describes what is known about the origin of SARS-CoV-2, with implications for policy, biological research and public-health surveillance. Theories about the origin include a natural emergence; a laboratory accident with a naturally harvested strain; an accident with a naturally harvested strain modified in a laboratory; and the deliberate creation of a biological weapon. While available scientific evidence points to a natural zoonoti…
The SPARS Pandemic 2025-2028
Effective communication about medical countermeasures—including drugs, devices and biologics—is often critical in emergency situations. Such communication, however, does not just happen. It must be planned and prepared for. One mechanism to develop communication strategies is through the use of prospective scenarios, which allow readers the opportunity to rehearse responses while also weighing the implications of their actions. This article descr…
The Scientific Response to Covid-19 and Lessons for Security
While many aspects of the response to the pandemic were wanting, the extraordinary global mobilisation of the scientific community is a source of hope
Red Teaming the Biological Sciences for Deliberate Threats
This article describes the use of “red teaming” to analyze and forecast biological threats to U.S. national security. Red teaming is a method whereby participants adopt an adversarial perspective, and is used to stimulate critical and creative thinking without some of the flaws of other types of threat assessments, including mirror-imaging. Red team analysis is prevalent in the military, security, and commercial realms. There have been widespread…
Analysis of sectoral participation in the development of Joint External Evaluations
The Joint External Evaluation Process (JEE), developed in response to the 2014 Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), is a voluntary, independent process conducted by a team of external evaluators to assess a country’s public health preparedness capabilities under the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) revision. Feedback from the JEE process is intended to aid in the development of national action plans by elucidating weaknesses in curren…
The Security Implications of Synthetic Biology
Advances in synthetic biology hold great promise, but to minimise security threats, national and international regulation will need to keep pace
The Existing Guidance for “Dual‐Use” Research
In considering how to weigh the risks and benefits of synthetic biology, Kaebnick, Gusmano, and Murray pose the question of whether there is scientific research that should not be funded or performed, or if there are potentially dangerous results that should not be widely disseminated. Such questions, they propose, require a new set of rules and norms for knowledge generation—an “ethics of knowledge.” They identify two examples of research that…
Red Teaming the Biological Sciences for Deliberate Threats
This article describes the use of “red teaming” to analyze and forecast biological threats to U.S. national security. Red teaming is a method whereby participants adopt an adversarial perspective, and is used to stimulate critical and creative thinking without some of the flaws of other types of threat assessments, including mirror-imaging. Red team analysis is prevalent in the military, security, and commercial realms. There have been widespread…
The Scientific Response to Covid-19 and Lessons for Security
While many aspects of the response to the pandemic were wanting, the extraordinary global mobilisation of the scientific community is a source of hope
The Existing Guidance for “Dual‐Use” Research
In considering how to weigh the risks and benefits of synthetic biology, Kaebnick, Gusmano, and Murray pose the question of whether there is scientific research that should not be funded or performed, or if there are potentially dangerous results that should not be widely disseminated. Such questions, they propose, require a new set of rules and norms for knowledge generation—an “ethics of knowledge.” They identify two examples of research that…
The Security Implications of Synthetic Biology
Advances in synthetic biology hold great promise, but to minimise security threats, national and international regulation will need to keep pace
Analysis of sectoral participation in the development of Joint External Evaluations
The Joint External Evaluation Process (JEE), developed in response to the 2014 Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), is a voluntary, independent process conducted by a team of external evaluators to assess a country’s public health preparedness capabilities under the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) revision. Feedback from the JEE process is intended to aid in the development of national action plans by elucidating weaknesses in curren…
The SPARS Pandemic 2025-2028
Effective communication about medical countermeasures—including drugs, devices and biologics—is often critical in emergency situations. Such communication, however, does not just happen. It must be planned and prepared for. One mechanism to develop communication strategies is through the use of prospective scenarios, which allow readers the opportunity to rehearse responses while also weighing the implications of their actions. This article descr…
The Scientific Response to Covid-19 and Lessons for Security
While many aspects of the response to the pandemic were wanting, the extraordinary global mobilisation of the scientific community is a source of hope
Red Teaming the Biological Sciences for Deliberate Threats
This article describes the use of “red teaming” to analyze and forecast biological threats to U.S. national security. Red teaming is a method whereby participants adopt an adversarial perspective, and is used to stimulate critical and creative thinking without some of the flaws of other types of threat assessments, including mirror-imaging. Red team analysis is prevalent in the military, security, and commercial realms. There have been widespread…
The Contested Origin of Sars-CoV-2
This article describes what is known about the origin of SARS-CoV-2, with implications for policy, biological research and public-health surveillance. Theories about the origin include a natural emergence; a laboratory accident with a naturally harvested strain; an accident with a naturally harvested strain modified in a laboratory; and the deliberate creation of a biological weapon. While available scientific evidence points to a natural zoonoti…
BWC confidence-building measures
In the absence of a treaty protocol or verification regime, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) instituted confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a mechanism to increase confidence in compliance by enhancing transparency and mitigating ambiguities regarding states parties’ biological activities. While a promising tool to support treaty compliance, low participation, concerns regarding the completeness and accuracy of CBM submissions…
Diplomacy disrupted
In 2022, Russia invoked Articles V and VI of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), requesting a formal meeting to discuss, and subsequent investigation of, alleged U.S.-funded biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine. Such allegations have been dismissed as false by scholars and diplomats alike, many of whom have argued that Russia’s actions represented an abuse of BTWC provisions and risked undermining the Convention. However, fe…
International Cooperation & Assistance in the Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention
Over the past 50 years, attention has intensified on Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) Article X, which obligates states parties to provide international cooperation and assistance (ICA) and ensure the broadest accessibility of biology for peaceful purposes. In the absence of a treaty protocol and institutional support, Article X's scope of activities and standard for compliance remain up to the interpretation of each state party. The…
Political science (7 works) · Medicine (6 works) · Bacillus and Francisella bacterial research (5 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Computer security (3 works) · Engineering (3 works) · Law (3 works) · 2019-20 coronavirus outbreak (2 works) · Biological warfare (2 works)