Nori Katagiri
Biographic Data
| ID | 1494342 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nori Katagiri |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nori |
| FAMILY NAME | Katagiri |
| SIGNATURE | KATAGIRI N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Saint Louis University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4502-0497 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 17 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The rise of offensive cyber and reality of European digital policy
Between cyber retaliation and escalation
I examine how the proportionality principle shapes state responses to a cyberattack. I do so by investigating variation in the effects of the principle of proportionality on the state response. The variation accounts for four types of state response. First, if states respond to a first strike in a proportionate manner, they are in compliance with the principle, and attackers are likely to take it as an indication of willingness to honor the princ…
Advanced persistent threats and the “big four”
The author investigates a range of international hacking groups collectively known as advanced persistent threats (APTs), which have conducted a concentrated number of cyber operations from four authoritarian states – China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea. The author collected data on 112 APTs that operated in 2003-2021 across the globe and analyzed their behavior and state affiliations to conclude that APTs' ties to the "big four" can be explaine…
Artificial Intelligence and Cross-Domain Warfare
In what ways are Artificial Intelligence (AI), cybersecurity, and traditional military conflict are connected? I examine how AI affects the relationship between cyber and military operations that states carry out. The analysis indicates that, while AI is unlikely to become a major cause of cross-domain war in the near future, it is likely to affect its likelihood in two ways. First, AI is likely to cause peacetime change in the balance of cyber a…
Democracy, firms, and cyber punishment
I explore four sets of explanations on what makes it hard for democracies to penalise hackers for their digital actions. My analysis reveals that of the four challenges, two are more compelling than the others. First, scholarship suggests that democracies seek to meet the expectation to comply with international rules of engagement and refrain from aggressive cyberspace behaviour. Second, some argue that democracies face strong challenge from con…
The promise and challenges of launching cyber-military strikes
I investigate three factors that keep countries from adopting the strategy of cross-domain warfare and launching cyber and military operations at the same time. I do so by disentangling the relationship between international law, cybersecurity norms, and the concept of cross-domain operations. My analysis of Japan’s cross-domain vision indicates how difficult it can be for norm-compliant countries to launch cross-domain operations. In Japan’s cas…
Explaining Cyberspace Dynamics in the Covid Era
This article explores new cyberspace developments witnessed in the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID) era and analyzes their significance relative to trajectories of pre-pandemic events. I show how COVID allowed hackers to scale up operational methods, use cryptocurrencies, and launch ransomware attacks and helped to widen resource gaps between states. My analysis also demonstrates that many events that appeared to be distinct at first have turned …
From cyber denial to cyber punishment
I investigate reasons why Japan does not use “active-defense” cyber strategy for the purpose of cyberspace deterrence. I show that the reason has much to do with the passive nature of cyber strategy best characterized as “denial defense,” a strategic posture designed to deny attacks by defensive methods. I offer three reasons for this strategic choice. The first is the way the law works in Japan. The legal system, including the constitution, is t…
Strategic Response to Great Power Decline
Many see American hegemony in decline and wonder what consequences it will bring. One of the major questions facing scholars of international relations and US foreign policy today is what the United States will do to slow, reverse, or minimize the negative consequences of this decline. The Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment helps readers answer that question. In particular, MacDonald and Parent offer a thought-provoking …
Shinzo Abe's Indo-Pacific Strategy
I use IR theories to investigate Japanese foreign policy between 2012 and 2017. I make two arguments. First, I argue that the best theoretical combination to explain Japanese foreign policy under Abe is one of defensive realism and liberalism, with focus on the economic aspects of regional partnerships. Japan has followed a traditional realist approach in security policy, but he has adopted a more activist and broader economic vision in his appro…
Organized insurgency, lethality, and target selection
I examine the relationship between organizational stability, lethality, and target selection, and attack method of Southeast Asian insurgency. I do so by comparing the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), using data of their activities between 1994 and 2015. I make two arguments. First, organizationally unstable insurgency groups tend to see their members increase generate more casualties, while stable groups often experience reducti…
A Critical Assessment of the Asia Rebalance
While the Obama administration’s Asia rebalance strategy received some praise from scholars and practitioners, it generated three problems that caused the USA to overlook many opportunities and neglect vital concerns. First, the strategy left Asia less stable by undermining US relations with China and smaller states in Southeast Asia. Secondly, it weakened America’s influence outside Asia by committing fewer resources. Finally, the rebalance was …
Between Structural Realism and Liberalism
In this article, I argue that Japan's threat perception has evolved in response to the balance of power and perceived intent. Russia, North Korea, and China are all nuclear powers with sizable conventional forces, but the level of threat varies over time, with Japan's response pattern changing from Russia to North Korea to China in recent years. Japan remains a quiet member of the war on terror, but it faces little direct threat from global terro…
Strategy and Grand Strategy for the Future of Asia
Given several possible strategic scenarios for East Asia, I argue that the region is likely to be divided by China’s growing power and the American presence along with its allies. The bipolar system in Asia will be relatively stable, however, because of conventional military balance, nuclear deterrence, and economic interdependence
Suicidal Armies
Why do rebel groups often fight like an army despite the fact that they keep losing most of the time? I examine seven possible answers and find that insurgent forces are likely to use conventional war strategy and be “suicidal” when they receive material aid from outsiders to build up armed forces and fight on terrain that supports large movements, without knowing that such a strategy does not always work, while strong states make interventions t…
Winning hearts and minds to lose control
The strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is considered key to successful counterinsurgency, but it often works at the expense of political control over the course of war. This happens when the strategy requires the counterinsurgent to work with a local nationalist group that takes advantage of its lack of access to civilians. This exposes the counterinsurgent to a dilemma inherent in the strategy; because working with the group is a crucial par…
Containing the Somali insurgency
The international community has struggled to fi nd ways to mitigate the crisis in Somalia today. Research fi nds that British experiences in Somaliland at the turn of the 20th century provide a useful historical lesson. Highlighting some of the most important factors of the Anglo-Somali war of 1899–1920, the author draws four major lessons and applies them to the current war in Somalia. Specifi cally, the international community should provide su…
Artificial Intelligence and Cross-Domain Warfare
In what ways are Artificial Intelligence (AI), cybersecurity, and traditional military conflict are connected? I examine how AI affects the relationship between cyber and military operations that states carry out. The analysis indicates that, while AI is unlikely to become a major cause of cross-domain war in the near future, it is likely to affect its likelihood in two ways. First, AI is likely to cause peacetime change in the balance of cyber a…
Between Structural Realism and Liberalism
In this article, I argue that Japan's threat perception has evolved in response to the balance of power and perceived intent. Russia, North Korea, and China are all nuclear powers with sizable conventional forces, but the level of threat varies over time, with Japan's response pattern changing from Russia to North Korea to China in recent years. Japan remains a quiet member of the war on terror, but it faces little direct threat from global terro…
Shinzo Abe's Indo-Pacific Strategy
I use IR theories to investigate Japanese foreign policy between 2012 and 2017. I make two arguments. First, I argue that the best theoretical combination to explain Japanese foreign policy under Abe is one of defensive realism and liberalism, with focus on the economic aspects of regional partnerships. Japan has followed a traditional realist approach in security policy, but he has adopted a more activist and broader economic vision in his appro…
Advanced persistent threats and the “big four”
The author investigates a range of international hacking groups collectively known as advanced persistent threats (APTs), which have conducted a concentrated number of cyber operations from four authoritarian states – China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea. The author collected data on 112 APTs that operated in 2003-2021 across the globe and analyzed their behavior and state affiliations to conclude that APTs' ties to the "big four" can be explaine…
Explaining Cyberspace Dynamics in the Covid Era
This article explores new cyberspace developments witnessed in the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID) era and analyzes their significance relative to trajectories of pre-pandemic events. I show how COVID allowed hackers to scale up operational methods, use cryptocurrencies, and launch ransomware attacks and helped to widen resource gaps between states. My analysis also demonstrates that many events that appeared to be distinct at first have turned …
Organized insurgency, lethality, and target selection
I examine the relationship between organizational stability, lethality, and target selection, and attack method of Southeast Asian insurgency. I do so by comparing the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), using data of their activities between 1994 and 2015. I make two arguments. First, organizationally unstable insurgency groups tend to see their members increase generate more casualties, while stable groups often experience reducti…
Suicidal Armies
Why do rebel groups often fight like an army despite the fact that they keep losing most of the time? I examine seven possible answers and find that insurgent forces are likely to use conventional war strategy and be “suicidal” when they receive material aid from outsiders to build up armed forces and fight on terrain that supports large movements, without knowing that such a strategy does not always work, while strong states make interventions t…
Winning hearts and minds to lose control
The strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is considered key to successful counterinsurgency, but it often works at the expense of political control over the course of war. This happens when the strategy requires the counterinsurgent to work with a local nationalist group that takes advantage of its lack of access to civilians. This exposes the counterinsurgent to a dilemma inherent in the strategy; because working with the group is a crucial par…
Containing the Somali insurgency
The international community has struggled to fi nd ways to mitigate the crisis in Somalia today. Research fi nds that British experiences in Somaliland at the turn of the 20th century provide a useful historical lesson. Highlighting some of the most important factors of the Anglo-Somali war of 1899–1920, the author draws four major lessons and applies them to the current war in Somalia. Specifi cally, the international community should provide su…
Containing the Somali insurgency
The international community has struggled to fi nd ways to mitigate the crisis in Somalia today. Research fi nds that British experiences in Somaliland at the turn of the 20th century provide a useful historical lesson. Highlighting some of the most important factors of the Anglo-Somali war of 1899–1920, the author draws four major lessons and applies them to the current war in Somalia. Specifi cally, the international community should provide su…
Winning hearts and minds to lose control
The strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is considered key to successful counterinsurgency, but it often works at the expense of political control over the course of war. This happens when the strategy requires the counterinsurgent to work with a local nationalist group that takes advantage of its lack of access to civilians. This exposes the counterinsurgent to a dilemma inherent in the strategy; because working with the group is a crucial par…
Suicidal Armies
Why do rebel groups often fight like an army despite the fact that they keep losing most of the time? I examine seven possible answers and find that insurgent forces are likely to use conventional war strategy and be “suicidal” when they receive material aid from outsiders to build up armed forces and fight on terrain that supports large movements, without knowing that such a strategy does not always work, while strong states make interventions t…
Strategy and Grand Strategy for the Future of Asia
Given several possible strategic scenarios for East Asia, I argue that the region is likely to be divided by China’s growing power and the American presence along with its allies. The bipolar system in Asia will be relatively stable, however, because of conventional military balance, nuclear deterrence, and economic interdependence
A Critical Assessment of the Asia Rebalance
While the Obama administration’s Asia rebalance strategy received some praise from scholars and practitioners, it generated three problems that caused the USA to overlook many opportunities and neglect vital concerns. First, the strategy left Asia less stable by undermining US relations with China and smaller states in Southeast Asia. Secondly, it weakened America’s influence outside Asia by committing fewer resources. Finally, the rebalance was …
Between Structural Realism and Liberalism
In this article, I argue that Japan's threat perception has evolved in response to the balance of power and perceived intent. Russia, North Korea, and China are all nuclear powers with sizable conventional forces, but the level of threat varies over time, with Japan's response pattern changing from Russia to North Korea to China in recent years. Japan remains a quiet member of the war on terror, but it faces little direct threat from global terro…
Shinzo Abe's Indo-Pacific Strategy
I use IR theories to investigate Japanese foreign policy between 2012 and 2017. I make two arguments. First, I argue that the best theoretical combination to explain Japanese foreign policy under Abe is one of defensive realism and liberalism, with focus on the economic aspects of regional partnerships. Japan has followed a traditional realist approach in security policy, but he has adopted a more activist and broader economic vision in his appro…
Organized insurgency, lethality, and target selection
I examine the relationship between organizational stability, lethality, and target selection, and attack method of Southeast Asian insurgency. I do so by comparing the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), using data of their activities between 1994 and 2015. I make two arguments. First, organizationally unstable insurgency groups tend to see their members increase generate more casualties, while stable groups often experience reducti…
Strategic Response to Great Power Decline
Many see American hegemony in decline and wonder what consequences it will bring. One of the major questions facing scholars of international relations and US foreign policy today is what the United States will do to slow, reverse, or minimize the negative consequences of this decline. The Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment helps readers answer that question. In particular, MacDonald and Parent offer a thought-provoking …
From cyber denial to cyber punishment
I investigate reasons why Japan does not use “active-defense” cyber strategy for the purpose of cyberspace deterrence. I show that the reason has much to do with the passive nature of cyber strategy best characterized as “denial defense,” a strategic posture designed to deny attacks by defensive methods. I offer three reasons for this strategic choice. The first is the way the law works in Japan. The legal system, including the constitution, is t…
The promise and challenges of launching cyber-military strikes
I investigate three factors that keep countries from adopting the strategy of cross-domain warfare and launching cyber and military operations at the same time. I do so by disentangling the relationship between international law, cybersecurity norms, and the concept of cross-domain operations. My analysis of Japan’s cross-domain vision indicates how difficult it can be for norm-compliant countries to launch cross-domain operations. In Japan’s cas…
Explaining Cyberspace Dynamics in the Covid Era
This article explores new cyberspace developments witnessed in the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID) era and analyzes their significance relative to trajectories of pre-pandemic events. I show how COVID allowed hackers to scale up operational methods, use cryptocurrencies, and launch ransomware attacks and helped to widen resource gaps between states. My analysis also demonstrates that many events that appeared to be distinct at first have turned …
Artificial Intelligence and Cross-Domain Warfare
In what ways are Artificial Intelligence (AI), cybersecurity, and traditional military conflict are connected? I examine how AI affects the relationship between cyber and military operations that states carry out. The analysis indicates that, while AI is unlikely to become a major cause of cross-domain war in the near future, it is likely to affect its likelihood in two ways. First, AI is likely to cause peacetime change in the balance of cyber a…
Democracy, firms, and cyber punishment
I explore four sets of explanations on what makes it hard for democracies to penalise hackers for their digital actions. My analysis reveals that of the four challenges, two are more compelling than the others. First, scholarship suggests that democracies seek to meet the expectation to comply with international rules of engagement and refrain from aggressive cyberspace behaviour. Second, some argue that democracies face strong challenge from con…
Between cyber retaliation and escalation
I examine how the proportionality principle shapes state responses to a cyberattack. I do so by investigating variation in the effects of the principle of proportionality on the state response. The variation accounts for four types of state response. First, if states respond to a first strike in a proportionate manner, they are in compliance with the principle, and attackers are likely to take it as an indication of willingness to honor the princ…
Advanced persistent threats and the “big four”
The author investigates a range of international hacking groups collectively known as advanced persistent threats (APTs), which have conducted a concentrated number of cyber operations from four authoritarian states – China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea. The author collected data on 112 APTs that operated in 2003-2021 across the globe and analyzed their behavior and state affiliations to conclude that APTs' ties to the "big four" can be explaine…
The rise of offensive cyber and reality of European digital policy
Political science (17 works) · Law (12 works) · Sociology (12 works) · Law (11 works) · Political economy (10 works) · Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies (9 works) · Economics (9 works) · Politics (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Computer security (6 works)